United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (DKT. NO. 55);
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (DKT. NO. 60);
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY (DKT. NO. 63);
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (DKT. NO. 65);
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SERVICE UNDER RULE 4
(DKT. NO. 69); GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR EXTENSION
OF DISCOVERY (DKT. NO. 70); DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RELIEF AND TO STRIKE THE MAY 13, 2016 DEPOSITION (DKT.
NO. 71); GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF
TIME (DKT. NO. 73); GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
WITHDRAW EXHIBITS (DKT. NO. 77); DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND AND SUPPLEMENT PLEADINGS (DKT. NO. 78);
DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION
(DKT. NO. 79); DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE
ORDER (DKT. NO. 81); DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
APPOINT COUNSEL (DKT. NO. 82); DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SERVICE UNDER RULE 4 (DKT.
NO. 90); DENYING PLAINTIFF'S THIRD MOTION TO APPOINT
COUNSEL (DKT. NO. 91); DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATE CASES (DKT. NO. 94); DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 95); DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT (DKT.
NO. 101); DENYING AS MOOT PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE EXCESS PAGES (DKT. NO. 102); DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO ADD PARTIES (DKT. NO. 104); AND DEFERRING RULING ON
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DKT. NO.
PAMELA PEPPER United States District Judge
September 2015, this court screened the plaintiff's
complaint. Dkt. No.10. The court concluded that the plaintiff
could proceed against six defendants (two of whom were, at
the time, Doe defendants) on Fourteenth Amendment due process
claims relating to a disciplinary complaint, alleged
harassment, medical care and conditions of confinement. The
court also ruled that the plaintiff could proceed against two
defendants on a First Amendment retaliation claim.
the defendants answered the complaint. Dkt. Nos. 22 (William
Coe); 26 (defendants Friend, Hernandez and Isferding); 47
(James Olstinske). The marshal's service mailed the
summons and complaint to defendant Ortiz on October 9, 2015;
defendant Ortiz had not returned that waiver by November 11,
2015. Dkt. No. 36. To date, defendant Ortiz has not answered
February 16, 2016, the court issued a scheduling order. Dkt.
No. 50. It ordered the parties to complete all discovery by
May 13, 2016. Dispositive motions were due June 14, 2016
(oppositions were due within thirty days). Id.
the court issued its scheduling order, this case has
deteriorated considerably. That deterioration is due, in no
small part, to the fact that that over the last ten months,
the parties have filed twenty-one motions; the court has not
ruled on one of them. The court's delay in ruling on
these motions has created a cascade effect-had it ruled on
the plaintiff's motion asking the court to serve a
missing defendant, for example, all of the parties would have
been joined to the suit by now. Had the court processed the
defendants' motion for sanctions, for example, its
attention to that motion likely would have prevented a number
of other motions from being filed. The responsibility for
these delays lies with this court. While today's order
does not repair the damage done in its entirety, the court
hopes that it will assist in setting the case back on a
forward path, and will prevent further damage from occurring.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (DKT. NO. 55)
April 25, 2016-not quite three weeks before discovery was
scheduled to close-the plaintiff filed a motion “asking
the court to order & compel the defendants & their
attorney to produce” a series of documents. Dkt. No.
55. The plaintiff indicated that he had personally mailed to
the defendants “and their attorney” a discovery
request three times. Id. The motion is three pages
long, and lists certain classes of documents: all of the
disciplinary reports written about him during a certain time
period; all written complaints he'd submitted during that
time period; all summaries of disciplinary hearings regarding
the plaintiff-no time period specified; an “exact
copy” of “the CHC medical contract that was in
effect at the Racine County Jail” during the relevant
time; all investigation reports during the relevant time; the
RCJ's intake procedures and procedures for medical
screening; classification procedures for the relevant time;
all separation orders relating to him. Id. at 1-2.
He then asks “for readable in their entirety
‘inmate request for medical attention request filled
out by the plaintiff indicating plaintiff's medical
request and medical staff or security staff responses
plaintiff ask for the following request.” Id.
at 2. He then lists 93 dates, with notations after each date
(which he indicated stood for “responded to” or
“not responded to.” Id. at 2-3.
