from an order of the circuit court for Waukesha County No.
2013CF1209 MICHAEL J. APRAHAMIAN, Judge. Affirmed.
Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.
Marquis T. Williams pled guilty in 2014 to first- degree
reckless homicide, was sentenced to prison for seven years,
and was ordered to pay $25, 142.80 in restitution. Williams
does not challenge the imposition of restitution nor its
amount, see W. S. § 973.20 (2015-16), but is
he does object to the Department of Corrections (DOC)
deducting funds from his prison account to pay his
restitution obligation. Williams moved his sentencing court
to order DOC to stop taking funds from his prison account to
pay his restitution obligation. The circuit court denied
Williams' request. We affirm, as the circuit court,
sitting in its role as the sentencing court, did not have
competency to address Williams' motion. As an inmate,
Williams' recourse is to the inmate complaint review
system (ICRS), Wis. Admin. Code ch. DOC 310 (Dec. 2014),
which, if denied at the administrative level, allows Williams
to bring a writ of certiorari to the circuit court. As
Williams did not utilize nor exhaust his administrative
remedies under the ICRS, the circuit court, sitting as the
sentencing court, did not have competency to entertain
It has long been the law that restitution may be disbursed
from an inmate's prison account. See State v.
Greene, 2008 WI.App. 100, ¶12, 313 Wis.2d 211, 756
N.W.2d 411; State v. Baker, 2001 WI.App. 100,
¶¶17-19, 243 Wis.2d 77, 626 N.W.2d 862. In 2015,
Wis.Stat. §§ 301.32(1) and 973.20(11)(c) codified
the common law by specifically authorizing the DOC to take
restitution from an inmate's account at "an amount
or a percentage the [DOC] determines is reasonable for
payment to victims." See 2015 Wis. Act 355 (Act
In State v. Minniecheske, 223 Wis.2d 493, 495, 590
N.W.2d 17 (Ct. App. 1998), the defendant sought an order
directing the State to reimburse him for money unlawfully
collected under a restitution order. We determined that the
court "may address all matters related to the criminal
prosecution and such incidental or ancillary matters as were
essential to carry out appropriately delegated judicial
functions, " but we explained that rendering a money
judgment for reimbursement of funds taken for restitution was
"not necessary to resolve the criminal matter before the
circuit court." Id. at 500. Accordingly, the
circuit court "could and did modify the judgment
… but it did not have the authority to determine the
amount of restitution improperly collected or to order
repayment under the procedural mechanisms." Id.
We explained that neither a writ of habeas corpus, nor a
Wis.Stat. § 974.06 postconviction motion, nor a motion
to modify sentence was the proper vehicle to obtain the
relief the defendant sought. Id. at 498-99.
Applying the reasoning of the Minniecheske court, we
conclude that the circuit court, acting as the sentencing
court, lacks the competency to address an allegedly improper
disbursement of funds by the DOC. Once an inmate is sentenced
to prison, he or she is under the control of the executive
branch and must address his or her objections to the internal
operating procedures of the DOC through the ICRS, Wis. Admin.
Code ch. DOC 310, and then, if necessary, by writ of
certiorari to the circuit court. Cf. State ex rel. Curtis
v. Litscher, 2002 WI.App. 172, ¶12, 256 Wis.2d 787,
650 N.W.2d 43 ("A decision may be reviewed by common law
certiorari when no legislative provision establishes how
review may be had. Certiorari is the well-established mode of
judicial review for inmates of Wisconsin prisons who seek to
challenge prison disciplinary decisions." (citation
Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 310.01 provides that the
purpose of the ICRS is to provide inmates a process by which
grievances may be expeditiously raised, investigated, and
decided. In order to use the ICRS, an inmate must first file
a complaint with the institution complaint examiner under
§ DOC 310.09. The inmate will then receive a decision
from the reviewing authority under § DOC 310.12. If the
inmate is dissatisfied, he or she may appeal the decision to
the corrections complaint examiner who will recommend a
decision to the secretary of the DOC. Secs. DOC 310.13,
310.03(15). The secretary will make a decision whether to
accept, reject, modify, or remand the recommendation of the
corrections complaint examiner at which time the
administrative remedies will have been exhausted. Sec. DOC
310.14. Before filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in
the circuit court,  an inmate must exhaust all his or her
administrative remedies. Sec. DOC 310.05; see also
Wis. Stat. § 801.02(7)(b).
Williams did not file a complaint in accordance with the
procedures found in Wis. Admin. Code ch. DOC 310. Williams
filed an "Interview/Information Request" and
received a response from the business office. He then filed a
motion with the sentencing court. As Williams did not follow
the proper administrative procedure to challenge the
DOC's disbursement of his prison funds for restitution,
the circuit court properly denied his request.
Williams also challenges the collection of funds from his
prison account as a violation of his judgment of conviction.
We disagree. The judgment of conviction provides that
"[i]f Probation/Extended Supervision is revoked and/or a
prison term ordered, outstanding financial obligations shall
be collected pursuant to statutory provisions, including
deductions from inmate prison monies." With the
inclusion of the word "or, " the language clearly
states that "[i]f … a prison term [is] ordered,
outstanding financial obligations shall be collected …
including deductions from inmate prison
monies." As previously discussed, the DOC can
collect restitution from an inmate's account, and nothing
in the judgment of conviction provides otherwise. Once the
court orders restitution, it is within the DOC's
authority to collect it from an inmate. See Wis.
Stat. §§ 301.31, 301.32(1), 303.01(8).
 All references to the Wisconsin
Statutes are to the 2015-16 version unless otherwise noted.
We recognize that Wis.Stat. § 973.20 (2013-14) was in
effect at the time of sentencing, but the portions of the
statute pertaining to ...