United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DEBRADRE D. JACKSON, Plaintiff,
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, RACINE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, DIEBOLD, LT. LONDRE, PAUL S. KEMPER, CAPT. GIERNOTH, DEPUTY JOHNSON, and C. O’DONNELL, Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING THE PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING
FEE (DKT. NO. 3) AND SCREENING THE COMPLAINT (DKT. NO.
PAMELA PEPPER United States District Judge.
plaintiff, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing
himself, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§1983, alleging that the defendants violated his
Fourteenth Amendment rights at the Racine Correctional
Institution. Dkt. No. 1. This order resolves the
plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee, dkt. no. 3, and screens the
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT
PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE
Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to this case because the
plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. 28
U.S.C. §1915. The law allows a court to give an
incarcerated plaintiff the ability to proceed with his
lawsuit without pre-paying the civil case-filing fee, as long
as he meets certain conditions. Id. One of those
conditions is a requirement that the plaintiff pay an initial
partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). Once the
plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the court may
allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350 filing fee
over time, through deductions from his prisoner account.
December 9, 2016, the court assessed an initial partial
filing fee of $1.63. Dkt. No. 6. The plaintiff made payment
in the amount of $2.00 on January 13, 2017. Therefore, the
court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed without prepayment of the filling fee and will allow
the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350.00 filing fee
over time from his prisoner account, as described at the end
of this order.
SCREENING OF THE PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
Standard for Screening Complaints
Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to
screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against
a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court may
dismiss an action or portion thereof if the claims alleged
are “frivolous or malicious,” fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, the
plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not plead
specific facts, and need only provide “fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)). “Labels and conclusions” or a
“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” will not do. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
factual content of the complaint must allow the court to
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
allegations must “raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Factual allegations, when accepted as true, must state a
claim that is “plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
courts follow the two-step analysis set forth in
Twombly to determine whether a complaint states a
claim. Id. at 679. First, the court determines
whether the plaintiff’s legal conclusions are supported
by factual allegations. Id. Legal conclusions not
supported by facts “are not entitled to the assumption
of truth.” Id. Second, the court determines
whether the well-pleaded factual allegations “plausibly
give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
The court gives pro se allegations, “however
inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Facts Alleged in the Complaint
28, 2016, Lieutenant Londre removed the plaintiff from
general population and placed him in Temporary Lock-Up
(“TLU”) pending “an investigation.”
Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Unit Manager Diebold authorized Londre to
make the transfer. Id. Later in July 2016, Captain
Giernoth released the plaintiff from TLU and took him to
Restrictive Housing-Behavioral Modification Unit
(“Green Unit”). Id. Deputy Warden
Johnson authorized the transfer from TLU to Green Unit.
Id. at 5. The plaintiff provides no further
information on what happened with the
“investigation,” how long he remained in TLU, the
conditions in TLU, why he was released from TLU, or whether
he was charged with a rule violation pursuant to the
investigation. Id. at 2. The plaintiff remained in
Green Unit for about eighty days. Id.
Unit is a housing unit used to prepare inmates for transfer
from TLU back to general population. Id. Inmates in
Green Unit have restricted telephone privileges, restricted
movement in the dayroom and during recreation, and have to
wear a different color uniform than inmates in general
population. Id. at 2-3. While in Green Unit, the
plaintiff did not have access to his “personal
property” (TV, radio, fan, etc.) and could not wear his
“personal clothing” (sweatpants, shorts,
t-shirts). Id. at 3. The ...