United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
TYRONE D. ARDS, Plaintiff,
TIMOTHY CASIANA, THEODORE ANDERSON, RANDY SCHNEIDER, MICHAEL J. THOMPSON, PATRICK STELLICK, MAURY THILL, JOE REDA, KIM CAMPBELL, ANN PETERS-ANDERSON, and DAVID SPANNANGEL, Defendants.
OPINION & ORDER
D. PETERSON District Judge
plaintiff Tyrone D. Ards, a state prisoner now incarcerated
at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility, is proceeding on
Eighth Amendment claims against prison officials at his
previous prison, the Columbia Correctional Institution. Ards
contends that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by depriving him of medical care, failing to respond to his
suicide threats, using excessive force against him, and
failing to protect him from excessive force.
opinion will address four documents filed by Ards: (1) a
motion for reconsideration of the partial summary judgment on
Ards's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, Dkt.
60; (2) a motion for an order allowing Ards to correspond
with witnesses using his legal loan, Dkt. 53; (3) a motion to
compel defendants to respond to his interrogatories and to
requests for admission, Dkt. 56; and (4) a declaration
indicating that Ards faces imminent danger, Dkt. 65. I will
deny the three motions. As for the fourth document, it is not
a motion asking for a particular relief, but I will
nonetheless consider whether Ards's safety is ensured. I
conclude that WSPF has implemented appropriate measures for
Ards's safety, but I will direct the Wisconsin Attorney
General's Office to apprise prison officials of
Ards's refusal to eat his meals or drink water.
Motion for reconsideration
granted defendants' motion for partial summary judgment
and dismissed Ards's deliberate-indifference claims for
denial of medical care because Ards had failed to exhaust
administrative remedies as to those claims. Dkt. 55, at 4-5.
Ards now moves for reconsideration of that decision. Dkt. 60.
For the reasons discussed below, I will deny Ards's
motion for reconsideration.
contends that I was “extremely bias[ed] because I
considered defendants' motion for partial summary
judgment even though the motion was filed 21 days after the
deadline. Dkt. 60, ¶ 1. But as I explained in the order,
defendants did not waive their right to move for summary
judgment on the exhaustion issue by failing to file their
motion on time. Dkt. 55, at 3. And, although defendants filed
their motion late, Ards was given an adequate opportunity to
respond to defendants' motion. Accordingly, the 21-day
delay did not prejudice Ards.
Deliberate-indifference claims against Anderson, Stellick,
Casiana, Reda, Campbell, and Spannangel for denial of medical
next contends that I erred by granting summary judgment on
his claims against defendants Theodore Anderson, Patrick
Stellick, Timothy Casiana, Joe Reda, Kim Campbell, and David
Spannangel. I granted summary judgment as to these defendants
because Ards had not filed a timely grievance. Dkt. 55, at 5.
The only grievance filed on time was his grievance about
being charged a co-pay for medical expenses, and that
grievance did not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. Dkt.
42, ¶ 34; Dkt. 42-1; Dkt. 42-4; Dkt. 55, at 5. In his
opposition brief, Ards asked me to review his inmate
complaints, Dkt. 48, at 3 (Ards's opposition brief,
stating, “Review complaints # 22802 [and]
22804.”), but the documents attached to his opposition
brief were not his grievances: they were decisions from the
reviewing authority rejecting Ards's grievances as
untimely. Dkt. 55, at 5. I explained that, because Ards had
not actually submitted his grievances, I could not tell what
Ards wrote in his grievances and that, even if the grievances
mentioned in those documents concerned denial of medical
care, his grievances were untimely, as noted by the reviewing
now argues in his motion for reconsideration that,
The court also gave the defendant an opportunity to give an
excuse as to why they filed for summary judgment [late], but
did not give the plaintiff any opportunity to explain why he
filed his I.C.E. late, even though when the plaintiff filed
his rejection he explained his reason in that complaint. But
for some outlandish reason [defendants' counsel] keep
denying me such documents.
Dkt. 60, ¶ 1. But Ards did have an opportunity to
explain why he filed his grievance late. Defendants pointed
out in their opening brief that Ards had not filed a timely
grievance. Dkt. 41, at 8 (“Surely if Ards had a
complaint about being denied care, or access to care, he
would have made it at that time. Having not timely done so,
he is now barred from doing so.”). Ards could have
explained in his opposition brief, Dkt. 48, why his untimely
grievances should be excused, but he did not.
take Ards to mean that he explained in his grievances (or
some other documents) why he filed his grievances late and
that defendants' counsel denied Ards access to those
documents, resulting in his inability to explain why his
untimely grievances should be excused. But if Ards could not
respond to defendants' motion for summary judgment
because he was missing those documents, he should have said
so in his opposition brief. Ards did not indicate that he was
missing those documents or that the missing documents
contained reasons that excused his untimely grievances. I
will not consider new arguments that Ards could have raised
in response to defendants' summary judgment motion.
See, e.g., Sigsworth v. City of
Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d 506, 512 (7th Cir.
2007). Accordingly, Ards's claim about the missing
documents does not warrant reconsideration of the summary
next contends that he gave a proper notice to prison
officials regarding denial of medical care because he
submitted numerous “request slips” for health
services. Dkt. 60, at 3-4. But Ards was required to follow
the grievance procedures established by the prison officials.
Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024, 1025 (7th