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Collins v. City of Milwaukee

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

June 14, 2017

CHARLES COLLINS, TRACY ADAMS, on behalf of her minor child, D.A., CALEB ROBERTS, STEPHEN JANSEN, GREGORY CHAMBERS, ALICIA SILVESTRE, JERIMIAH OLIVAR, DAVID CROWLEY, and JEREMY BROWN, Plaintiffs,
v.
CITY OF MILWAUKEE, MILWAUKEE FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSION, and CHIEF EDWARD FLYNN, in his official capacity as the Chief of the Milwaukee Police Department, Defendants.

          ORDER

          J. P. Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge

         On June 7, 2016, the parties jointly requested entry of a stipulated protective order and submitted a proposed draft of the order. (Docket #21). The parties request that the Court enter such an order so that they may avoid the public disclosure of confidential information and documents. Id. at 1-2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 26(c) allows for an order “requiring that a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not be revealed or be revealed only in a specified way.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c)(1)(G); see also Civil L. R. 26(e).

         The Court sympathizes with the parties' request and will grant it, but, before doing so, must note the limits that apply to protective orders. Protective orders are, in fact, an exception to the general rule that pretrial discovery must occur in the public eye. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 596 (7th Cir. 1979); Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c); see also Citizens First Nat'l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 943, 945-46 (7th Cir. 1999). Litigation must be “conducted in public to the maximum extent consistent with respecting trade secrets. . .and other facts that should be held in confidence.” Hicklin Eng'r, L.C. v. Bartell, 439 F.3d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 2006).

         Nonetheless, the Court can enter a protective order if the parties have shown good cause, and also that the order is narrowly tailored to serving that cause. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(c); Citizens First, 178 F.3d at 945; Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (even when parties agree to the entry of a protective order, they still must show the existence of good cause). The Court can even find that broad, blanket orders are narrowly tailored and permissible, when it finds that two factors are satisfied:

(1) that the parties will act in good faith in designating the portions of the record that should be subject to the protective order; and
(2) that the order explicitly allows the parties to the case and other interested members of the public to challenge the sealing of documents.

County Materials Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 740 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing Citizens First, 178 F.3d at 945).

         The parties have requested the protective order in this case in good faith. This case involves alleged constitutional violations arising from the City of Milwaukee police force's stop-and-frisk policies. Information implicated in this case includes personally identifying information and criminal histories for numerous individuals, including minors, confidential informants, crime victims, City employees, and others. The case also concerns the City's financial information. These are sufficient bases for the requested protective order.

         The parties' proposed protective order, however, appears overbroad. It provides that, if the parties need to file any such documentation with the Court, they may do so by filing the documents with the Court under seal. In other words, it appears that the parties wish to be able to seal-in their entirety-any documents that contain sensitive information. This departs from the Court's desire to ensure that every phase of the trial occurs in the public eye to the maximum extent possible. See Hicklin Eng'r, 439 F.3d at 348. While the Court understands that some documents will need to be sealed entirely, other documents may contain only small amounts of confidential information, and so redaction of those documents may be more appropriate.

         The Court, thus, has crafted its own protective order to enter in this case. The Court's protective order still allows the parties to file documents under seal, but does not presume that every confidential document should be filed under seal in its entirety. Rather, it contemplates that the parties will use their judgment to determine the best way to protect confidential information in submitted documents. The order also includes a provision consistent with the Court's and this district's standard practice of allowing any party and any interested members of the public to challenge the sealing of documents.

         Finally, the Court must note that, while it finds the parties' proposed order to be permissible and will, therefore, enter it, the Court subscribes to the view that the Court's decision-making process must be transparent and as publicly accessible as possible. Thus, the Court preemptively warns the parties that it will not enter any decision under seal.

         Because the parties' proposed protective order adequately complies with the standards set forth above (after the Court's minor changes), the Court will enter an order based on the parties' joint motion and proposed order to the Court.

         Accordingly, Pursuant to the joint motion of the parties (Docket #21), the Court finds that the exchange of sensitive information between the parties and/or third parties other than in accordance with this Order may cause unnecessary damage and injury to the parties and to others. The Court further finds that the terms of this Order are fair and just and that good cause has been shown for entry of this Order.

         This Protective Order shall apply to all information and documents disclosed by the parties, either voluntarily or pursuant to a request for the production of documents or a subpoena duces tecum, in the course of this litigation, whether written, electronic, oral, visual, or contained in documents, transcripts, or in any other form.

         IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 26(e) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1)(D), (A) DESIGNATION OF CONFIDENTIAL OR ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY INFORMATION. Designation of information under this Order must be made by placing or affixing on the document or material, in a manner that will not interfere with its legibility, the words “CONFIDENTIAL” or “ATTORNEYS EYES ONLY.”

(1) One who produces information, documents, or other material may designate them as “CONFIDENTIAL” when the person in good faith believes they contain the following types of information:
(a) personally-identifying information, including dates of birth, social security numbers, home addresses, ...

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