Friend, Hernandez and Ortiz responded on May 10, 2016. Dkt.
No. 57. They indicated that they hadn't received the
plaintiff's requests until March 28, 2016, and that
they'd served their response (including 598 pages of
responsive documents) on April 27, 2016. Id. at 1-2.
The defendants also pointed out that the plaintiff had failed
to comply with the “meet-and-confer” requirements
of Civil Local Rule 37, and noted that the court already had
reminded the plaintiff once about this requirement.
Id. at 2.
defendants' response indicates that they have responded
to the plaintiff's March 2016 discovery requests. The
defendants also are correct that in its February 10, 2016
order, the court explained to the plaintiff that before he
could file a motion to compel discovery, he had an obligation
to meet and confer in good faith with the defendants. Dkt.
No. 45 at 2. Sending the same discovery demand three times
does not constitute meeting and conferring in good faith.
While the plaintiff cannot pick up the phone and call defense
counsel, he can write and ask if there is any additional
information counsel needs, or whether counsel could explain
to him why he had not received the documents he requested.
The plaintiff presented no evidence that he had done that.
The court will deny this motion.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL (DKT. NO. 60)
court received the defendants' response to the first
motion to compel on May 10, 2016. Dkt. No. 57. On that same
day, the court received a second motion to compel from the
plaintiff. Dkt. No. 60. In this one, he asked the court to
order the defendants to produce a video from July 2, 2014,
recording an hour that he was out of his cell. He also asked
for the RCJ's employee rule book; psychological stress
evaluation reports for defendants Hernandez, Isferding and
Friend; employee discipline records for those three
defendants and Carrie Bellows (whom the court dismissed from
the lawsuit on September 22, 2015), William Coe and James
Olstinske; and a print-out of the plaintiff's trust
account during the relevant time. Id. at 1-3.
Hernandez and Isferding responded. Dkt. No. 61. While terse,
the defendants' response implies that the plaintiff had
not yet served these discovery demands on the defendants.
Id. at 1 (“Insofar as Plaintiff actually
intended to serve a request for production of documents
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 34, Defendants will respond in
motion, the plaintiff did not indicate that he had served the
defendants with these discovery requests. And again, he did
not attach to the motion any certification that he had met
and conferred in good faith with the defendants; in other
words, he did not comply with Local Rule 37. Finally, the
court received this motion on May 10, 2016-three days before
the deadline for completing discovery, giving the defendants
only three days to respond. The court will deny this motion.
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STAY (DKT. NO. 63)
court received this motion from the plaintiff almost two
weeks after the deadline for completing discovery had passed.
Dkt. No. 63. In the last couple of paragraphs of the motion,
the plaintiff asked the court to stay all proceedings until
it had ruled on the above two motions to compel. Id.
But at the beginning of the motion, the plaintiff stated that
the defendants were “slated to file a motion pertaining
to a direct answer to a deposition question that was asked in
bad faith.” Id.
point, the court had not received any motions from the
defendants about anything-depositions or otherwise. The court
did not stay the proceedings at the time the plaintiff asked
it to. The court generally does not “stay”
proceedings unless there is something going on outside of the
case- for example, a case pending in state court that must be
resolved before the federal case can proceed-whose resolution
might impact the federal case. The court does grant
extensions of time for completing discovery and filing
motions, when a party asks and there is good cause. The court
will not grant the plaintiff's motion to stay
proceedings, but it will address extending deadlines at the
end of this order.
court also notes that in the last sentence of his motion, the
plaintiff stated that one of the motions he wanted the court
to rule on was a “motion filed by plaintiff stating
this case was agreed to be heard by a magistrate.”
Id. The plaintiff never filed such a motion. But the
record does show that he consented to a magistrate
judge hearing this case. What it does not show is whether all
of the defendants have consented.
the plaintiff filed his complaint, he filed a completed
“Consent to Proceed Before a U.S. Magistrate
Judge.” Dkt. No. 6. At that time, the assigned
magistrate judge was Judge Aaron E. Goodstein. The plaintiff
refused to consent to Judge Goodstein hearing his case.
