United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING
FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING HIS COMPLAINT
PAMELA PEPPER United States District Judge
plaintiff, a state prisoner who is representing himself,
filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that
the defendants violated his civil rights while he was housed
at the Wisconsin Resource Center. Dkt. No. 1. He also has
filed a motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the
filing fee (Dkt. No. 2). The court will grant the motion to
proceed without prepaying the filing fee, and will screen the
Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepayment of the Filing
Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to this action because
the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint.
28 U.S.C. §1915. That law allows a court to give an
incarcerated plaintiff the ability to proceed with his
lawsuit without prepaying the civil case filing fee, as long
as he meets certain conditions. On June 27, 2016, the
plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee (Dkt. No. 2). On June 28, 2016,
Magistrate Judge William Duffin (the presiding judge at that
time) ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing
fee of $14.93. Dkt. No. 5. The plaintiff paid the initial
partial filing fee on July 18, 2016. Because the plaintiff
has paid the initial partial filing fee, the court will grant
his motion, and will allow the plaintiff to pay the remainder
of the fee over time as explained at the end of this
Screening the Plaintiff's Complaint
Standard for Screening Complaints
requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a).
The court must dismiss part or all of a complaint if the
plaintiff raises claims that are legally "frivolous or
malicious, " that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, the
plaintiff must provide a "short and plain statement of
the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]"
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A plaintiff does not need to plead
specific facts, and his statement need only "give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint
that offers "labels and conclusions" or
"formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, "that is plausible on
its face." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint allegations
"must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts follow
the principles set forth in Twombly. First, they
must "identify pleadings that, because they are no
more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A plaintiff
must support legal conclusions with factual allegations.
Id. Second, if there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, courts must "assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief." Id.
state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendants: 1) deprived of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States; and 2) acted under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of North Fond
du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court is
obliged to give a pro se plaintiff's
allegations, "however inartfully pleaded, " a
liberal construction. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.
89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 106 (1976)).
Facts Alleged in the Complaint
plaintiff alleges that in November 2015, he refused to take
the medication Geodon. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Geodon (generic name
ziprasidone) is an antipsychotic medication that is used to
treat schizophrenia and the manic symptoms of bipolar
disorder. See www.drugs.com/geodon.html
(last visited July 19, 2016). The plaintiff states that Dr.
Michelle Andrade ordered an injection of Geodon to be
forcefully administered in the event he refused to
voluntarily take the medication. Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.
plaintiff states that RN Charissa Doolittle claimed that she
had a court order giving her the right to extract the
plaintiff from his cell and forcefully administer the drug.
Id. at 3. The plaintiff explains that at the time of
his refusal, a judge recently had ordered only that he take
his medication, but had "purposefully withheld" an
order requiring the medication to be involuntarily
administered should he refuse. Id. at 2, 4. The
plaintiff states that the staff at the Wisconsin Resource
Center knew the contents of the court order. Id. at
4. When the plaintiff demanded to see the court order,
Doolittle presented a "crumpled up piece of scrap paper
from the trash." Id. at 3. The plaintiff states
that PCS Rich Zimkiewicz observed this incident unfold and
"vowed to have [the plaintiff] forcefully medicated if
[he] did not submit" even though he knew no court order
existed. Id. at 3, 4.
plaintiff states that he wrote a Health Service Request,
documenting that he was taking the Geodon under protest to
avoid the physical harm that might occur during a cell
extraction. Id. at 3. The plaintiff states that ...