United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
CHRIS J. JACOBS III, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES CONGRESS, Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
BARBARA B. CRABB District Judge
Chris J. Jacobs III, a prisoner at the Columbia Correctional
Institution, has filed what he has labeled as a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which
he challenges his 1998 conviction for kidnapping and false
imprisonment. Because petitioner has already filed five other
such petitions in this court, all raising the same challenges
to his conviction, this petition must be dismissed.
in the petition are challenges to two statutes, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the
Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which petitioner says
have barred him from seeking any meaningful relief or review
of his claims stemming from that same conviction.
Petitioner's challenge to the PLRA is outside the scope
of his petition and his challenge to AEDPA fails because it
is precluded by Supreme Court precedent. Thus, these
purported claims must be dismissed along with the petition.
calls his case a habeas corpus petition “and/or §
1983 (to change the laws) and/or Class Action” on
behalf of himself “and other inmates across the
US.” He further characterizes it as “a lawsuit
challenging the laws of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA).” He asks for his release from state custody and
asks also “that the AEDPA and PLRA be amended so
it's available to inmates.” I will evaluate his
habeas corpus petition, and then his challenges to the
Habeas Corpus Petition
petitioner in cases nos. 16-cv-619-bbc, 15-cv-034-bbc,
10-cv-805-bbc and 09-cv-32-bbc that he had filed a habeas
corpus petition challenging this same conviction and sentence
in 2006 and that that petition had been dismissed with
prejudice because it was untimely. Jacobs v.
Schneiter, 06-cv-74-jcs, Op. & Order, dkt. #23 (W.D.
Wis. Aug. 29, 2006). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), a
petitioner may not file a second or successive application in
the district court unless he first obtains an order from the
appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court
to consider the application. Petitioner does not say that he
has Dated this. A “second or successive” petition
is one in which the prisoner is challenging the same
conviction that he challenged in a previous petition that was
decided on the merits. In re Page, 179 F.3d 1024,
1025 (7th Cir. 1999). In petitioner's case, his 2006
dismissal with prejudice for untimeliness was “on the
merits” because, in that situation, “[a
petitioner] has no further opportunity to obtain a
disposition on the merits of his or her claims in the state
courts.” Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049,
1053 (9th Cir. 2005). Accord Carter v. United
States, 150 F.3d 202, 205-06 (2d Cir.1998); Hawkins
v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 547 (10th Cir. 1995).
Accordingly, petitioner cannot proceed on this petition.
Nunez v. United States, 96 F.3d 990, 991 (7th Cir.
1996) (“A district court must dismiss a second or
successive petition, without awaiting any response from the
government, unless the court of appeals has given approval
for its filing.”).
remind petitioner that if he still wishes to bring another
challenge to his1998 conviction or sentence, he may only do
so if he first obtains authorization from the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. For a more detailed
description of the procedure to follow, petitioner should
read Rule 9 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases and 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3) and (4). If he chooses to do this,
the proper respondent to name would not be the United States
Congress, but the prison warden or other state officer who is
currently responsible for petitioner's custody. Rule 2(a)
of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“If the
petitioner is currently in custody under a state-court
judgment, the petition must name as respondent the state
officer who has custody.”).
contends that both the PLRA and AEDPA “have so many
restrictions that [he] cannot get into court.” Reading
his petition liberally, I understand that he is complaining
that (1) because he has “three strikes” under the
PLRA, he is unfairly barred from bringing additional in
forma pauperis constitutional or other civil claims; and
(2) because of AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations
and restrictions upon successive petitions for habeas corpus,
he has been unable to obtain meaningful review of his
conviction or sentence.
PLRA does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus, so
petitioner has no reason to challenge it in this case. In any
event, the challenges petitioner is raising have all been
rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States. See,
e.g., Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S.Ct. 1759
(2015) (affirming PLRA's three-strike bar to successive
suits in forma pauperis, even where third prior
dismissal is subject to pending appeal); McQuiggin v.
Perkins, 133 S.Ct. 1924 (2013) (carving out
“actual innocence” exception to AEDPA's
otherwise valid one-year statute of limitations for habeas
corpus petitions); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651
(1996) (holding AEDPA's restrictions on “second or
successive” habeas petitions to be constitutional);
Turner v. Brown, No. 15-1592 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017)
(applying both untimely and successive restrictions in
affirming district court's denial of habeas petition).
Therefore, these challenges must be dismissed with the
ORDERED that the petition of Chris Jacobs III for a writ of
habeas corpus is DISMISSED for petitioner's failure to
obtain the authorization required by ...