Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

United States v. Givens

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

November 14, 2017

United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Odell Givens, Defendant-Appellant.

          Argued September 18, 2017

         Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 12 CR 421 - John Z. Lee, Judge.

          Before Bauer, Flaum, and Sykes, Circuit Judges.

          Bauer, Circuit Judge.

         On September 6, 2012, a grand jury indicted Odell Givens on three counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Givens pleaded guilty to all four counts on February 14, 2014.

         On April 28, 2014, the United States Probation Office filed a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), which it updated on June 18, 2015. The PSR calculated Givens' total offense level at 37, with a criminal history category of IV, resulting in a Sentencing Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months' imprisonment, followed by a term of supervised release.

         Givens made several objections to the PSR in his sentencing memorandum. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, he objected to the PSR's proposed condition of supervised release that would require him to "remain within the jurisdiction where [he] is being supervised, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation officer." Givens argued that, if the court were to impose the condition, he should only be prohibited from "knowingly" leaving the jurisdiction.

         The district court held Givens' sentencing hearing in two parts, on December 1 and December 14, 2016. The court overruled Givens' objection to the supervised release condition. It also clarified that the condition's reference to "jurisdiction" meant "the federal district in which he is being supervised" and admonished Givens that it was his responsibility to familiarize himself with the district's boundaries. The court sentenced Givens to 186 months imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. Givens timely appealed.

         I. DISCUSSION

         Givens raises three challenges to his sentence. First, he contends that the court erred by imposing the supervised release condition prohibiting him from traveling outside the jurisdiction without permission. Second, he argues that the written judgment's inclusion of a $400 special assessment was error because the court failed to include it in its oral pronouncement of his sentence. Finally, he contends that the written judgment erroneously fails to define "excessive use of alcohol."

         A. Supervised Release Condition

         18 U.S.C. § 3563(b) sets forth a list of discretionary conditions that district courts may impose as part of a sentence of supervised release. At issue here is the condition that a defendant "remain within the jurisdiction of the court, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation officer." Id. § 3563(b)(14). Givens argues that the court should not have imposed this condition at all, or alternatively, that the court should have modified the condition to include a knowledge requirement. Because Givens objected to the condition in the district court, we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Douglas, 806 F.3d 979, 983 (7th Cir. 2015).

         Givens contends that the court should not have imposed this condition in any form because, in his case, the condition does not satisfy 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). That section requires that any condition of supervised release involve "no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth" in § 3553(a). As we have stated repeatedly, however, this particular condition is administrative in nature and can be imposed whenever a district court adequately explains the need for supervised release in the first instance. United States v. Warren, 843 F.3d 275, 281 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Poulin, 809 F.3d 924, 931 (7th Cir. 2016). Givens does not argue that the court failed to explain its reasons for imposing a term of supervised release. There is no basis, therefore, to find that the court abused its discretion in imposing this particular condition.

         As support for his argument that the court should have included the word "knowingly" in the condition, Givens notes that we have previously stated that this condition "would be improved by explicitly adding a scienter requirement, particularly in a case where it is foreseeable that a defendant will reside near the boundary of two judicial districts." United States v. Kappes,782 F.3d 828, 849-50 (7th Cir. 2015). In a later case, however, we clarified that such language is not mandatory, and that courts may impose this condition without it. Poulin, 809 F.3d at 931. There is no contention here that Givens lives on or near the boundary of two districts, and he presents no other compelling argument as to why ...


Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.