United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DECISION AND ORDER
RUDOLPH T. RANDA U.S. District Judge.
plaintiff, Frederick Banks, is a pro se prisoner
housed in FCI Butner in North Carolina. He has filed a
complaint alleging violations of his constitutional rights.
The plaintiff has also filed a petition to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee (in forma pauperis).
the Prison Litigation Reform Act, a prisoner may not bring a
civil action or appeal a civil judgment in forma
if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while
incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action
or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed
on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the
prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The plaintiff is barred from
proceeding in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g) because he has accumulated dozens of
"strikes." The plaintiff has been told this many
10, 2016, the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts summarized the plaintiff's litigation
Banks has, while a prisoner, filed numerous cases in federal
district courts throughout the country that have been
dismissed as malicious or frivolous or for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. In 2008, this Court
(Tauro, J.), identified ten such cases and denied his motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis on that ground.
See Banks v. Sutherland, C.A. No. 08-10880-JLT,
Docket No. 3 (D. Mass. May 28, 2008). In 2013, a federal
district court in Ohio identified 205 cases Banks had filed
in federal district courts which had been dismissed at the
pleading stage; of those cases, one third were dismissed
under the three strikes provision of 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g). See Banks v. Valaluka, C.A. 15-01935, 2015
WL 7430077, at *1 & n.1 (N.D Ohio Nov. 18, 2015).
Banks v. Eddy, No. 1:16-cv-10974 (D. Mass. June 10,
inmate with three or more strikes "can use the partial
prepayment option in § 1915(b) only if in the future he
‘is under imminent danger of serious physical
injury.'" Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d
1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996). In order to meet the imminent
danger standard, the threat complained of must be real and
proximate. Ciarpaglini v. Saini, 352 F.3d 328, 330
(7th Cir. 2003). Only "genuine emergencies" qualify
as a basis for circumventing § 1915(g). Lewis v.
Sullivan, 279 F.3d 526, 531 (7th Cir. 2002).
case, the plaintiff is seeking $500, 000, 000.00 from
thirty-six defendants, including eighteen judges, seven
senators, and the president of the United States. He states
that he has been targeted for telepathic surveillance. The
complaint also alleges various events which will occur later
this year, including his arrest by forty FBI agents on August
7, 2016, and court testimony by one of those agents on August
11, 2016. The plaintiff alleges that he has been previously
found to be "paranoid, mentally ill, and delusional . .
. ." (ECF No. 1 at 1.) Without regard to his mental
condition, the allegations in the complaint are clearly
delusional. They do not plausibly allege that the plaintiff
is under imminent danger of serious physical injury even if
he has accurately predicted that he will be arrested by forty
FBI agents on August 7, 2016. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot
proceed in forma pauperis.
he filed an in forma pauperis petition. The Seventh
Circuit requires that litigants who attempt to
"bamboozle" the court - by seeking to proceed
in forma pauperis after they have been informed that
they are barred from doing so - be restricted.
Litigants to whom § 1915(g) applies take heed! An effort
to bamboozle the court by seeking permission to proceed in
forma pauperis after a federal judge has held that §
1915(g) applies to a particular litigant will lead to
immediate terminations of the suit. Moreover, the fee remains
due, and we held in Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429,
436-37 (7th Cir. 1997), that unpaid docket fees incurred by
litigants subjects to § 1915(g) lead straight to an
order forbidding further litigation. Sloan's appeal is
dismissed for failure to pay the appellate filing and docket
fees. Until Sloan has paid in full all outstanding fees and
sanctions in all civil actions he has filed, the clerks of
all courts in this circuit will return unfiled all papers he
tenders. This order does not apply to criminal cases or
petitioners challenging the terms of his confinement, and may
be reexamined in two years under the approach of
Newlin and Support Systems International, Inc.
v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995).
Sloan v. Lesza, 181 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 1999).
on the foregoing, this case will be dismissed, the filing fee
assessed, and the plaintiff restricted until he has paid in
full all outstanding filing fees and sanctions imposed by any
federal court. The restriction imposed by this order does not
restrict the plaintiff from filing a notice of appeal in this
case nor "impede him from making any filings necessary
to protect him from imprisonment or other confinement, but .
. . [it does] not let him file any paper in ...