United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
JAMES A. PENHALLEGON, SR., Plaintiff,
ANN KRUEGER, GREY DAVIS, SGT. NET, SGT. CREW CUT, and SIR FINNIE, Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FULL FILING FEE
(DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
PAMELA PEPPER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
plaintiff, who is representing himself, is a prisoner at
Columbia Correctional Institution. He filed this lawsuit
under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that his civil rights
were violated while he was incarcerated at the Kenosha
Correctional Center. This case is before the court for a
decision on the plaintiff’s request to proceed without
prepaying the full filing fee (Dkt. No. 2) and for screening
of his complaint.
to Proceed without Prepaying the Full Filing Fee
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case
because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his
complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. The PLRA allows a court to
give an incarcerated plaintiff the ability to proceed with
his lawsuit without prepaying the case filing fee, as long as
he meets certain conditions. One of those conditions is a
requirement that the plaintiff pay an initial partial filing
fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). Once the plaintiff pays the
initial partial filing fee, the court may allow the plaintiff
to pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time through
deductions from his prisoner account. Id.
April 20, 2016, the court entered an order requiring the
plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $19.70.
Dkt. No. 5. The plaintiff paid that fee on April 29, 2016.
Accordingly, the court grants his request to proceed without
prepaying the full filing fee and allows him to pay the
balance of the $350.00 filing fee over time from his prisoner
account, as described at the end of this order.
of the Plaintiff’s Complaint
requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a).
The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or
malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading
system, the plaintiff must provide a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled to
relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff does not
need to plead specific facts, and his statement need only
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim
is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However,
a complaint that offers “labels and conclusions”
or “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on
its face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint allegations
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts follow
the principles set forth in Twombly. First, they
must “identify pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A plaintiff
must support legal conclusions with factual allegations.
Id. Second, if there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, courts must “assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id.
state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendants: 1) deprived him of
a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States; and 2) acted under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du
Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is
obliged to give the plaintiff’s pro
se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,
” a liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
plaintiff is suing five defendants who are associated with
Kenosha Correctional CDated: Superintendent Ann Krueger,
Captain Grey Davis, Sergeant Net, Sergeant “Crew Cut,
” and “Food Service Supervisor Sir
“Finnie.” Dkt. No. 1 at 6.
plaintiff alleges that on April 12, 2015, he was assaulted by
his cellmate, which resulted in permanent physical and
psychological injuries. Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 5. The plaintiff
states that unnamed staff, officers, and medical staff failed
to give him proper treatment immediately after the assault.
Id. at 7.
plaintiff also states that, prior to the assault, he spoke to
defendants Net, “Crew Cut, ” and
“Finnie” about the issues he was having with his
cellmate and asked if they could move him to a different
cell. Id. at 3. He also submitted two inmate request