United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
CHARLES E. CARTHAGE, JR., Plaintiff,
DYLAN RADTKE, MARC CLEMENTS, WILLIAM J. POLLARD, JIM SCHWOCHERT, and JOHN and JANE DOES, Defendants.
Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge.
Charles E. Carthage, Jr. (“Carthage”), a prisoner
proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants, various employees at
Dodge Correctional Institution (“Dodge”),
alleging that they wrongfully designated him an escape risk.
(Docket #9 at 5-6). This designation lead Carthage to suffer
increased physical restraints and strip searches, verbal
abuse by guards, and severe conduct restrictions.
Id. at 6- 7. The designation also meant that
Carthage was passed over for a needed kidney transplant.
Id. at 8.
was allowed to proceed on three claims: (1) deprivation of
due process, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2)
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 9-10. Defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment on December 27, 2017, arguing that
Carthage failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before
filing this suit. (Docket #19). Carthage filed nothing in
response, and the deadline for doing so has passed. On the
state of the record, the Court is obliged to grant
Defendants' motion and dismiss this action.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that the court
“shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910,
916 (7th Cir. 2016). A fact is “material” if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit” under the
applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of fact is
“genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party.” Id. The court construes all facts and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
non-movant. Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc.,
815 F.3d 356, 360 (7th Cir. 2016).
Exhaustion of Prisoner Administrative Remedies
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) establishes
that, prior to filing a lawsuit complaining about prison
conditions, a prisoner must exhaust “such
administrative remedies as are available[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(a). This includes pretrial detainees. See
Burton v. Ruzicki, 258 F. App'x 882, 885 (7th Cir.
2007); Truly v. Sheahan, 135 F. App'x 869, 871
(7th Cir. 2005).
exhaust administrative remedies, the prisoner must
“file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the
time, the prison's administrative rules require, ”
and he must do so precisely in accordance with those rules;
substantial compliance does not satisfy the PLRA. Pozo v.
McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002);
Burrell v. Powers, 431 F.3d 282, 284-85 (7th Cir.
2005). A suit must be dismissed if it was filed before
exhaustion was complete, even if exhaustion is achieved
before judgment is entered. Perez v. Wis. Dep't of
Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). Several
important policy goals animate the exhaustion requirement,
including restricting frivolous claims, giving prison
officials the opportunity to address situations internally,
giving the parties the opportunity to develop the factual
record, and reducing the scope of litigation. Smith v.
Zachary, 255 F.3d 446, 450-51 (7th Cir. 2001). Failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense
to be proven by Defendants. Westefer v. Snyder, 422
F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2005).
Wisconsin Department of Corrections maintains an Inmate
Complaint Review System (“ICRS”) to provide a
forum for administrative complaints. Wis. Admin. Code §
DOC 310.04. The ICRS governs complaints made in Wisconsin
state prisons against correctional officials, whether filed
by convicted prisoners or pretrial detainees. See
Id. § DOC 310.03(11) (defining ICRS as “the
process by which complaints filed by inmates of
adult correctional institutions are investigated and
resolved”) (emphasis added).
are two steps an inmate must take to exhaust his
administrative remedies under the ICRS. First, the inmate
must file an offender complaint with the Institution
Complaint Examiner (“ICE”) within fourteen days
of the events giving rise to the complaint. Id.
§§ DOC 310.07(1), 310.09(6). The ICE may reject a
complaint or, before accepting it, can direct the inmate to
“attempt to resolve the issue.” See Id.
§§ DOC 310.08, 310.09(4), 310.11(5). If the
complaint is rejected, the inmate may appeal the rejection to
the appropriate reviewing authority. Id. § DOC
310.11(6). If the complaint is not rejected, the ICE
issues a recommendation for disposing of the complaint,
either dismissal or affirmance, to the reviewing authority.
Id. §§ DOC 310.07(2), 310.11. The
reviewing authority may accept or reject the ICE's
recommendation. Id. § DOC 310.07(3).
if the ICE recommends dismissal and the reviewing authority
accepts it, the inmate may appeal the decision to the
Corrections Complaint Examiner (“CCE”) within ten
days. Id. §§ DOC 310.07(6), 310.13. The
CCE issues a recommendation to the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections, who may accept or reject it.
Id. §§ DOC 310.07(7), 310.13, 310.14. Upon
receiving the Secretary's decision, or after forty-five
days from the date the Secretary received the recommendation,
the inmate's administrative remedies are exhausted.
Id. §§ DOC 310.07(7), 310.14.
Carthage's Failure to ...