Id. For that reason, the case was assigned to a
district court judge-Judge Rudolph T. Randa. The case was
reassigned to Judge Pepper on December 29, 2014, after she
was appointed to the district court. Months later, in
September 2015, Judge Goodstein went on recall status (a sort
of semi-retirement), and all of the cases to which he'd
been assigned were assigned to other magistrate judges. The
plaintiff's case was assigned to Judge Nancy Joseph.
Under this district's policy, the clerk's office sent
out new consent forms to the parties who'd appeared. Dkt.
time, the plaintiff consented to Judge Joseph hearing the
case. Dkt. No. 13. After defendants Friend, Hernandez, and
Isferding were served, they, too, consented to Judge Joseph
hearing the case; their attorney, Attorney Lanzdorf, signed
off on the consent. Dkt. No. 19. Despite the fact that the
docket indicates that the clerk's office sent William Coe
and James Olstinske consent forms on September 24, 2015 (dkt.
no. 12), neither of those defendants (represented by Attorney
Elmer) has ever filed a consent form.
consent form instructs parties that, whether they do or
don't consent, they must file the form within twenty-one
days of the date that they receive it. It is not clear when
Coe and Olstinske received their consent forms, but Coe must
have received his before November 4, 2015 (the date he filed
his answer), and Olstinske must have received his by at least
February 11, 2016 (the date he filed his answer). The
twenty-one-day filing deadline stated in the consent form has
long passed for both of these defendants.
happens when a defendant does not follow the directions in
the consent form, and does not file the consent form on time?
The clerk's office often sends a reminder to that party.
Sometimes that doesn't happen- sometimes, particularly in
cases involving more than one defendant, and cases involving
defendants who are served later in a case, that letter does
not go out. It didn't in this case. The court does not
have a policy of “punishing” a defendant who
fails to file a consent form on time, or who fails to file it
at all. Instead, if a party does not file the consent form at
all, the court assumes-as it must, given the requirements of
Article III of the Constitution and 28 U.S.C. §636-that
the party who didn't respond does not consent.
clerk's office cannot transfer a case from a district
judge to a magistrate judge without the express consent of
all of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. §636(c)(1).
Because Coe and Olstinske have not consented to Judge Joseph
hearing the case, the case remains with Judge Pepper.
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS (DKT. NO. 65)
court received the above motion to stay on May 24,
2015-eleven days after the deadline for the close of
discovery. It also appears that the court received the motion
eleven days after counsel for the defendants conducted the
plaintiff already had hinted, in the above motion to stay,
that there had been problems with the deposition, and that he
expected the defendants to file a motion. The defendants did
file that motion, in the form of a motion for sanctions. Dkt.
No. 65. The motion seeks dismissal of the plaintiff's
case. In the alternative, it seeks money damages, an order
compelling the plaintiff to answer questions, and an
extension of the dispositive motions deadline. Id.
The Defendants' Brief
their supporting brief, the defendants explain that on April
27, 2016, they served notice of the deposition, scheduled for
May 13, 2016. Dkt. No. 66 at 2. On that date, Attorneys
Lanzdorf and Elmer, along with a court reporter, appeared at
Columbia Correctional Institution for the scheduled
deposition. Id. The plaintiff attended the
deposition without security restraints, and there were no
correctional facility staff in the deposition room. The
plaintiff sat at the head of the table; counsel sat on one
side, the court reporter on the other, each
“approximately four feet away from Plaintiff.”
Id. After the plaintiff acknowledged that counsel
could enquire as to “anything reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of relevant information, ”
id., counsel began to ask a series of questions
regarding which of the defendants actually found the
plaintiff guilty of an infraction that led to his being
disciplined, id. at 3. In particular, counsel asked
the plaintiff whether it was defendant Isferding, or
defendant Hernandez, who “actually made the finding of
guilt that resulted in imposition of discipline?”
