September 12, 2017
from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 15 cv 2330 -
Charles P. Kocoras, Judge.
Bauer, Easterbrook, and Kanne, Circuit Judges.
Smith, a registered sex offender, was convicted of driving
with a revoked license and sentenced to one year's
imprisonment followed by one year's mandatory supervised
release. To begin his supervised released-often called
parole-Smith needed the Illinois Department of Corrections to
approve a host site. On his release date Smith submitted two
host sites. At that time, the Department had not investigated
or approved the proposed sites. A parole supervisor therefore
ordered Smith's parole officer, Paul Anderson, to issue a
parole violation report rather than release Smith.
parole violation report contained incorrect statements.
Principally, the report claimed that electronic monitoring
was a condition of Smith's supervised release. It also
noted that the Department had attempted to place Smith at a
host site that would allow him to comply with the electronic
monitoring requirement. Neither statement was accurate.
spent another six months in custody before the Department
released him on good-time credit. He sued his parole officer,
Paul Anderson, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged
violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted
Anderson's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
the defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See,
e.g., Werner v. Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 758-9 (7th Cir.
2016). To do so, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
violated a clearly establish statutory or constitutional
right. Id. Here, Smith cannot demonstrate that
Anderson violated a clearly established constitutional right,
even when we view the facts in the light most favorable to
brings his 1983 claim for an alleged violation of the Fourth
Amendment. He argues that Anderson's parole violation
report led the Department to hold him beyond his release
date. Because Anderson lacked reasonable suspicion for the
facts that formed the basis of his report, Smith insists that
the report violated the Fourth Amendment. See Knox v.
Smith, 342 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that
the seizure of a parolee without reasonable suspicion could
violate the Fourth Amendment).
immunity bars Smith's claim. No court has held that the
Fourth Amendment compels the release of sex offenders who
lack lawful and approved living arrangements. Brown v.
Randle, 847 F.3d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 2017). Thus, when
sex offenders lack these arrangements, their continued
detention does not violate clearly established rights. In
such circumstances, the officers responsible for their
detention are entitled to qualified immunity. Id.
the situation here. Indeed, Illinois law requires the
Department to ensure that inmates have proper and approved
residences before releasing them on parole. 111. Admin. Code
tit. 20, § 1610.110. It also authorizes the Department
to hold inmates until it has approved their living
arrangements. Id. As of his release date, Department
had not approved Smith's host site. Thus, Smith's
continued detention did not violate a clearly established
insists that the Department had approved his host site. He
claims that in the absence of additional conditions imposed
by statute or the parole board, an inmate satisfies section
1610.110's approval requirement by submitting any site
that allows law enforcement to monitor the parolee. Thus,
Smith contends, the Department automatically approved his
site when he submitted his mother's residence and she
agreed to host him.
course, that cannot be the case. The Department's
approval-not the inmate's submission-entitles an inmate
to release under the Code. And despite Smith's
contentions, the Department's approval is neither
mechanical nor ...