Thomas F. Benson, Mark Rechlicz, Mark Rechlicz Enterprises, Inc., Robert J. Muranyi, RJM Pro Golf Incorporation and William J. Scheer, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners,
City of Madison, Defendant-Respondent.
Submitted on Briefs: Oral Argument: April 19, 2017.
OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 371 Wis.2d 760, 886
N.W.2d 593 (2016 - Unpublished)
Dane Richard G. Niess, L.C. No. 2014CV180
the plaintiff-appellant-petitioners, there were briefs by
Kevin J. Palmersheim, Cathleen A. Dettmann and Haley
Palmersheim, SC Middleton and oral argument by Kevin J.
the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Catherine M.
Rottier and Boardman & Clark, . LLP, Madison, with whom
on the brief was Michael P. May and Doran E. Viste, City of
Madison Attorney's Office. There was an oral argument by
Catherine M. Rottier and Paul Norman.
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.
This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of
appeals, Benson v. City of Madison, No. 2015AP2366,
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016), which
affirmed the Dane County circuit court'sjudgment
dismissing a lawsuit filed by the petitioners against the
City of Madison ("the City") pursuant to the
Wisconsin Fair Dealership Law ("the WFDL"), a
statute that governs, among other things, the termination or
nonrenewal of specified types of business relationships.
See generally Wis.Stat. ch. 135 ("Dealership
Practices") (2013-14) .
The City owns four public golf courses: Odana, Yahara,
Monona, and Glenway. For years, the City entered into
"operating agreements" ("Agreements")
with the petitioners, four "golf professionals"
("Golf Pros"), to oversee the clubhouse operations
at these courses. That is, while the City maintained the
physical golf courses, the Golf Pros performed varied tasks
such as collecting greens fees, hiring and managing
attendants, supervising golfing, operating the clubhouse and
pro shop, selling concessions, and giving
In 2012 the City informed the Golf Pros that it would not be
renewing the Agreements. The Golf Pros subsequently filed a
lawsuit against the City, both alleging that the City had
failed to comply with the WFDL in ending the City's
relationships with them and seeking damages. The circuit
court below ultimately dismissed the lawsuit on summary
judgment, concluding that the relationships between the Golf
Pros and the City did not constitute "dealerships"
protected by the WFDL. See Wis.Stat. §
135.02(3) . The Golf Pros appealed, and the court of appeals
affirmed. Benson, unpublished slip op., ¶2.
On this appeal, we are asked to resolve two principal
questions: first, whether the WFDL applies to the City at
all; and second, whether the relationships between the Golf
Pros and the City are "dealerships" under the WFDL.
Additionally, assuming we answer both questions in the
affirmative, the City contends that the Golf Pros'
lawsuit is time-barred and should be dismissed on grounds of
We conclude that the WFDL applies to the City; that the
relationships between the Golf Pros and the City are
"dealerships" under the WFDL; that the Golf
Pros' lawsuit is not time-barred; and that the City is
not immune from the lawsuit. Consequently, we reverse the
decision of the court of appeals and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Although the City's relationships with the Golf Pros span
back a number of years, the most recent version of the
Agreements governed a period running from January 1, 2008, to
December 31, 2012. Because the nature of the relationships
between the City and the Golf Pros is central to this case,
we first summarize the duties of the City and of the Golf
Pros, as well as overall financial arrangements, as set forth
in these Agreements.
Each Golf Pro entered into a separate Agreement with the
City, with each of the four Golf Pros managing clubhouse
operations at one of the City's four courses. The
Agreements begin by noting, inter alia, that the
City "is engaged in the operation and maintenance of
[the golf course] and desires to engage a competent and
qualified golf professional to operate, manage, and provide
certain services at [the golf course]"; that "the
Golf Pro desires to procure from the City the right to
operate and provide the services"; and that "the
public interest and welfare will be served . . . by the
granting of an agreement to a reputable party who will
provide certain services to the public patronizing the golf
course." The Agreements then grant to each Golf Pro
"the exclusive privilege and obligation to operate"
one of the four golf courses.