Id. at 3. The plaintiff responded, “The answer
again, the writer was Hernandez. He recommends the days. If
you're found guilty, them the days you're going to
get.” Counsel responded, “Does the person who
makes the finding of guilt-Is the person who makes the
finding of guilt the same person who makes the recommendation
of discipline?” At this point, the plaintiff responded
that he had answered the question already, and that he
objected. Counsel and the plaintiff went back and forth, with
the plaintiff continuing to object to the question. Counsel
finally noted the objection, but stated-contrary to the
plaintiff's comment that “we can move on to
something else”-that he was not going to move on until
the plaintiff gave him a clear answer to the question.
Id. at 3-4.
point, counsel indicates, the plaintiff became “hostile
and confrontational.” Id. at 4. Counsel states
that the plaintiff leaned toward counsel
“aggressively” and demanded to know what counsel
meant by saying he wasn't going to move on. When counsel
continued to try to frame the question, the plaintiff stated,
“Mr. Lanzdorf, this is a maximum security prison. You
better move on, man.” Id. Counsel stated that
he understood the plaintiff's remark to constitute a
threat, and suggested a break (noting the court reporter
moving away from the plaintiff). Counsel asked for a member
of the institution staff to come in; when the staff member
came into the room, the plaintiff stated, “I don't
care who you call. If we call staff, it's over with,
man.” Id. Counsel indicates that at that
point, he did not feel safe continuing the deposition, or
even trying to call the court for a ruling. Id.
higher-ranking security officer came into the room, and
counsel explained what had happened and that he believed the
plaintiff's statements were threatening. Id. at
5. The plaintiff did not deny that his statements were
threatening. The institution staff was not able to locate a
telephone, and so counsel eventually decided to continue with
the deposition, and to try to call the court after it
concluded. Id. Counsel indicates that, as the
security staff left the room, the plaintiff said something to
the effect of “this is a waste of time, ” or
“this is not important.” Id. The
following exchange then occurred:
COUNSEL: I'm going to ask that she read back the last
pending question before we go on, but I would just state for
the record that while - while we were on a break you stated
to - to staff here at the prison here that this, referring to
this deposition, is not important. Is it your position that
this lawsuit is not important?
PLAINTIFF: The lawsuit is important, but, I mean, I mean,
this is a hassle man. Don't you know, I got, ooh, man,
psychological issues, man. You press the wrong button, man,
too, man, you really don't want to do that, man.
COUNSEL: Why don't I want to do that?
PLAINTIFF: I mean, I keep telling you, when I tell you to
leave stuff alone, man, leave it alone. I'm not properly
medicated. I won't be responsible, man. I've asked
you actually the best I know how to leave it alone, man.
that continuing to try to clarify the plaintiff's answer
would make matters worse, counsel moved on, and completed the
deposition without getting the clarifying information.
Id. Counsel indicates that he
deliberately steered clear from certain legitimate lines of
inquiry that, but for Plaintiff's threats, he would have
otherwise pursued because he believed them likely to provoke
further threats or violent actions from the Plaintiff,
including, but not limited to, Plaintiff's full
disciplinary record and history of confrontations with staff
at the Racine County Jail.
Id. at 6. Before leaving the deposition-and with
institution staff present- counsel called the court's
chambers to ask the court to address the issues described
above. The court's staff indicated to counsel that Judge
Pepper was not available to receive the call. Id.
(In fact, Judge Pepper was in Chicago on personal business on
May 13, 2016, and was not available to take calls that day.)
Counsel indicates that the court reporter appeared shaken,
stated that she'd never seen anything like this during a
prison deposition, and that if the plaintiff had made another
threatening statement, she would have left. Id.
Counsel indicates that he himself has conducted over thirty
inmate depositions, some at supermax facilities, and has
never been threatened or made to feel that his or anyone
else's safety was at risk. Id. Counsel believes
that the plaintiff deliberately threatened him with violence.
He indicates that he spent nine hours working on the
deposition (including prep time, travel and conducting the
deposition itself), and also would be receiving an invoice
for the cost of obtaining the deposition transcript.
defendants ask the court to impose the sanction of dismissal.
