Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Booker v. Johnsonville Sausage LLC

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

July 31, 2017

DELVARIS BOOKER, Plaintiff,
v.
JOHNSONVILLE SAUSAGE LLC, Defendant.

          ORDER

          J. P. STADTMUELLER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Plaintiff Delvaris Booker (“Booker”) filed this action against his former employer, Defendant Johnsonville Sausage LLC (“Johnsonville”), complaining of racial discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See (Docket #1). On June 29, 2017, Johnsonville filed a motion for summary judgment as to all of Booker's claims. (Docket #34). For the reasons stated below, it will be granted.

         1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit” under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. The court construes all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must not weigh the evidence presented or determine credibility of witnesses; the Seventh Circuit instructs that “we leave those tasks to factfinders.” Berry v. Chicago Transit Auth., 618 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 2010).

         2. RELEVANT FACTS

         2.1 Plaintiff's Failure to Dispute the Material Facts

         The relevant facts are undisputed because Booker did not dispute them. In connection with its motion, Johnsonville filed a supporting statement of material facts that it asserted were not in dispute. In response, Booker filed a one-page motion requesting denial of Johnsonville's motion and his own five-page statement of material facts with accompanying exhibits. (Docket #41, #42).

         Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Civil Local Rule 56 describe in detail the form and contents of a proper opposition to a motion for summary judgment. In particular, Local Rule 56 mandates that a party opposing summary judgment must file a concise response to the moving party's statement of facts that must contain:

(i) a reproduction of each numbered paragraph in the moving party's statement of facts followed by a response to each paragraph, including, in the case of any disagreement, specific references to the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon, and
(ii) a statement, consisting of short numbered paragraphs, of any additional facts that require the denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, declarations, parts of the record, and other supporting materials relied upon to support the facts described in that paragraph. A non-moving party may not file more than 100 separately-numbered statements of additional facts[.]

Civ. L. R. 56(b)(2)(B). The Rule warns that “[t]he Court will deem uncontroverted statements of material fact admitted solely for the purpose of deciding summary judgment.” Id. 56(b)(4). Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a party seeking to dispute an asserted fact must cite to specific materials in the record which support such a dispute. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the party fails to do so, the Rule permits the court to deem the fact undisputed. Id. 56(e)(2).

         These rules provide for the orderly disposition of cases “by ensuring that the proposed findings of fact are in a form that permits the district court to analyze the admissible evidence supporting particular factual propositions and determine precisely what facts, if any, are material and disputed.” Schmidt v. Eagle Waste & Recycling, Inc., 599 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2010). They are not “hyper-technical” and they do not turn litigation into a game of skill. Id. Instead, they provide “plain instructions” designed to “assist the court by organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and. . .imposing some discipline on the pretrial process.” Markham v. White, 172 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1999).

         Booker ignored these rules, foisting onto the Court the task of reviewing the evidence for anything that might rebut Johnsonville's proffered facts. However, “district courts are not obliged in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes and may adopt local rules reasonably designed to streamline the resolution of summary judgment motions.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994); Herman v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 1989) (“A district court need not scour the record to make the case of a party who does nothing.”).

         In reviewing applications of a district court's local summary judgment rules, the Seventh Circuit has “repeatedly held that requiring strict compliance with [such rules] is not an abuse of the district court's discretion.” Zoretic v. Darge, 832 F.3d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 2016); Anders v. Waste Mgmt. of Wis., 463 F.3d 670, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2006). Indeed, even in cases brought by pro se plaintiffs, the Court is entitled to strictly enforce the rules regarding summary judgment procedure. See Hill v. Thalacker, 210 F. App'x 513, 515 (7th Cir. 2006). Consequently, the Court finds that Booker has not complied with the requirements of Local Rule 56 and it deems admitted each of Johnsonville's statements of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Civ. L. R. 56(b)(4).

         2.2 Facts Material to the Disposition of Defendant's Motion

         Booker is African-American. He began his employment with Johnsonville in January 2015. Robert Roska (“Roska”) was part of the team that interviewed Booker and recommended him for employment. Booker initially ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.