Pursuant to the Agreements, each Golf Pro was hired to
perform the following tasks, among others (some of which
• "[s]upervise and operate the [golf course] in a
clean, efficient, and creditable manner, "
"manag[e] the speed of play, " "efficiently
start play on the first tee so as to maximize play and
revenue to the City, " and "provide a
ranger/ambassador when heavy play so requires";
• "[e]mploy attendants to sell and collect green
fees, resident and non-resident annual passports and other
established player promotional devices, renewals, and take
and process reservations, " and "collect for the
City all green fees, locker fees, player promotional pass
fees, and tournament fees";
• "operate concession rights at the pro shop,
clubhouse, and golf course, " "sell food and
beverages" during specified periods, "[o]btain the
necessary licenses to operate and maintain on the premises a
concession operation for the sale of beverages, confections,
and food, " and "sell golf clothing and golf
• "[p]rovide a sufficient number of motorized golf
carts to meet the needs of the public" and "rent
and operate golf carts and equipment"; and
• "teach and give golf lessons for
compensation" as well as "conduct" a specified
number of "free clinics each season."
Significantly, the Golf Pros were "responsible for the
purchase of all supplies and equipment used in the pro shop,
golf range, motorized cart concessions, and food and beverage
concessions." Each Golf Pro was entitled to "hire
assistants to assist in the operation" of the golf
course, "concessions and collecting money due the City
under" the Agreement. But the Golf Pros were
"responsible for the hiring and supervision of all
employees necessary for the efficient operation of the
clubhouse and the pro shop and further, the hiring, training,
scheduling and supervision of course rangers and
starters." The Golf Pros were also "responsible for
the salaries, benefits, and premiums for Worker's
Compensation and Social Security, all income tax deduction
and any other tax or payroll deductions required by law"
for these employees. The Golf Pros were required to maintain
a number of different types of insurance.
The Agreements did not oblige the Golf Pros to maintain the
physical courses; this was performed by the City through its
own employees. The City also owned the land and buildings and
paid relevant utilities.
The City paid each Golf Pro a "base contract
payment" specified in the Agreements. The Golf Pros also
All income from concessions, sale of merchandise at the pro
shop, golf instruction, pull cart . . . and golf club rental,
except for a return each week to the City of Madison fifteen
(15%) percent of the gross receipts of pull carts . . . and
golf club rental, and eleven (11%) percent of the restaurant
According to the Agreements, the Golf Pros did not receive
any money from the "green fees, locker fees, player
promotional pass fees, and tournament fees"; the Golf
Pros simply collected these fees and "remit[ted]"
them to the City. According to the parties, "the City
set the prices for greens fees, passes and locker fees"
and furnished "the equipment necessary to process
payments of greens fees, locker fees and charges for season
passes." On the other hand, the Golf Pros set food,
beverage, and merchandise prices.
The Agreements required the Golf Pros to provide either $1,
000 or $3, 500 (depending on the Agreement) each year
"to a fund to be matched by the City to execute a formal
marketing plan for [the City's] golf program." The
Agreements state that the Golf Pros "agree to
participate in the creation of this marketing plan."
Finally, the Agreements provide that "[t]he relationship
between the City and the Golf Pro shall be one of an
independent contractor and not one of employer and employee,
[I]n the operation and conduct of this Agreement, the City
does not grant Golf Pro the right to sell or distribute any
goods or services provided by the City, nor does the City
grant Golf Pro the right to use a City trade name, trademark,
service mark, logotype, advertising or other commercial
On August 1, 2012-a few months before the expiration of the
Agreements-the Golf Pros met with the City's Parks
Superintendent ("Superintendent") and other City
employees. The Superintendent informed the Golf Pros that
"the golf operation was not sustainable" and asked
for "proposals for clubhouse operations for the next
term of the" Agreements. Proposals were submitted, but
on October 8, 2012, the City's mayor decided to
"recommend internalizing clubhouse operations" to
the City's Common Council. On October 12, 2012, the
Superintendent informed the Golf Pros that the Agreements
were not going to be renewed.
