United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
DAVID E. SIERRA-LOPEZ, Plaintiff,
OFFICER BLAIR, DR. PERSIKE, DR. WHITE and LT. ANDERSON, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
BARBARA B. CRABB District Judge.
January 3, 2018, I granted pro se plaintiff David E.
Sierra-Lopez leave to proceed on the following claims against
staff at the Columbia Correctional Institution:
a) Defendant Officer Blair violated plaintiff's rights
under the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him from
harming himself on December 14, 2016;
b) Defendant Dr. Persike violated plaintiff's rights
under the Eighth Amendment by failing to check on plaintiff
after he had harmed himself and was placed on property
restrictions and by subjecting him to harsh conditions of
c) Defendant Lt. Anderson violated plaintiff's rights
under the Eighth Amendment by failing to respond reasonably
to plaintiff's statements that he needed help and by
using excessive force, or failing to protect him from
excessive force, on December 20, 2016;
d) Defendant Dr. White violated plaintiff's rights under
the Eighth Amendment by subjecting plaintiff to harsh
conditions of confinement.
plaintiff has filed a motion for reconsideration of that
order, arguing that he should have been permitted to proceed
against several additional defendants and on several
additional claims. Dkt. #18. He has also filed a motion for
assistance in recruiting counsel. Dkt. #19. I will deny both
motions for the reasons stated below.
Motion for Reconsideration of the Screening Order
argues that he should have been permitted to proceed on the
following claims: (1) supervisory officials failed to prevent
numerous constitutional violations; (2) his conduct report
and due process hearing violated his Fourteenth Amendment
rights; and (3) he was subjected to an unconstitutional strip
search. I discuss each argument below.
Claims against supervisory officials
argues that he should have been permitted to proceed against
several supervisory defendants, including defendants Warden
Michael Dittmann, Security Director Weber and Unit Manager
Walker because these defendants were responsible for
supervising the other defendants and “allowed”
the other defendants to violate plaintiff's rights.
However, a supervisor may be liable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 only if he or she is “personally responsible for
the deprivation of the constitutional right.”
Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651
(7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Gentry v. Duckworth, 65
F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)). This means that the
supervisor must “know about the conduct and facilitate
it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of
what they might see[.]” Matthews v. City of East
St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012).
plaintiff's allegations do not permit an inference that
Dittmann, Weber or Walker approved, condoned, or turned a
blind eye to any unconstitutional treatment of plaintiff, or
that they would even have had an opportunity to learn about
plaintiff's situation and intervene during the relevant
time period. Therefore, plaintiff may not proceed with claims
against these defendants.
Claims relating ...