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Glover v. Co Schraufnagel

United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin

August 31, 2017

CALVIN GLOVER, Plaintiff,
v.
CO SCHRAUFNAGEL, [1] Defendant.

          OPINION & ORDER

          JAMES D. PETERSON, DISTRICT JUDGE.

         Pro se plaintiff Calvin Glover is a prisoner in the custody of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections, currently housed at the Columbia Correctional Institution (CCI). Glover filed a complaint alleging that a CCI correctional officer, CO Schraufnagel, was deliberately indifferent to Glover's safety when he drafted a conduct report falsely stating that Glover provided information against another inmate. Glover alleges that Schraufnagel knew or should have known that naming Glover in the report “created a substantial and unreasonable risk to [his] health and safety.” Dkt. 1, at 3. I granted Glover leave to proceed on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim and a state-law libel claim against Schraufnagel. Dkt. 15.

         Now the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Dkt. 22 and Dkt. 25. Glover moves for summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim; Schraufnagel moves for summary judgment on both claims. Because Glover has not adduced evidence sufficient to sustain his Eighth Amendment claim, I will grant summary judgment in Schraufnagel's favor on that claim and will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Glover's state-law claim.

         UNDISPUTED FACTS

         Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed.

         On September 23, 2014, while searching Glover's cell, CCI correctional officer James Schraufnagel found a calculator marked with another inmate's name-Julius Coleman. Schraufnagel investigated and determined that Coleman did not own a calculator, that the calculator belonged to CCI's school, that Coleman had not checked out the calculator, and that Coleman did not attend CCI's school. So Schraufnagel wrote a conduct report charging Coleman with theft and other rules violations. In the report, Schraufnagel noted that Glover had told him that he received the calculator from Coleman. The parties dispute whether Glover said anything about getting the calculator from Coleman.

         The next day, Coleman confronted Glover about the conduct report and what Glover purportedly told Schraufnagel. According to Glover, other prisoners have ostracized him and labeled him a “snitch” as a result of the conduct report.

         On October 13, 2014, another inmate assaulted Glover. Glover told the Health Services Unit (HSU) that he “was doing leg lifts on the pull up bar at rec and another inmate came from behind and just kicked me.” Dkt. 24-2, at 2. HSU observed a large purple bruise on the inside of Glover's left thigh and noted “[n]o deformities or swelling[. Range of motion] intact.” Id. Glover reported that the inmate was “apologetic” and “thought he was someone else so it ended there and nothing came of it.” Id. at 3. But now Glover says that the nurse lied in the medical records. He told her that he didn't want to report the inmate who kicked him because he feared retaliation. Glover maintains that that inmate called him a snitch as he kicked him.

         Schraufnagel states that he was not aware that other inmates had labeled Glover a snitch. Glover never told him that others thought he was a snitch or that he believed he was in danger. Glover asked Schraufnagel to amend his report, to clarify that Glover never told Schraufnagel that Coleman had given him the calculator. But that was it. Glover did not tell Schraufnagel that the conduct report had caused him trouble until after the October assault.

         ANALYSIS

         The court must enter summary judgment if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the court “look[s] to the burden of proof that each party would bear on an issue of trial; [and] then require[s] that party to go beyond the pleadings and affirmatively to establish a genuine issue of material fact.” Santaella v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 123 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 1997). If either party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial, ” summary judgment against that party is appropriate. Mid Am. Title Co. v. Kirk, 59 F.3d 719, 721 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Tatalovich v. City of Superior, 904 F.2d 1135, 1139 (7th Cir. 1990)). “As with any summary judgment motion, this [c]ourt reviews these cross-motions ‘construing all facts, and drawing all reasonable inferences from those facts, in favor of . . . the non-moving party.'” Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 756 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Auto. Mechs. Local 701 Welfare & Pension Funds v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 502 F.3d 740, 748 (7th Cir. 2007)).

         “[S]ummary judgment ‘is the “put up or shut up” moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.'” Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Schacht v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999)). A mere “scintilla of evidence” is not enough to survive. Pugh v. City of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 625 (7th Cir. 2001).

         A. Eighth Amendment

         “Because officials have taken away virtually all of a prisoner's ability to protect himself, the Constitution imposes on officials the duty to protect those in their charge from harm from other prisoners.” Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001)). “A prison official's ‘deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). To maintain an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner must adduce evidence that he was “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm, ” and that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to that risk. Id. at 834. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. A prison official has “an obligation ‘to take reasonable measures to abate [the risk]'” only if he knows about it. Dale, 548 F.3d at 569 (quoting Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006)). A prison ...


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