On October 25, 2012, the Golf Pros served the City with a
notice of claim. See Wis.Stat. § 893.80
("Claims against governmental bodies or officers, agents
or employees; notice of injury; limitation of damages and
suits.") . On January 17, 2014, the Golf Pros filed a
complaint in Dane County circuit court against the City
alleging that the City had failed to comply with the WFDL in
terminating the City's relationships with them; the Golf
Pros sought damages. Specifically, the complaint alleged that
the City "failed to provide to the Golf Pros any written
notice of termination or nonrenewal, let alone a notice that
can be said to comply with the requirements" of the WFDL
and "failed to provide the Golf Pros with the required
60 days in which to rectify any claimed deficiency, "
adding that "indeed [the City] claimed no deficiency in
the Golf Pros' performance whatsoever." The Golf
Pros argued that the City's "nonrenewal and
termination of the Golf Pros' respective [Agreements] was
a direct violation of the WFDL."
On August 31, 2015, the circuit court issued a decision and
order granting a motion for summary judgment filed by the
City and denying a motion for partial summary judgment filed
by the Golf Pros. The decision was based on the circuit
court's conclusion that "[t]he Golf Pros'
contractual relationships with the City were not protected
'dealerships' under the [WFDL]." On September
29, 2015, the circuit court entered an order for judgment and
judgment of dismissal.
On November 11, 2015, the Golf Pros filed a notice of appeal.
On August 25, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed,
"agree[ing] with the circuit court that . . . the Golf
Pros did not have dealerships." Benson,
unpublished slip op., ¶2. On September 26, 2016, the
Golf Pros filed a petition for review in this court. On
January 10, 2017, we granted the petition.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal arose following the circuit court's decision
on summary judgment. "We review summary judgment rulings
independently, applying the well-established standards set
forth in Wis.Stat. § 802.08." Marks v. Houston
Cas. Co., 2016 WI 53, ¶35, 369 Wis.2d 547, 881
N.W.2d 309 (quoting Hirschhorn v. Auto-Owners Ins.
Co., 2012 WI 20, ¶20, 338 Wis.2d 761, 809 Wis.2d
In this case we interpret and apply the WFDL. "The
interpretation and application of a statute present questions
of law that this court reviews de novo while benefitting from
the analyses of the court of appeals and circuit court."
State v. Denny, 2017 WI 17, ¶46, 373 Wis.2d
390, 891 N.W.2d 144 (quoting State v. Alger, 2015 WI
3, ¶21, 360 Wis.2d 193, 858 N.W.2d 346) .
The WFDL governs "dealerships, " which are
specially-defined "contract[s] or agreement[s]"
entered into between "grantors" and
"dealers." Wis.Stat. §§ 135.02-135.025.
Generally speaking, where dealerships exist, the WFDL imposes
certain obligations on grantors with respect to those
relationships. For instance, grantors are prohibited from
"terminat[ing], cancel[ling], fail[ing] to renew or
substantially chang[ing] the competitive circumstances of a
dealership agreement without good cause, " Wis.Stat.
§ 135.03, and usually must provide "at least 90
days' prior written notice of termination, cancellation,
nonrenewal or substantial change in competitive
circumstances." Wis.Stat. § 135.04. If a grantor
"violates" the WFDL,
a dealer may bring an action against such grantor in any
court of competent jurisdiction for damages sustained by the
dealer as a consequence of the grantor's violation,
together with the actual costs of the action, including
reasonable actual attorney fees, and the dealer also may be
granted injunctive relief against unlawful termination,
cancellation, nonrenewal or substantial change of competitive
Wis. Stat. § 135.06.
In this case we are asked to determine whether the WFDL
applies to the City, and if so, whether the relationships
between the Golf Pros and the City are
"dealerships" under the WFDL. We now examine these
questions. A. Whether the WFDL Applies to the City
To ascertain whether the WFDL applies to the City, we look to
the text of the relevant statute. As explained, the WFDL
concerns itself with "dealerships, " which are
entered into between "grantors" and
"dealers." The WFDL defines "grantor" to
mean "a person who grants a dealership." Wis.Stat.
§ 135.02(5) . "Dealer" is defined to mean
"a person who is a grantee of a dealership situated in
this state." § 135.02(2) . Finally, the statute
defines "dealership" in part as follows:
A contract or agreement, either expressed or implied, whether
oral or written, between 2 or more persons, by which
a person is granted the right to sell or distribute goods or
services, or use a trade name, trademark, service mark,
logotype, advertising or other commercial symbol, in which
there is a community of interest in the business of offering,
selling or distributing goods or services at wholesale,
retail, by lease, agreement or otherwise.
