September 18, 2017
from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 12 CR 421 - John
Z. Lee, Judge.
Bauer, Flaum, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.
September 6, 2012, a grand jury indicted Odell Givens on
three counts of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), and one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Givens pleaded guilty
to all four counts on February 14, 2014.
April 28, 2014, the United States Probation Office filed a
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), which it updated on
June 18, 2015. The PSR calculated Givens' total offense
level at 37, with a criminal history category of IV,
resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines range of 292 to 365
months' imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised
made several objections to the PSR in his sentencing
memorandum. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, he
objected to the PSR's proposed condition of supervised
release that would require him to "remain within the
jurisdiction where [he] is being supervised, unless granted
permission to leave by the court or a probation
officer." Givens argued that, if the court were to
impose the condition, he should only be prohibited from
"knowingly" leaving the jurisdiction.
district court held Givens' sentencing hearing in two
parts, on December 1 and December 14, 2016. The court
overruled Givens' objection to the supervised release
condition. It also clarified that the condition's
reference to "jurisdiction" meant "the federal
district in which he is being supervised" and admonished
Givens that it was his responsibility to familiarize himself
with the district's boundaries. The court sentenced
Givens to 186 months imprisonment followed by five years of
supervised release. Givens timely appealed.
raises three challenges to his sentence. First, he contends
that the court erred by imposing the supervised release
condition prohibiting him from traveling outside the
jurisdiction without permission. Second, he argues that the
written judgment's inclusion of a $400 special assessment
was error because the court failed to include it in its oral
pronouncement of his sentence. Finally, he contends that the
written judgment erroneously fails to define "excessive
use of alcohol."
Supervised Release Condition
U.S.C. § 3563(b) sets forth a list of discretionary
conditions that district courts may impose as part of a
sentence of supervised release. At issue here is the
condition that a defendant "remain within the
jurisdiction of the court, unless granted permission to leave
by the court or a probation officer." Id.
§ 3563(b)(14). Givens argues that the court should not
have imposed this condition at all, or alternatively, that
the court should have modified the condition to include a
knowledge requirement. Because Givens objected to the
condition in the district court, we review for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Douglas, 806 F.3d 979,
983 (7th Cir. 2015).
contends that the court should not have imposed this
condition in any form because, in his case, the condition
does not satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). That section
requires that any condition of supervised release involve
"no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary for the purposes set forth" in § 3553(a).
As we have stated repeatedly, however, this particular
condition is administrative in nature and can be imposed
whenever a district court adequately explains the need for
supervised release in the first instance. United States
v. Warren, 843 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016).
Givens does not argue that the court failed to explain its
reasons for imposing a term of supervised release. There is
no basis, therefore, to find that the court abused its
discretion in imposing this particular condition.
support for his argument that the court should have included
the word "knowingly" in the condition, Givens notes
that we have previously stated that this condition
"would be improved by explicitly adding a scienter
requirement, particularly in a case where it is foreseeable
that a defendant will reside near the boundary of two
judicial districts." United States v. Kappes,782 F.3d 828, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2015). In a later case,
however, we clarified that such language is not mandatory,
and that courts may impose this condition without it.
Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931. There is no contention here
that Givens lives on or near the boundary of two districts,
and he presents no other compelling argument as to why ...