United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
ADELMAN District Judge
March 24, 2011, I sentenced defendant Tyrone Malone to 77
months in prison followed by 4 years of supervised release on
his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more
of cocaine base and 5 kilograms or more of cocaine. Defendant
completed the prison sentence and commenced supervision on
May 23, 2014. On October 12, 2016, defendant filed a motion
for early termination of supervised release. I directed the
government to respond and allowed defendant to reply. I now
deny the motion.
to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(1), the court may grant early
termination if: (1) the defendant has completed at least one
year of supervision; (2) the government has been given notice
and an opportunity to be heard; and (3) the court finds that
termination is in the interest of justice based on the
defendant's conduct and the pertinent sentencing factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). E.g., United
States v. Smith, No. 09-CR-20, 2016 BL 43385, at *1
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2016). The first two criteria are met in
this case; the issue is whether termination would be in the
interest of justice.
district court has wide discretion in determining whether to
terminate an individual's term of supervised
release.” United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766,
771 (7th Cir. 2006). The court must consider the
applicable § 3553(a) factors, although it need not make
explicit findings as to each one. United States v.
Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 2011). In
considering the defendant's conduct on supervision,
courts have generally required more than mere compliance
before granting early termination. E.g., Folks
v. United States, 733 F.Supp.2d 649, 652 (M.D. N.C. 2010
(collecting cases). Courts have tended to grant such relief
in cases where the defendant's behavior has been
exceptionally good, where supervision hinders rather than
fosters the defendant's rehabilitation, or where some new
or unforeseen circumstance otherwise supports a reduction of
the original supervision term. See, e.g., United
States v. White, No. 06-CR-50, 2012 BL 275841, at *2
(E.D. Wis. Oct. 19, 2012) (collecting cases); United
States v. O'Hara, No. 00-CR-170, 2011 BL 458029, at
*3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 16, 2011) (collecting cases).
defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that early
termination is warranted. White, 2012 BL 275841, at
*2 (citing United States v. Weber, 451 F.3d 552, 559
n.9 (9th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Weintraub, 371 F.Supp.2d 164, 167 (D. Conn. 2005);
United States v. McKay, 352 F.Supp.2d 359, 361 (E.D.
N.Y. 2005)). The court need not hold a hearing before denying
such a motion. United States v. Curry, No.
09-30026-DRH, 2016 BL 269382, at *1-2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 18,
2016) (citing United States v. Nonahal, 338 F.3d
668, 671 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Reagan, 162 Fed.Appx. 912, 913 (11th Cir.
bases his request on his employment, providing a letter from
his employer praising his character; his acceptance into a
CDL driving course, which may lead to employment as an
over-the-road truck driver; and his involvement in the
community, including volunteer work for the Urban League and
a speaking engagement at a stop the violence rally. He
further indicates that he is up to date on child support
payments, has become a care-giver for his mother, and plans
on re-enrolling in college to complete his associates degree
in human resources. He also attaches certificates he earned
are commendable accomplishments. However, defendant overlooks
the serious compliance issues he had earlier in the
supervision term. As the supervising probation officer
indicated in a report to the court dated September 24, 2015,
defendant committed several violations related to illegal
drug use. Between June 2014 and April 2015, defendant
submitted several random urinalysis tests, all of which were
negative for illicit substances. However, on April 22, 2015,
he tested positive for THC and subsequently admitted using
marijuana. At that time, he vehemently denied the need or
desire for substance abuse counseling. Nevertheless, he
continued to test positive: on May 20, 2015, June 5, 2015,
June 22, 2015, July 9, 2015, July 22, 2015, and August 5,
2015. He indicated that he began using because he had been
removed from random urinalysis testing, and that he felt
entitled to use because he was employed and
stable. Defendant further violated his conditions
by missing a urinalysis test on December 8, 2014, receiving a
traffic citation on February 27, 2015, and failing to notify
his supervising officer of changes to his residence on July
6, 2015. Despite these violations, the probation officer
recommended no action at that time, as the most recent drug
test was negative, defendant had maintained a stable
residence, remained employed, and accomplished a couple of
goals while on supervised release. I agreed and allowed
supervision to continue.
defendant indicates in his reply, he has avoided further
violations since the September 2015 report. Nevertheless,
based on the earlier violations, I cannot conclude that
defendant's conduct on supervision, overall, has been
exceptionally good. Defendant indicates that, if he becomes a
truck driver, travel restrictions would hinder his work.
Interference with employment or other positive endeavors can
be a reason for terminating supervision, but defendant has
not yet completed the course and obtained employment as a
driver, so his concern is premature; because the probation
officer may grant permission for out of district travel, the
concern is also speculative. See White, 2012 BL
275841, at *3 (rejecting as speculative argument that
supervision would interfere with work as a CDL truck driver).
Defendant provides no other grounds for concluding that the
original supervision term should be shortened.
of the § 3553(a) factors also supports denial. Defendant
has a substantial prior record, including convictions for
retail theft in 1988, possession with intent to deliver
cocaine in 1989, disorderly conduct in 1992, obstructing an
officer in 1993, possession of cocaine and marijuana in 1993,
resisting/obstructing and operating after revocation in 1995,
bail jumping in 1997, and marijuana possession in 1997 and
2007. He was on probation for the 2007 marijuana case when he
committed the instant offense, leading to revocation. The
original pre-sentence report also documented issues with
marijuana abuse, which continued during the instant
supervision term. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
Given these issues, continued supervision is warranted to
deter further violations of law, § 3553(a)(2)(B), to
protect the public, § 3553(a)(2)(C), and to ensure that
defendant avoids further illegal drug use, §
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion (R. ...