United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
TOMMIE L. CARTER, Plaintiff,
ALLISON MCGOWAN, AMY GUNDERSON, DEREK SCHAUTEN, and JOEL SANKEY, Defendants.
Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge.
March 14, 2017, the Court entered an order denying several of
Plaintiff's motions (Docket #33), including a motion to
compel production of surveillance footage (Docket #30), a
motion for appointment of counsel (Docket #31), and a motion
for sanctions and an investigation against prison officials
(Docket #32). On March 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed a letter
requesting reconsideration of that decision. (Docket #34).
he does not cite any authority for his request, the only
relevant rule is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which
permits a court to grant relief from one of its orders if a
party can show “the narrow grounds of mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered
evidence, voidness, or ‘any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment.'”
Tylon v. City of Chicago, 97 F.App'x 680, 681
(7th Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(6)). Such relief
“is an extraordinary remedy and is granted only in
exceptional circumstances.” Harrington v. City of
Chicago, 443 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006).
motion merely states his disagreement with the Court's
March 14, 2017 order. Asserting “that the. .
.court's underlying judgment was wrong. . .is an
impermissible use of Rule 60(b).” Tylon, 97
F.App'x at 681. Further, Plaintiff fails to address any
of the specific Rule 60(b) grounds for relief. Banks v.
Chicago Bd. of Educ., 750 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“The district court does not abuse its discretion by
denying a Rule 60(b) motion that is not based on one of the
specified grounds for relief.”); Monzidelis v.
World's Finest Chocolate, Inc., 92 F.App'x 349,
353 (7th Cir. 2004) (Rule 60(b) motion denied because the
movant “failed to even argue that mistake,
excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, or other
exceptional circumstances had undermined the legitimacy of
the prior judgment”) (emphasis in original).
example, with respect to the motion to compel, the Court
found that Plaintiff failed to show that he had engaged in
good-faith meet-and-confer efforts to resolve his dispute
with defense counsel prior to filing the motion. (Docket #33
at 1-2). In the instant motion, Plaintiff claims he made such
efforts. (Docket #34 at 1). Once again, he offers no proof of
this. Further, while he says that he attached Defendants'
responses to his discovery requests to his motion,
id., they are not to be found in the record, nor are
they attached to his motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiff objects to the Court's denial of his motion for
appointment of counsel on the ground that he failed to submit
evidence of his attempts to secure his own counsel, as is
required before the Court can consider such a request.
(Docket #33 at 2-3); (Docket #34 at 2). He does not cure this
deficiency in his motion for reconsideration, and the
Court's ruling therefore must stand.
as to the motion for sanctions and an investigation, the
Court noted in its prior order that Plaintiff believes that
prison officials are interfering with his ability to litigate
this case by, inter alia, inappropriately searching
his cell and confiscating his legal materials. (Docket #33 at
3). The Court, in view of the relevant legal standards, could
not grant Plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief on his
unverified and far-ranging allegations of wrongdoing.
Id. at 4. That has not changed, since all Plaintiff
offers in his letter are additional unsubstantiated
accusations. Because he advances no reason on which to
credibly question the Court's prior conclusions,
Plaintiff's request for reconsideration must be
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's request
for reconsideration of the Court's March 14, 2017 order
(Docket #34) be and the same is hereby
The Court separately notes that on
March 22, 2017, Plaintiff also submitted a letter objecting
to Defendants' taking his deposition on March 30, 2017.
(Docket #35). Plaintiff claims he is undergoing a mental
health evaluation that day and cannot attend a deposition.
Id. at 1. He also appears to believe that he can
refuse to sit for a deposition because he intends to invoke
his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as to
some or all of the questions that will be asked.
To the extent Plaintiff is asking the Court to quash
the notice of deposition on these grounds, the request is
denied. First, Plaintiff may invoke his Fifth Amendment
rights during the deposition, but this does not absolve him
of his duty to attend and, where appropriate, make an
assertion of those rights. Second, assuming that a scheduling
conflict exists, Plaintiff concedes that he sent a letter to
defense counsel only last week raising his concerns and that
he has not received a response. Id. at 2. Absent a
certification that the parties have met and conferred in a
good-faith attempt to resolve Plaintiff's potential
scheduling conflict, the Court cannot intervene. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (requiring a party seeking a
protective order to certify as to his attempts to resolve the
dispute without court action).
If Plaintiff declines to sit for a deposition, the
Court invites Defendants to file a motion for sanctions,
including potential ...