United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
EARNEST L. JOHNSON, JR., Plaintiff,
WISCONSIN CORRECTIONAL CENTER SYSTEM, DR. EUGENE BURKE, AURORA HEALTH CARE, DR. JOHN DOE, DR. JEFFREY B. SHOVERS, SGT. STEVEN JANUS, STATE OF WISCONSIN CORRECTIONALS, TANYA CHIAPUSIO, and MARIA BEG, Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER
ADELMAN District Judge
Earnest Johnson, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging that defendants violated his civil rights. This
matter comes before me on plaintiff’s second motion to
change payment from $350 to $304.12 (ECF No. 14),
plaintiff’s third motion for appointment of counsel
(ECF No. 15), and for screening of the amended complaint (ECF
to Pay $350”
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) allows
inmates to proceed with their lawsuits in federal court
without pre-paying the $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §
1915. However, this right is only available to a petitioner
who is “unable to pay such fees or give security
therefor.” § 1915(a)(1). Plaintiff was able to pay
the full filing fee at the time the lawsuit was filed, and he
in fact paid the amount. Therefore, his second motion to
change payment $350 to $304.14 (ECF No. 14) will be denied.
of the Amended Complaint
PLRA requires me to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I must dismiss an action or portion thereof if the claims
alleged are “frivolous or malicious, ” fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
state a claim under the federal notice pleading system,
plaintiffs must provide a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not plead specific
facts and need only provide “fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47
(1957)). “Labels and conclusions” or a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” will not do. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
factual content of the complaint must allow me to “draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. Indeed, allegations
must “raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Factual
allegations, when accepted as true, must state a claim that
is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
follow the two step analysis set forth in Twombly to
determine whether a complaint states a claim. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 679. First, I determine whether the
plaintiff’s legal conclusions are supported by factual
allegations. Id. Legal conclusions not supported by
facts “are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Id. Second, I determine whether the
well-pleaded factual allegations “plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.” Id. Pro
se allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,
” are given a liberal construction. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
amended complaint is confusing and a bit difficult to
understand. Plaintiff appears to allege that sometime in
2007, he was injured and was placed in the ICU. (ECF No. 16
at 3). During this time, defendant, Dr. Maria Beg, prescribed
him “blood thinners for life.” (Id.).
About eight months later, plaintiff required knee surgery and
Beg took plaintiff off of the blood thinners in preparation
for the surgery. (Id.). Plaintiff states that Beg
should have placed him back on the blood thinners after the
surgery. (Id.). She failed to do so, and this
failure has caused plaintiff to develop very painful blood
clots in his leg. (Id. at 3, 5).
Dr. Jeffrey Shovers, was the individual who conducted
plaintiff’s knee surgery. (Id. at 3).
Plaintiff states that the knee surgery caused knee swelling
and popping that did not exist prior to surgery.
(Id. at 3). Plaintiff notified Shovers about his
knee troubles. (Id.). He also notified Shovers that
he was suffering substantial leg pain likely caused by blood
clots that developed after being taken off of the blood
thinners. (Id.). Shovers examined plaintiff
post-operation and indicated that he might have “left
something in” plaintiff’s knee and that “he
will have to go back in there.” (Id. at 3-4).
Shovers did not go back to do another surgery on
plaintiff’s knee, and he also did not place plaintiff
back on blood thinners to alleviate his leg pain.
notified Nurse Tanya Chiapusio about leg pain likely caused
by blood clots that developed after being taken off of the
blood thinners. (Id. at 4.). By this time, plaintiff
also suffered “internal bleeding” from being
taken off of the blood thinners. (Id.). Chiapusio
also refused to place plaintiff back on the blood thinners.
(Id.). Instead, she accused plaintiff of having leg
pain because he was not taking Warfarin, the medicine he was
prescribed after his knee surgery. (Id.).
later, plaintiff was transferred to Chippewa Valley
Correctional Center where he was given an ultrasound and was
indeed diagnosed with “new and old blood clots”
in his leg. (Id. at 4-5). Plaintiff was put back on
blood thinners at this time to help with the blood clots.
(Id.) Plaintiff was then transferred to Kenosha
Correctional Center where Dr. Eugene Burke took the plaintiff
off of the blood thinners because plaintiff was still taking