§ 135.02(3)(a) (emphasis added). Thus, whether the WFDL
applies to the City turns on whether the City is a
"person" under the WFDL.
Luckily, "[p]erson" is defined in the WFDL: "a
natural person, partnership, joint venture,
corporation or other entity." Wis.Stat. §
135.02(6) (emphasis added). We agree with the Golf Pros that
the City falls within this definition. The WFDL applies by
its terms to "corporation[s], " and the City is a
municipal corporation. See, e.g., City of
Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis.2d
364, 370, 243 N.W.2d 422');">243 N.W.2d 422 (1976) ("By statute, the City
of Madison is 'a body corporate and politic, with powers
and privileges of a municipal corporation at common law and
conferred by these statutes.' [Wis. Stat. § 66.019]
This court has repeatedly held that a city is a municipal
corporation."); Wis.Stat. § 62.09(7) (a) ("The
corporate authority of the city shall be vested in the mayor
and common council.").
This interpretation comports with our oft-repeated rules that
" [s]tatutory language is given its common, ordinary,
and accepted meaning" and that "[i]f the meaning of
the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry."
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty.,
2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting
Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236
Wis.2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659) . "Without some indication
to the contrary, general words (like all words, general or
not) are to be accorded their full and fair scope. They are
not to be arbitrarily limited. This is the general-terms
canon." Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 101
(2012) (referring to this rule by its Latin designation,
"generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda"); see also, e.g., State
v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, ¶39, 373 Wis.2d 1, 889 N.W.2d
423 ("We will not read into the statute a limitation the
plain language does not evidence." (quoting Cty. of
Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶33, 315 Wis.2d 293, 759
N.W.2d 571)). The general term "corporation" thus
presumptively should be read to include more specific types
Numerous courts have similarly concluded that statutes
referring to "corporations" include within their
ambit municipal corporations. See, e.g., Lincoln
v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373, 373-78 (1936) (section of
Bankruptcy Act affected municipal corporations, where the
section applied to "person[s]" and
"person" was defined to include corporations);
Hoye v. United States, 277 F.2d 116, 119 (9th Cir.
1960) (section of Internal Revenue Code defining
"person" to include "an officer or employee of
a corporation" contemplated municipal corporations
because the section made "no distinction in its
applicability to different classes of corporations");
Madison Cty. Fiscal Court v. Kentucky Labor Cabinet,
352 S.W.3d 572, 576 (Ky. 2011) (cities were "subject to
. . . wage and hour requirements" of statute defining
"employer" to include "corporation[s], "
because "[a] municipal corporation is a
corporation" (second alteration in original)).
But we need not look beyond Wisconsin for guidance on the
question. In Hyland, Hall & Co. we considered
"whether cities and counties have standing to sue for
treble damages under the Wisconsin antitrust act."
Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis.2d at 367. The City
itself was one of the plaintiffs in that case. See
id. at 367-68. The relevant statute applied to
"person[s], " which was defined to include
"corporations." Id. at 369 (quoting
then-Wis. Stat. §§ 133.01, 133.04). We noted that
we had "repeatedly held that a city is a municipal
corporation" and concluded that "cities . . . are
'corporations' within the meaning of" the
statute such that the City was "entitled to sue for
treble damages." Id. at 370-71.
In the course of our analysis in that case, we also observed
that Wis.Stat. § 990.01 provided as follows:
Construction of laws; words and phrases. . . . In the
construction of Wisconsin laws the words and phrases which
follow shall be construed as indicated unless such
construction would produce a result inconsistent with the
manifest intent of the legislature:
(26) Person. "Person" includes all partnerships,
associations and bodies politic and corporate.
Id. at 369 (emphasis added) (quoting then-Wis. Stat.
§ 990.01(26)). Reasoning that a city is a "body
politic and corporate, " we confirmed that was "no
contradiction" between Wis.Stat. § 133.04 and
Wis.Stat. § 990.01(26). Id. at 370-71.