Id. at 7-8. They argue that such a harsh sanction is
warranted by the plaintiff's litigiousness (not only in
this case, but in a number of other cases he has filed); his
ignoring of the court's warnings (such as its warning
that he could not file a motion to compel without first
meeting and conferring with counsel, or the court's
warning in one of the plaintiff's other cases that
responding to correspondence or motions with threats could
result in sanctions); and the need to deter the kind of
threatening conduct in which the plaintiff engaged at the
deposition. Id. at 8-10. The defendants argue that
if the court does not feel it appropriate to dismiss the
case, the court should require the plaintiff to pay the costs
and fees that the defendants have incurred in conducting the
deposition, require the plaintiff to respond (in writing) to
the questions they did not pose (or did not get clear answers
to) at the deposition, and extend the deadline for filing
dispositive motions. Id. at 10.
The Plaintiff's Response
plaintiff objected to the defendants' motion. Dkt. No.
75. He first points out that in its February 16, 2016
scheduling order, the court advised the parties that if the
defendants wanted to depose the plaintiff, they had to serve
all parties with notice at least fourteen days before the
deposition. Id. at 1; see Dkt. No. 50
(scheduling order) at 1, ¶1. The plaintiff argues that
counsel did not provide that fourteen-day notice, and he
refers the court to an attachment to a motion he filed after
the defendants filed their motion for sanctions.
No. 71-1, in connection with a motion to stay proceedings and
strike the deposition in its entirety, the plaintiff attached
a “Visitor Notification” form. The document is
“from” someone named “J. Haldeman, ”
and it's addressed to “LOBBY.” In the
“date notified” box, it shows the date
“5/6/16.” Id. at 1. It indicates that
the date of the visit will be May 13, 2016, the time will be
12:45 p.m., and the purpose of the visit is
“Professional Visit-Deposition for WILLIAMS, TRAVIS . .
. .” Id. The form indicates that when the
visitors (listed as Attorneys Lanzdorf and Elmer and court
reporter Peterson) arrived, “J. Haldeman” was to
be contacted. Id.
plaintiff reads this form to indicate that counsel did not
notify Columbia Correctional staff about the May 13, 2016
deposition until May 6, 2016-seven days beforehand. He argues
that this meant he had little time to have someone help him
review his complaint (and indicates that someone else wrote
the complaint for him). Dkt. No. 75 at 1. He alleges that
counsel's statement that counsel sent the deposition
notice on April 27, 2016 was not true, and that the plaintiff
wasn't notified until nine days later. Id. He
takes issue with various details in the defendants'
motion-he argues that the deposition room wasn't small,
that there was no need for him to be in restraints for the
deposition, that he was not four feet away from the lawyers
and the court reporter, that he did not acknowledge that
counsel could ask him questions about anything reasonably
calculated to lead to discovery of relevant information.
Id. at 2.
argues that counsel asked questions designed to annoy, harass
and bully him into giving answers that would favor the
defendants. He indicates that the exchanges the defendants
quoted in their motion came after he'd already been asked
about forty questions, and that the quotes do not show his
full words. Id. He expresses frustration at the fact
that counsel refused to move on after the plaintiff objected
to the “who determined guilt” question four
times. Id. He indicates that counsel left out a
discussion of how counsel tried to get staff attention by
waving his arm at a surveillance camera, and he indicates
that he-the plaintiff-asked for higher-ranking staff to come
in because he'd lodged numerous complaints about the
first officer to respond. Id.
plaintiff raises many other issues, but the court
particularly notes the following:
1.) Plaintiff further stated to Captain Keller [the officer
of higher rank] that this is a court proceeding so you
can't instruct me to do anything. 2.) Plaintiff further
stated to Captain Keller review the camera and see the fact
that this man's changed his posture and leaned forward
while demanding I answer a question, Captain this attorney
tried to intimidate me by his actions, this is a maximum
security prison Captain I am surrounded by much tougher
people than him that's what I'm trying to explain.
Id. at 3. The plaintiff also alleges that the
excerpts of the deposition which counsel quoted are
“tailored.” Id. He asserted that
he's never ‘had a attorney just inquire away
telling him he's not moving on to the next
question.” Id. at 4.
The Defendants' Reply
defendants replied. Dkt. No. 84. They reiterate that they
served notice of the deposition on April 27, 2016, and attach
the notice of deposition. Dkt. No. 85-3. That notice is dated
April 27, 2016 and the certificate of service indicates that
it was served by U.S. mail, postage paid, on the same date.
