United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DAVID J. SHARP, Plaintiff,
STOUGHTON TRAILERS, LLC, Defendant.
OPINION & ORDER
D. PETERSON, District Judge
David J. Sharp brings this employment discrimination suit
against his former employer, defendant Stoughton Trailers,
LLC, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (ADA), and the Wisconsin Fair Employment Act,
Wis.Stat. §§ 111.31-111.395 (WFEA).
defendant has moved to dismiss counts II and III of
plaintiff’s complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 7. The court will grant
defendant’s motion to dismiss count II but will deny
the motion to dismiss count III.
2012, Dr. Jeffery P. Staab diagnosed plaintiff with chronic
subjective dizziness (CSD). Plaintiff took prescribed
medication to treat his symptoms from September 2012 to
September 2013; at that time, doctors started tapering the
medication regimen. Plaintiff’s symptoms were largely
under control at that time.
October 28, 2013, defendant hired plaintiff as a value stream
manager. But in January 2014, plaintiff’s symptoms
resurfaced; he had trouble walking and standing, making it
dangerous for him to drive or to be around moving equipment.
Plaintiff told his supervisor, Dale Einerson, about his CSD
at that time, and Einerson accommodated plaintiff by allowing
him to come into work later on some mornings or to work from
home as needed.
March 4, 2014, plaintiff told his production managers and
Kate Shieldt, defendant’s vice president of human
resources, about his CSD. On March 13, 2014, Robert Wahlin,
defendant’s president, informed plaintiff that Einerson
no longer worked for the company and that Mike Doverspike
would be plaintiff’s new supervisor. Although
Doverspike knew about plaintiff’s CSD, he refused to
continue Einerson’s accommodations. In response,
plaintiff produced a letter from his physician requesting a
flexible schedule to accommodate his CSD. Defendant requested
additional information from plaintiff’s physician.
Plaintiff informed human resources and Doverspike that he
would request an updated letter when his physician returned
obtained a supplemental letter from his physician on April 1,
2014, and he brought it with him to work that day. On his way
to work, Doverspike called plaintiff and told him to report
to his office when he arrived. Plaintiff dropped the letter
at Ms. Shieldt’s desk on his way to Doverspike’s
office. There, plaintiff met with Doverspike and Shieldt, who
promptly terminated plaintiff for alleged performance issues.
Plaintiff did not find another job until September 2015.
filed a complaint with the State of Wisconsin Equal Rights
Division and with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. On June 19, 2015, the EEOC notified plaintiff of
his right to sue. Plaintiff alleges disability discrimination
in violation of the ADA and the WFEA, and intentional
discrimination that entitles plaintiff to punitive damages
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a.
court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s
ADA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, because it
arises under federal law. To the extent that plaintiff has
stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the
WFEA, the court would have supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claim, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),
because that claim is so related to plaintiff’s ADA
claim that it forms part of the same case or controversy.
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the
complaint’s legal sufficiency. To state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, a complaint must provide a
"short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
Rule 8 "does not require ‘detailed factual
allegations, ’ but it demands more than an unadorned,
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). A complaint must contain "more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do[.] . . . Factual allegations must
be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level[.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
moves to dismiss counts II and III of plaintiff’s
complaint. Defendant contends that the WFEA does not provide
a private right of action and that plaintiff cannot maintain
an independent claim for punitive damages pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1981a.
Private right of ...