United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
CHARLES W. YOUNG-COOPER, Petitioner,
STATE OF WISCONSIN, Respondent.
STADTMUELLER U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
March 30, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for an extension of
time to submit a federal habeas petition. (Docket #1).
Petitioner states that he is no longer in physical custody,
but is still subject to a period of supervised release.
Id. at 3. Petitioner indicates that he filed a
motion for a sentence modification in Wisconsin state court.
Id. at 1. The motion was denied by the circuit
court, and that ruling was upheld by the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals on November 11, 2015. Id. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court denied his petition for review on April 6,
2016. Id. at 2. Petitioner thus believed that his
deadline for filing a federal habeas action was April 6,
2017. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Through the
instant motion, Petitioner seeks a 120-day extension, or
until August 5, 2017, to file his petition. (Docket #1 at 2).
motion cannot itself be construed as a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus because it offers no grounds for relief.
See Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts. Rather, the
motion is better understood as a request that
Petitioner's limitations period be equitably tolled in
advance of the filing of a petition. Socha v.
Pollard, 621 F.3d 667, 670-71 (7th Cir. 2010). For the
motion to be granted, it must show that Petitioner meets the
standards for equitable tolling. Id.
the Court notes that Petitioner is not quite correct on the
end date of his limitations period. A state prisoner in
custody pursuant to a state court judgment has one year from
the date “the judgment became final” to seek
federal habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A
judgment becomes final within the meaning of Section
2244(d)(1)(A) when all direct appeals in the state courts are
concluded followed by either the completion or denial of
certiorari proceedings in the U.S. Supreme Court, or, if
certiorari is not sought, at the expiration of the 90 days
allowed for filing for certiorari. See Ray v.
Clements, 700 F.3d 993, 1003 (7th Cir. 2012). Accounting
for that extra 90 days, Petitioner's limitations period
began to run on July 5, 2016, and thus ended on July 5, 2017.
with this slight extension, Petitioner's motion
nevertheless fails to establish his entitlement to equitable
tolling. “A petitioner ‘is entitled to equitable
tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his
rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing.'” Socha v. Boughton, 763 F.3d 674,
683 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Holland v. Florida, 560
U.S. 631, 649 (2010)). As to the first element, Petitioner
must not only describe his diligence in the time after the
limitations period expired, but before it as well.
Carpenter v. Douma, 840 F.3d 867, 870 (7th Cir.
2016). Petitioner makes no attempt to explain how he
diligently pursued his rights from July 5, 2016 until the
filing of his motion on March 30, 2017. A review of publicly
available Wisconsin court records suggests that he has done
nothing at all, at least with respect to filing motions or
other papers in his state court criminal case. See State
of Wisconsin v. Charles Young-Cooper, 1997-CF-24, Court
Record Events, available at
https://wcca.wicourts.gov (no meaningful events
docketed since the April 6, 2016 order denying review from
the Wisconsin Supreme Court). Petitioner has not shown that
his situation warrants equitable tolling. His motion must,
therefore, be denied. As this case was opened solely for the
Court to consider and rule upon Petitioner's motion, the
action itself will also be dismissed.
Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases,
“the district court must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the
applicant.” To obtain a certificate of appealability
under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), Petitioner must make a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right” by establishing that “reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal citations
omitted). Further, when the Court has denied relief on
procedural grounds, the petitioner must show that jurists of
reason would find it debatable both that the “petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right” and that “the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). As the Court discussed above,
reasonable jurists would not debate whether Petitioner's
motion should have been resolved in a different manner. As a
consequence, the Court is further compelled to deny a
certificate of appealability as to Petitioner's motion.
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's motion
seeking application of equitable tolling (Docket #1) be and
the same is hereby DENIED;
IS FURTHER ORDERED that a certificate of
appealability as to Petitioner's motion (Docket #1) be
and the same is hereby DENIED; and
IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same
is hereby DISMISSED.
Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
Though this order comes significantly
after the extension period Petitioner requested, he has as of
yet still failed to file a habeas petition in this Court.
This reinforces the Court's conclusion ...