Hyland, Hall & Co. all but disposes of the
instant question. As in Hyland, Hall & Co., we
are presented with a statute that pertains to
"person[s], " defined to include
"corporation[s]." As in Hyland, Hall &
Co., we have additional guidance from the legislature
regarding the definition of the word "person": we
should construe that word in the WFDL to include "bodies
politic or corporate" "unless such construction
would produce a result inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the legislature." Wis.Stat. § 990.01(26)
. And finally, as in Hyland, Hall
& Co., the entity under consideration is the City, a
municipal corporation. One of the only differences
between Hyland, Hall & Co. and this case is that
the City was a plaintiff in the former but finds itself to be
a defendant in the latter.
"What is of paramount importance is that [the
legislature] be able to legislate against a background of
clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of
the language it adopts." DOJ v. DWD, 2015 WI
114, ¶47, 365 Wis.2d 694, 875 N.W.2d 545');">875 N.W.2d 545 (alteration in
original) (quoting Finley v. United States, 490 U.S.
545, 556 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Serv., Inc., 545 U.S. 546,
557-58 (2005)). It would be peculiar, to say the least, for
us to conclude that the City is a "corporation" and
a "person" under the relevant statute in
Hyland, Hall & Co. but not in this case. Indeed,
Hyland, Hall & Co. and this case both involve
chapters of the Wisconsin Statutes-Chapter 133 and Chapter
135, respectively-concerned with the "Regulation of
Trade." See Wis.Stat. (Table of Contents) . The
reasoning in Hyland, Hall & Co. applies with
equal force here, so we simply apply it. See DO J v.
DWD, 365 Wis.2d 694, ¶47 (observing that the word
"disclose" had been interpreted in a prior case
involving a different statute than the one at issue and
stating, "[W]e would require a convincing reason indeed
to interpret 'disclose' any differently in this
The noscitur a sociis canon of construction does not
change our conclusion. That canon provides that "an
unclear statutory term should be understood in the same sense
as the words immediately surrounding or coupled with
it." Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves
v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶40, 270 Wis.2d 318, 677 N.W.2d
612. For reasons already discussed, the word
"corporation" is not unclear, so we have no need to
resort to the canon. But even if we did, the words
"natural person, " "partnership, "
"joint venture, " and "other entity" do
not so plainly evidence legislative exclusion of municipal
corporations from the meaning of "corporation" that
we may conclude that the City falls outside the WFDL.
A court has no right to resort to the maxim  of noscitur a
sociis . . . for the purpose of reading into a statute a
distinction which the legislature neither made nor intended
to make. [This] rule [is] not the master  of the courts,
but merely their servant , to aid them in ascertaining the
legislative intent. [It] afford[s] a mere suggestion to the
judicial mind that, where it clearly appears that the
lawmakers were thinking of a particular class of persons or
objects, their words of more general description may not have
been intended to embrace any other than those within the
Boardman v. State, 203 Wis. 173, 176, 233 N.W.2d 556
(1930) (quoting Benson v. Chicago St. P., M. & 0. Ry.
Co., 77 N.W. 798, 799 (1899)); see also, e.g.,
State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶35, 308 Wis.2d
615, 748 N.W.2d 447');">748 N.W.2d 447 (concluding that the noscitur a
sociis canon did not apply because of a lack of
similarity between listed terms); cf. Noffke ex rel.
Swenson v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, ¶27, 315 Wis.2d 350,
760 N.W.2d 156 ("If the legislature intended such a
narrow construction, the legislature could have clearly
placed such a restriction in the text of the statute.").
Finally, Wis.Stat. § 135.07 must be considered. That
section, entitled "Nonapplicability, " lists
certain parties to whom the WFDL does not apply. See,
e.g., Wis.Stat. § 135.07 ("This chapter does
not apply: ... (2) To the insurance business."). Cities
are not among those listed. Clearly the legislature
recognized the need to circumscribe the WFDL in certain
circumstances, and we cannot conclude that the possibility
that the WFDL might apply to cities is so farfetched as to
have escaped its consideration. "Under the
well-established canon of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius (the expression of one thing excludes another),
where the legislature specifically enumerates certain
exceptions to a statute, we conclude, based on that rule,
that the legislature intended to exclude any other
exception." State v. Delaney, 2003 WI 9,
¶22, 259 Wis.2d 77, 658 N.W.2d 416; cf. Lake City
Corp. v. City of Mequon, 207 Wis.2d 155, 171, 558 N.W.2d
100 (1997) ("It is clear that the legislature knew how
to accomplish this goal, since it included similar qualifying
language in this very same statute.").
