United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
JASON M. PARKER, Plaintiff,
KENOSHA COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
ADELMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Jason M. Parker, who was formerly confined at the Kenosha
County Jail, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that defendants violated his civil rights. This
order resolves plaintiff's motion to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee and screens his complaint.
Docket Nos. 2 & 1. It also addresses, but does not
resolve, his motion to appoint counsel. Docket No. 7.
Motion to Proceed without Prepayment of the Filing Fee
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case
because plaintiff was incarcerated at the time he filed his
complaint. The PLRA gives courts discretion to allow
plaintiffs to proceed with their lawsuits without prepaying
the $350 filing fee, as long as they comply with certain
requirements. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. One of those
requirements is that the plaintiff pay an initial partial
filing fee. On July 13, 2017, U.S. Magistrate Judge William
E. Duffin (the judge assigned to the case at that time)
ordered plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of
$36.45. Plaintiff paid that fee on July 26, 2017. As such, I
will grant his motion to proceed without prepayment of the
full filing fee. Plaintiff must pay the remainder of the
of Plaintiff's Complaint
law requires that I screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner
has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious,
that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the
defendant was acting under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North
Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see
also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). I will
give a pro se plaintiff's allegations,
“however inartfully pleaded, ” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
complaint alleges that named defendants, Kenosha County
Sheriff's Department, Kenosha County Detention Center,
Kenosha County Correctional Health Services (KCCHS), and
Kenosha County Jail Pre-Trial Facility, deliberately and
continually retaliated against him for filing a sexual abuse
case against one of the officers in November 2016. Plaintiff
alleges he has been suffering “mentally, physically,
and emotionally.” He alleges that defendants have
deprived him of his “rights, privileges, and
immunities, ” ignored his sentence, and subjected to
him cruel and unusual punishment by placing him segregation
and keeping him on intake blocks. Keeping him on intake
blocks deprived him of numerous privileges, such as better
food, fresh air, clothing, and work programs. Plaintiff also
alleges that KCCHS deliberately ignored his medical needs.
complaint lists numerous conclusory allegations against the
defendants. While plaintiff may have claims, he does not
sufficiently state them here. There is no way for the court
to draw any reasonable inferences about specific incidents of
constitutional violations. Construing the complaint
liberally, it seems that plaintiff may have claims for
retaliation, deliberate indifference to medical needs, and
cruel and unusual punishment under either the Fourteenth or
Eighth Amendment (depending on plaintiff's status at the
time of the event(s)).
not clear whether or when plaintiff was a pretrial detainee
rather than a convicted prisoner. But either way, in order to
state a retaliation claim, plaintiff must demonstrate 1) that
he engaged in an activity protected by the First Amendment;
2) that he suffered some sort of a deprivation that would be
likely to deter him from engaging in that activity in the
future; and 3) that the protected activity was at least a
motivating factor in the defendant's decision to take
retaliatory action against him. Bridges v. Gilbert,
557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Potts v.
Moreci, 12 F.Supp. 1065, 1073 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (applying
standard to pretrial detainee).
requirements for stating a claim for deliberate indifference
are the same whether plaintiff was a pretrial detainee or
serving a sentence. Chavez v. Cady, 207 F.3d 901,
904 (7th Cir. 2000). Prison officials violate the
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when their
conduct demonstrates “deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners.” Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997). This
standard contains both an objective element (that the ...