Id. They note that even if they hadn't served
the notice fourteen days prior to the deposition, the remedy
for the plaintiff would have been to move for a protective
order pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1)(B). Id. at
84. In response to the plaintiff's allegation that the
defendants misquoted the deposition transcript, the
defendants have provided the court with the full transcript,
as well as a video. Dkt. No. 84 at 1; Dkt. No. 85-4
(transcript); Dkt. No. 88 (video). Finally, the defendants
argue that the plaintiff has continued to be obstreperous,
pointing out that when they sent the plaintiff a video
he'd requested, the plaintiff responded with a letter,
saying he'd sent the entire packet back unopened. Dkt.
No. 84 at 3.
The Court's Analysis
The Rules Governing Depositions
court begins by looking at Fed.R.Civ.P. 30, which governs
oral depositions. Rule 30(d)(2) states, “The court may
impose an appropriate sanction-including the reasonable
expenses and attorney's fees incurred by any party-on any
person who impedes, delays, or frustrates the fair
examination of the deponent.” The question the court
must answer is whether the plaintiff “impeded, delayed
or frustrated” a “fair” deposition.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b) says that parties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the
needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues
at stake, the amount in controversy, the parties'
relative access to relevant information, the parties'
resources, the importance of discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
scope of discovery is broad. This means that a lawyer
conducting a deposition may ask about any issue that is
relevant to a party's claim or defense. There are several
ways that a party can collect that information- through oral
depositions (Fed. R. Civ. P. 30), through written
interrogatories (Rule 33), through requests for production of
documents (Rule 34), and through requests for admissions
Civ. P. 30(c)(2) states that if a party who is being deposed
objects to a question (for example, on the ground that it
isn't relevant to his claim), the court reporter must
note the objection, “but the examination still
proceeds; the testimony is taken subject to any
objection.” The rule also states that if a party does
have an objection to a question, the objection “must be
stated concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive
manner.” The only grounds for not answering a question
in a deposition are “to preserve a privilege, to
enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or” to make
a motion “to terminate or limit [the deposition] on the
ground that it is being conducted in bad faith or in a manner
that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the
deponent or party.” Id., Fed.R.Civ.P.
party who is being deposed may not simply refuse to answer
questions. The person may note, for the record, that he
objects to a question, and the court reporter has to record
that objection. But he still has to answer the question,
unless it falls into one of the categories in Rule
The Fairness of the May 13, 2016 Deposition
deposition began at 12:38 p.m. on May 13. Dkt. No. 85-4 at 1.
At the outset, Attorney Lanzdorf attempted to explain the
standard deposition rules to the plaintiff. Id. at
3-5. The plaintiff, however, expressed impatience with this,
stating, “We can get down to business, though. You can
save the formalities.” Id. at 5. When the
plaintiff indicated that he was in pain, Attorney Lanzdorf
enquired whether the pain was so bad that the plaintiff
couldn't participate meaningfully in the deposition.
Before counsel could finish the question, however, the
plaintiff interrupted, saying, “No. I'm in such
degree of pain, I wish you just - let's get to the meat
of this and get it over with and you can hit the highway, I
can go back and do what I do best.” Id. at 6.
following exchange occurred next:
COUNSEL: All right. I'm going to try to do this as
quickly as possible. Just another background thing. I may ask
you a question that you don't feel comfortable answering,
that you don't think is bearing on the incidents that are
the subject of this lawsuit.
That said, if you feel uncomfortable answering a question you
can tell me why, you can state your objection for the record,
but this being a deposition, I'm giving - I've given
broad leeway in the scope of questions that I can ask you.
And so the rules of a deposition are very different than the
rules of a court. In a court proceeding lawyers can only ask
questions and expect to receive an answer to those questions
if it's directly relevant to that proceeding. In a
deposition it's a little bit broader. It's anything
that's reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
information that's relevant.
So if we need to, if there's a question that you
don't feel comfortable answering, you can make that
record clear, but if you're refusing to answer a
question, then at that stage we'll contact ...