United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DERRICK P. JONES, Plaintiff,
MEG SCHNABL, and CONNIE ACHERSON, Defendants.
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT
PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT
PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 8), SCREENING
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT, AND DIRECTING PLAINTIFF TO FILE AN
PAMELA PEPPER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
plaintiff, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing
himself, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, dkt.
no. 1, along with an incomplete motion for leave to proceed
without prepayment of the filing fee, dkt. no. 2. The
plaintiff later submitted a prisoner trust account statement,
dkt. no. 5, and a completed motion for leave to proceed
without prepayment of the filing fee, dkt. no. 8. This order
resolves his motions and screens his complaint.
Motions for Leave to Proceed without Prepayment of the
noted above, the first motion that the plaintiff filed asking
the court to allow him to proceed without pre-paying the
filing fee was incomplete. Dkt. No. 2. It contained only the
first page of the form, and the plaintiff did not provide his
prison trust account statement. The court will deny that
the plaintiff's second motion: the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff
was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. 28 U.S.C.
§1915. The PLRA allows a court to give an incarcerated
plaintiff the ability to proceed with his lawsuit without
prepaying the case filing fee, as long as he meets certain
conditions. One of those conditions is that the plaintiff pay
an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b).
November 16, 2016, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an
initial partial filing fee of $17.27. Dkt. No. 6. The
plaintiff paid that fee on December 7, 2016. Accordingly, the
court will grant the plaintiff's completed, second,
motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing
fee. The court will require the plaintiff to pay the
remainder of the filing fee over time as set forth at the end
of this decision.
Screening the Plaintiff's Complaint
requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a).
The court must dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff raises
claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,
” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b).
state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
proceed under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege
that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the
defendant was acting under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North
Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see
also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The
court gives a pro se plaintiff's allegations,
“however inartfully pleaded, ” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
4, 2016, the plaintiff was an inmate at the Waukesha County
Jail. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. That day, he was placed in
administrative segregation for being disruptive. Id.
He did not, however, receive a due process hearing.
Id. at 3. The jail administrators told the plaintiff
that he was not placed in segregation for a disciplinary
reason, but the plaintiff maintains that he had a right to a
due process hearing even if his segregation placement was
labeled administrative. Id. at 3.
plaintiff also asserts that he was placed in segregation
because he was African American, while a Caucasian inmate
remained in the general population. Id. The
plaintiff contends that both he and the Caucasian inmate
should have been placed in segregation until the
investigation was completed. Id. Further, the