United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
OPINION & ORDER
D. PETERSON District Judge.
petitioner Gaylen Jackson is a prisoner in the custody of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) currently housed at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Oxford, Wisconsin
(FCI-Oxford). He is serving a sentence for a 1998 conviction
for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Jackson has
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 challenging his sentence under Mathis v.
United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016).
petition is before the court for preliminary review, pursuant
to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases. Under Rule 4, I will dismiss the petition
only if it plainly appears that Jackson is not entitled to
relief. As discussed below, Jackson is not entitled to the
relief that he seeks, so I will dismiss the petition.
the following facts from Jackson's petition, Dkt. 1, and
publicly available case records.
a 1998 jury trial, Jackson was found guilty of one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) in the United States District Court for the
District of Minnesota. The court record is unclear, but
Jackson states that he was sentenced under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924, which imposes a
mandatory minimum 15-year sentence of imprisonment on
defendants convicted of being a felon in possession of a
firearm who have three or more previous convictions for a
violent felony. (Without the ACCA sentencing enhancement, the
felon-in-possession statute sets only a 10-year maximum
sentence with no minimum. See § 924(a)(2).)
Jackson has several previous felony convictions. He indicates
that the sentencing judge found that the ACCA applied to him
because of prior Minnesota convictions for robbery and
burglary. The court sentenced Jackson to 20 years of
imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release.
His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.
2000, Jackson moved to vacate or set aside his conviction
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the District of Minnesota. The
motion was denied. Jackson completed his period of
imprisonment and reentered the community on supervised
release. In 2016, his supervised release was revoked and he
was sentenced to 11 months of imprisonment followed by two
years of supervised release. Jackson then filed a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 in this court.
postconviction relief to federal prisoners generally must
proceed under § 2255, Jackson brings this challenge
under § 2241. To obtain relief under § 2241, a
habeas petitioner must satisfy three conditions. First, the
prisoner must show that he relies on a judicial decision in
“a ‘statutory-interpretation case, ' rather
than a ‘constitutional case.'” Brown v.
Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Brown v. Rios, 696 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2012)).
“Second, the prisoner must show that he relies on a
retroactive decision that he could not have invoked in his
first § 2255 motion.” Id. Third, the
prisoner must demonstrate that there was “a grave
enough error to be deemed a miscarriage of justice corrigible
therefore in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Id.
(quoting Rios, 696 F.3d at 640). Jackson plainly
cannot satisfy the third condition, so I must dismiss his
who was sentenced under the ACCA, challenges his sentence
under Mathis, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision.
Mathis interpreted the enumerated offense clause
within the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The
enumerated offense clause defines “violent
felony” to include “burglary, arson, or
extortion.” In Mathis, the Court reaffirmed
the proper process for determining whether a defendant's
prior state-law conviction is one of the enumerated violent
felonies under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii): the
“categorical approach.” 136 S.Ct. at 2248. Under
the categorical approach, the sentencing court should compare
the elements of the state law under which the defendant was
convicted to the elements of the generic version of the
enumerated violent felony. If the state law “define[s]
multiple crimes” by listing “elements in the
alternative, ” the sentencing court should use the
“modified categorical approach, ” which permits a
court to look at a “limited class of documents [from
the record of a prior conviction] to determine what crime,
with what elements, a defendant was convicted of” and
then “compare that crime . . . with the relevant
generic offense.” Id. at 2249. Upon
comparison, if the state law is “the same as, or
narrower than, the relevant generic offense, ” it
qualifies as an enumerated violent felony. Id. at
satisfies the first condition, because Mathis is a
statutory-interpretation case. Dawkins v. United
States, 829 F.3d 549, 551 (7th Cir. 2016). As for the
second condition, Mathis “appears to be a
substantive rule that applies retroactively.”
Pulliam v. Krueger, No. 16-cv-1379, 2017 WL 104184,
at *2 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2017); see also Holt v. United
States, 843 F.3d 720, 722 (7th Cir. 2016) (“noting
that “substantive decisions such as Mathis
presumptively apply retroactively on collateral
review”). But see Robinson v. Krueger, No.
17-cv-1187, 2017 WL 2407253, at *5 (C.D. Ill. June 2, 2017)
(“Mathis is not retroactive.”).
Jackson cannot obtain relief under § 2241 because he
cannot satisfy the third condition. That is, he cannot
demonstrate that there was any error in his
sentencing, let alone a grave enough error to be deemed a
miscarriage of justice. I take Jackson to contend that under
Mathis, the sentencing court erroneously found that
three of his prior Minnesota convictions for second-degree
burglary, attempted first-degree burglary, simple robbery,
and attempted aggravated robbery were violent felonies.
with the two 1994 robbery convictions, The Seventh Circuit
has held, under the categorical approach required by
Mathis, that a conviction under Minnesota's
simple robbery statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.24, is a
violent felony under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines'
force clause, which is identical to the ACCA's force
clause: both define violent felony to include crimes that
have “as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another.” See United States v. Maxwell, 823
F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct.
401 (2016). Minnesota's aggravated robbery statute,
§ 609.245, is based on the simple robbery statute,
therefore a conviction under the first-degree aggravated
robbery statute-including a conviction for attempted
first-degree aggravated robbery-is necessarily a violent
felony under the force clause, too.
1988 second-degree burglary conviction is a violent felony
under the ACCA's enumerated offense clause.
“Generic” burglary is “an unlawful or
unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other
structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor
v. UnitedStates, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990). The
1986 version of Minn. Stat. ...