United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
ADELMAN, DISTRICT JUDGE.
convicted defendant Deangelo Anderson of felon in possession
of a firearm (count three), contrary to 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1); possession of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute (count four), contrary to 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense (count five), contrary to 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i). I sentenced defendant to 36
months' imprisonment on counts three and four, running
concurrently, and 60 months on count five, running
consecutively, for a total of 96 months.
appealed, and while the appeal was pending the United States
Supreme Court decided Dean v. United States, 137
S.Ct. 1170 (2017), holding that sentencing courts may
consider the mandatory minimum term required by § 924(c)
when choosing the appropriate sentence for the predicate
offenses. Dean abrogated Seventh Circuit case-law
forbidding such consideration. See, e.g., United
States v. Ikegwuonu, 826 F.3d 408 (7th Cir.
2016); United States v. Roberson, 474 F.3d 432
(7th Cir. 2007).
Seventh Circuit affirmed defendant's convictions but
ordered a limited remand of the sentence, see United
States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir.
2005), so that I could determine whether I would have imposed
the same sentence, knowing that I can consider the mandatory
sentence in light of Dean. Consistent with
Paladino, I permitted the parties to file memoranda
and now place on the record a decision not to re-sentence.
explained at sentencing, defendant committed serious crimes.
The police attempted to pull him over, but he took off at
high speed, eventually jumping out of his moving car and
fleeing on foot, with the car continuing forward until it hit
a tree. After apprehending defendant, the officers checked
the car, locating a plastic baggie containing 39 individually
wrapped corner cuts of crack cocaine and a loaded 9mm pistol
with an extended magazine. I also noted defendant's
substantial prior record, including a juvenile adjudication
for second degree sexual assault of a child and adult
convictions for resisting/obstructing in 2010; marijuana
possession in 2011; felon in possession of a firearm in June
2012, for which he initially received probation but was
revoked with a 3 year confinement term activated after his
arrest in this case; bail jumping in October 2012, for which he
was sentenced to 18 months initial confinement followed by 3
years extended supervision; and resisting/obstructing in
concluded that a substantial prison sentence was needed to
reflect the seriousness of the offenses, which involved the
dangerous combination of drugs and guns, and to account for
the danger created by defendant's reckless flight; to
protect the public from further such offenses; and to deter
defendant from further involvement with guns and drugs.
Defendant's poor record on supervision also suggested
that confinement was needed to protect the public, as he
failed to comply with the rules while in the community.
recommended a time served disposition (24 months) on counts
three and four, followed by the mandatory 60 month term
required by count five. He criticized the government's
decision to charge a § 924(c) count in relation to the
drugs and asked me to consider the guideline sentence absent
that charge. I noted that this argument was “in some
tension” with Roberson and Ikegwuonu.
I nevertheless considered the defense recommendation, finding
it insufficient given the seriousness of the offenses and the
danger they posed, particularly during the flight, and
defendant's inability to stay out of trouble in the
community. In other words, I did not reject the defense
recommendation because I felt bound by Roberson but
rather because that recommendation failed to satisfy the
purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
on to consider the government's recommendation of a total
sentence of 170 months, finding it greater than necessary
given the small amount of crack cocaine involved in this
case, the inordinate weight placed by the guidelines on two
of defendant's prior convictions, the length of his prior
sentences, and defendant's family support and employment.
Under all the circumstances, I found a sentence of 36 months
on counts three and four, running concurrently with each
other and with the balance of the state revocation sentence,
followed by 60 months consecutive on count five, sufficient
but not greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes of
reviewed the matter again in light of Dean, and
after considering the parties' memoranda, I conclude that
I would have imposed the same sentence. The clerk shall
transmit this memorandum to the court of appeals.
At the time of sentencing in
this case, defendant had served about 2 years towards the 3
year term imposed ...