United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
JEFFREY D. LEISER, Plaintiff,
DR. JOAN HANNULA, et al., Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
STEPHEN L. CROCKER Magistrate Judge
August 11, 2016, I denied pro se plaintiff Jeffrey
Leiser's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Plaintiff's claims in this case concern defendants'
alleged failure to treat his spinal and testicle pain while
he was housed at Stanley Correctional Institution. Leiser had
requested an emergency order requiring the Wisconsin
Department of Corrections to bring him to the University of
Wisconsin-Madison hospital to be evaluated by a neurosurgeon.
I denied his motion because Leiser had failed to show he was
entitled to the relief he sought. (Dkt. 40.) Plaintiff has
since filed a Motion for Reconsideration (dkt. 41), a Renewed
Motion for Injunctive Relief (dkt. 54), and a Supplemental
Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief (dkt. 55). The Renewed
Motion and Supplemental Renewed Motion ask the court to enter
an order requiring Leiser to receive narcotics and/or
Tramadol to control his pain. After reviewing the
parties' submissions, I concluded that there are no
material facts in dispute that would warrant a hearing.
Leiser still has not submitted any evidence suggesting that
he is entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks.
Therefore, I am denying his motions.
for Reconsideration (dkt. 41)
filed his Motion for Reconsideration of my order denying his
request to see a neurosurgeon on August 26, 2016. In his
subsequent filings, he stated that he had an appointment with
a neurosurgeon on December 20, 2016. (Dkt. 54, at 2-3.) The
records Leiser and the defendants submitted confirm that
Leiser was seen by Dr. Jerry Davis, a neurosurgeon at
Gunderson Health System, on December 20, 2016. (Conlin Decl.,
Ex. A, dkt. 58-1, at 3.) He recommended surgery, but told
Leiser that he could not perform it until Leiser was able to
achieve a body weight between 225 and 230 pounds.
(Id. at 3.) As Leiser received the relief he was
seeking in his initial motion for preliminary injunction, I
will deny it as moot.
Motion and Supplemental Motion (dkts. 54, 55)
the case in his prior motion, the relief Leiser seeks is
rarely granted. “To obtain a preliminary injunction,
the moving party must show that its case has ‘some
likelihood of success on the merits' and that it has
‘no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable
harm if a preliminary injunction is denied.'”
Stuller, Inc. v. Steak N Shake Enters., Inc., 695
F.3d 676, 678 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ezell v. City of
Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 694 (7th Cir. 2011)). To grant a
preliminary injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (PLRA) a court must find that such
relief is: (1) narrowly drawn; (2) extends no further than
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right; and
(3) is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1).
requests an order requiring the staff at the New Lisbon
Correctional Institution (“NLCI”) to provide
narcotics or Tramadol because his current pain management
regiment of Tylenol, ibuprofen, and icing is so insufficient
that he cannot lose the weight necessary for him to undergo
surgery. Leiser submitted records of his treatment at NLCI in
support, but there are three reasons why nothing before me
suggests that a preliminary injunction is appropriate.
Leiser's current request does not involve his claims
against any of the named defendants. I granted Leiser leave
to proceed against individuals that were involved in his care
while he was housed at the Stanley Correctional Institution.
Leiser has not sought leave to amend his complaint to name
additional defendants and he explicitly stated that he does
not want “to make the current NLCI HSU staff part of
this civil suit” (dkt. 55, at 4). Given that the PLRA
permits me to only order injunctions that are narrowly
tailored to correct the constitutional violation in
this lawsuit, his request is outside the perimeters
of my authority.
Leiser has an adequate remedy at law. If he believes that he
has a § 1983 claim against the individuals that have
treated him at NLCI, he may seek relief within the DOC's
grievance system. Then, once he has exhausted his
administrative remedies within the DOC, if he is still
dissatisfied, he may file a separate lawsuit against the
even if Leiser's allegations implicated one of the
defendants to this lawsuit, he has not submitted any evidence
suggesting that his claims are likely to succeed on the
merits. As noted, Leiser has been granted leave to proceed on
deliberate indifference and state law negligence claims.
“Deliberate indifference” means that the
officials are aware that the prisoner needs medical
treatment, but are disregarding the risk by consciously
failing to take reasonable measures. Forbes v.
Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 266 (7th Cir. 1997).
parties submitted Leiser's treatment records between
November and December of 2016. While, Leiser has not
authenticated the records he submitted, I have taken them
into account for purposes of determining whether his motion
had any merit to the point where a hearing would be
necessary. Here is a summary of them:
• November 25, 2016: Leiser submitted a health services
request (“HSR”) form complaining of nerve pain
and stating that ibuprofen and muscle rub does not help. The
response note dated November 26, indicates that a nurse
reviewed it and scheduled him to be seen by HSU.
• November 27, 2016: Leiser submitted another HSR
requesting to be seen. The November 27 response note
indicates that he was scheduled to be seen.
• November 30, 2016: Leiser submitted an HSR and letter
to the HSU manager complaining of the same symptoms. A
December 1 response note states that he was ...