United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING
FEE (DKT. NO. 2), GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
ACCESS TO RELEASE ACCOUNT (DKT. NO. 8), AND DISMISSING THE
PAMELA PEPPER United States District Judge.
plaintiff, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing
himself, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 alleging that the defendants violated his Eighth
Amendment rights when they prescribed him medication that
caused him to murder his girlfriend. Dkt. No. 1. This order
resolves the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed
without prepayment of the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and his
motion for access to his release account, dkt. no. 8, and
screens the plaintiff's complaint.
IN FORMA PAUPERIS STATUS
Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to this action because
the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint.
28 U.S.C. §1915. The law allows a court to give an
incarcerated plaintiff the ability to proceed with his
lawsuit without pre-paying the civil case-filing fee, as long
as he meets certain conditions. Id. One of those
conditions is a requirement that the plaintiff pay an initial
partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). Once the
plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the court may
allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350 filing fee
over time, through deductions from his prisoner account.
19, 2016, the court assessed an initial partial filing fee of
$28.34. Dkt. No. 6. The plaintiff paid that amount through
two payments received on August 1, 2016 and August 23, 2016.
Therefore, the court will grant the plaintiff's motion
for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filling fee,
and will allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the
$350.00 filing fee over time from his prisoner account, as
described at the end of this order.
SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT
Standard for Screening Complaints
Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to
screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court may
dismiss a compliant, or part of it, if the claims alleged are
“frivolous or malicious, ” fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, the
plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not plead specific
facts, and need only provide “fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
“Labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will
not do. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
factual content of the complaint must allow the court to
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Indeed, allegations must “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Factual allegations, when accepted as true, must state a
claim that is “plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
courts follow the two-step analysis set forth in
Twombly to determine whether a complaint states a
claim. Id. at 679. First, the court determines
whether the plaintiff's legal conclusions are supported
by factual allegations. Id. Legal conclusions not
supported by facts “are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Id. Second, the court determines
whether the well-pleaded factual allegations “plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
The court gives pro se allegations, “however
inartfully pleaded, ” a liberal construction. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Facts Alleged in the Complaint
Edgar Jackson is a psychiatrist employed by Relevance
Counseling Services (“RCS”) in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin. Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 6. On July 9, 2012, the
plaintiff's girlfriend introduced the plaintiff to
Jackson because Jackson was their son's doctor.
Id. After meeting with the plaintiff for only five
minutes, Jackson prescribed the plaintiff one-milligram
tablets of Xanax/Alprazolam and Lamicatal. Id.,
¶¶ 6, 10. Jackson instructed the plaintiff to take
this tablet three times a day, for a total of three
milligrams per day. Id., ¶ 12.
plaintiff states, “Dr. Edgar B. Jackson was unaware of
the legal medical dose a person was allowed to intake into
their system as a 1st time patient.”
Id., ¶ 9. He states that Jackson should have
prescribed the plaintiff only .025-.05 milligram tablets,
three times a day, for a total of 0.75-1.5 milligrams per
day. Id., ¶¶ 10, 12. Jackson also did not
inform the plaintiff of any of the side effects of the drugs,
including “speaking incoherently, state of confusion,
hallucinating, impaired ...