In sum, we conclude that the City is a "person"
under the WFDL, and that the WFDL therefore applies to
Whether the Relationships Between the Golf Pros and the City
Are "Dealerships" Under the WFDL
Having concluded that the WFDL applies to the City, we now
address whether the relationships between the Golf Pros and
the City are "dealerships" under the WFDL. Whether
a relationship constitutes a "dealership" under the
WFDL is a recurring question for courts, see Bush v.
Nat'1 School Studios, Inc., 139 Wis.2d 635, 646, 407
N.W.2d 883, in part because the definition of
"dealership" in the WFDL is "both extremely
broad and highly nuanced." Baldewein Co. v.
Tri-Clover, Inc., 2000 WI 20, ¶12, 233 Wis.2d 57,
606 N.W.2d 145');">606 N.W.2d 145. "In most cases, there is rarely an
obvious answer to the question of whether a business is a
dealership . . . ." Bush, 139 Wis.2d at 647.
Again, the WFDL defines "dealership" in part as
A contract or agreement, either expressed or implied, whether
oral or written, between 2 or more persons, by which a person
is granted the right to sell or distribute goods or services,
or use a trade name, trademark, service mark, logotype,
advertising or other commercial symbol, in which there is a
community of interest in the business of offering, selling or
distributing goods or services at wholesale, retail, by
lease, agreement or otherwise.
Wis. Stat. § 135.02(3) (a) . In determining whether this
definition is satisfied, our cases have typically divided the
statutory language into three parts: (1) the existence of a
contract or agreement between two or more persons; (2) by
which a person is granted one of the rights specified; and
(3) in which there is the requisite "community of
interest." See, e.g., Kania v. Airborne
Freight Corp., 99 Wis.2d 746, 763, 300 N.W.2d 63 (1981).
In arguing that a dealership existed in this case, the Golf
Pros point to Wis.Stat. § 135.025, which states that
Chapter 135 "shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying remedial purposes and policies."
§ 135.025(1). The statute lists the WFDL's
"underlying purposes and policies" as follows:
(a) To promote the compelling interest of the public in fair
business relations between dealers and grantors, and in the
continuation of dealerships on a fair basis;
(b) To protect dealers against unfair treatment by grantors,
who inherently have superior economic power and superior
bargaining power in the negotiation of dealerships;
(c) To provide dealers with rights and remedies in addition
to those existing by contract or common law;
(d) To govern all dealerships, including any renewals or
amendments, to the full extent consistent with the
constitutions of this state and the United States.
§ 135.025(2) . Pursuant to established case law,
however, the rule of liberal construction set forth in §
135.025(1) does not, generally speaking, apply to the
definition of "dealership":
If a relationship is a dealership, the protections afforded
the dealer are to be construed and applied liberally to the
dealer. But the statute itself undertakes to draw a line to
encompass the kinds of enterprises and relationships which
are to enjoy such protection. There is no basis upon which
the courts can provide that protection to enterprises and
relationships which fall without the legislative line."
Kania, 99 Wis.2d at 775 (quoting H. Phillips Co.
v. Brown- Forman Distillers Corp., 483 F.Supp.
1289 (W.D. Wis. 1980)); cf. DO J v. DWD, 365 Wis.2d
694, ¶31 ("This policy contains the very language
we must interpret in this case. We cannot construe the
statute liberally in aid of disclosure of information and
protection from retaliatory action for disclosure of
information until we know what the terms 'disclosure of
information' and 'retaliatory action'
Returning to the three-part test for the existence of a
dealership, we already know that the City, like the Golf
Pros, is a "person" under the WFDL. Additionally,
the Agreements between the parties are obviously
"contract[s] or agreement[s]." Our inquiry thus
revolves around whether the other two conditions necessary
for the creation of a ...