United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
OPINION AND ORDER
STEPHEN L. CROCKER Magistrate Judge.
Charles Sheppard is proceeding in this case on claims that
defendants Sergeant Bloyer and Officer McCollough violated
his rights under the Eighth Amendment by ignoring his threats
of self-harm. In the March 14, 2016, I dismissed several
other defendants from the case because plaintiff's
allegations did not support an inference that these
defendants were personally involved in any violation of his
has filed two motions: First, plaintiff seeks reconsideration
of his request for assistance of counsel, as well as
reconsideration of the dismissal of several supervisory
defendants. See dkt. 22. Second, plaintiff seeks
sanctions, alleging various discovery violations as well as
retaliation against him by prison officials. See
dkt. 23. For the reasons below, I am denying both motions,
but am ordering defendants to provide further response to
some of the allegations plaintiff makes in connection with
his motion for sanctions.
Motion for Reconsideration.
argues that he should have been permitted to proceed with
claims that Warden Boughton, Secretary Wall, Security
Director Sweeney and ICE Ellen Ray failed to properly train
and supervise Bloyer and McCollough in suicide prevention. He
says that he has evidence that the job descriptions of these
officials include insuring that all prison staff are properly
trained in suicide prevention and that these defendants
should have known that Bloyer and McCollough were not
properly trained. He further argues that he has evidence
showing that McCollough and Bloyer have attended only three
suicide prevention training sessions since 2007.
denying plaintiff's request to resurrect his claims
against these defendants. As I explained previously, a
supervisor may be liable under § 1983 only if he or she
is “personally responsible for the deprivation of the
constitutional right.” Chavez v. Illinois State
Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561
(7th Cir. 1995)). This means that the supervisor
must “know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve
it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they
might see[.]” Matthews v. City of East St.
Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012).
Additionally, a supervisor may be liable for flawed policies
or deficient training, over which the supervisor had control,
if the policies or training amount to deliberate indifference
to the rights of persons affected by the policies or
inadequate training. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
allegations do not permit an inference that Boughton, Wall,
Sweeney or Ray approved, condoned, or turned a blind eye to
Bloyer's or McCollough's treatment of plaintiff, or
that they would even have had an opportunity to learn about
plaintiff's situation and intervene during the relevant
time period. Moreover, plaintiff has not alleged any specific
facts implying that these defendants knew or should have
known that the suicide prevention training Bloyer and
McCollough had received was so inadequate that it could
result in inmates being deliberately ignored or encouraged to
harm themselves. Here, plaintiff has alleged that Bloyer and
McCollough deliberately ignored his requests for help and
told him that they “did not give a fuck” whether
he harmed himself. But plaintiff has offered no basis to
infer that any of the supervisory defendants should have
known that the three suicide-prevention training sessions
attended by Bloyer and McCollough-or conversely, their
failure to attend more sessions-likely would result in these
officers acting in such a callous way. Rather, the only
reasonable inference from plaintiff's allegations is that
Bloyer and McCollough ignored his requests for help
despite the training they had received, and that no
additional training would have caused them to respond more
appropriately. Accordingly, plaintiff's request for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the supervisory
defendants is denied.
Motion for Assistance in Recruiting Counsel.
also asks that I reconsider whether to provide him with
assistance in recruiting counsel. He states that he needs
counsel so that he can review confidential training materials
relevant to his claims. However, plaintiff provides little
explanation (1) what confidential training materials he
needs; (2) why he needs them; and (3) why he cannot review
those materials without counsel. It may be that plaintiff
needs certain materials and that defendants are denying him
access. However, such concerns would be more appropriately
raised in a motion to compel or other request for help with
discovery, rather than in a motion for assistance in
recruiting counsel. Because I am not persuaded that plaintiff
needs assistance of counsel at this stage, I am denying his
renewed request for counsel for the reasons I have already
provided in previous orders.
Motion for Sanctions.
plaintiff has filed a motion for sanctions. He states that:
defendant Bloyer failed to timely respond to his request for
defendant has failed to provide documents related to a prison
investigation that plaintiff requested during discovery;
Bloyer has retaliated against him by denying him library time
and putting him in segregation ...