United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
ELLIOTT G. KYLES, Plaintiff,
JEFF BRANN, BEAU G. LIEGEOIS, TIMOTHY A. HINKFUSS, and WILLIAM R. F. ACKELL, Defendants.
DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE
(DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING THE COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 1), AND
DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ADD A PARTY (DKT. NO.
PAMELA PEPPER United States District Judge.
plaintiff, a state prisoner who is representing himself,
filed a complaint alleging that the defendants violated his
constitutional rights. Dkt. No. 1. The plaintiff also filed a
motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing
fee, dkt. no. 2, and a motion to add a party, dkt. no. 8.
This decision screens the complaint and resolves the
Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepayment of the Filing
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case
because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his
complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. The PLRA allows a court to
give an incarcerated plaintiff the ability to proceed with
his lawsuit without prepaying the case filing fee, as long as
he meets certain conditions. One of those conditions is that
the plaintiff pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C.
5, 2017, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial
partial filing fee of $8.30. Dkt. No. 5. The plaintiff paid
the initial partial filing fee on June 16, 2017. Accordingly,
the court will grant the plaintiff's motion to proceed
without prepayment of the filing fee. The court will order
the plaintiff to pay the remainder of the filing fee over
time in the manner explained at the end of this decision.
Screening the Plaintiff's Complaint
requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a).
The court must dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff raises
claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,
” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
proceed under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege
that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the
defendant was acting under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North
Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see
also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The
court gives a pro se plaintiff's allegations,
“however inartfully pleaded, ” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
The Plaintiff's Allegations
plaintiff alleges that defendant Beau G. Liegeois, a district
attorney, failed to protect the plaintiff's Fourth, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Dkt. No. 1 at 3-4.
Specifically, the plaintiff explains that, despite Liegeois
knowing that a police officer is not permitted to stop or pat
down a person on the street without reasonable suspicion,
Liegeois “went forward with this unlawful
prosecution.” Id. at 4. The plaintiff also
states that Liegeois failed to produce highly exculpatory
evidence that would have created reasonable doubt, including
the warrant and the “CAD report” leading up to
and after his arrest. Id.
plaintiff alleges that defendant Jeff Brann, of the drug task
force, illegally seized the plaintiff in a drug
investigation, without any evidence that the plaintiff had
committed a crime. Id. at 5. He states that Brann
has indicated that he was looking for the plaintiff based on
an arrest warrant, but, according to the plaintiff, Brann had
no written warrant describing the person to be seized.
Id. The plaintiff argues that without a warrant,
there was no basis for the stop and subsequent pat-down
the plaintiff states that defendant William R. F. Ackell, the
plaintiff's public defender, “sabotaged [his]
motion hearing on 4/12/16 and refused to ask the witness
questions, [he] wanted him to ask.” Id. The
plaintiff also states that Ackwell refused to file an
interlocutory appeal and failed to defend the plaintiff to
the best of his ability. Id.
the plaintiff alleges that defendant Judge Timothy A.
Hinkfuss overlooked the violation of the plaintiff's
constitutional rights and denied the plaintiff's motion
to suppress evidence even though the State never proved
probable cause existed. Id. at 6. The plaintiff
argues that Judge Hinkfuss “exceed[ed] the proper
bounds of judicial discretion and triggered the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees of substantive and ...