United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
TOMMIE L. HOLLIS, Plaintiff,
CAPTAIN RYMARKIEWIEZ et al., Defendants.
ADELMAN DISTRICT JUDGE.
Tommie L. Hollis, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is
representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that defendants violated his civil
rights. This matter comes before me on plaintiff's motion
for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and
for screening of the complaint. Docket Nos. 1-2.
Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to
this action because plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed
this complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The law allows an
incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his lawsuit without
prepaying the civil case filing fee, as long as he meets
certain conditions. One of those conditions is that plaintiff
pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b).
Once plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, I can
allow plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350 filing fee
over time, through deductions from his prisoner account.
October 26, 2017, Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin ordered
plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $15.53.
Docket. No. 7. Plaintiff paid the fee on November 14, 2017.
Therefore, I will grant plaintiff's motion for leave to
proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. He must pay the
remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained
at the end of this order.
PLRA also requires federal courts to screen complaints
brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental
entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I can dismiss an action or portion
thereof if the claims alleged are “frivolous or
malicious, ” fail to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). I must give a pro
se plaintiff's allegations, “however
inartfully pleaded, ” a liberal construction. See
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
is an inmate at Waupun Correctional Institution
(“WCI”). Docket No. 1. Defendants are Department
of Corrections (“DOC”) employees who work at WCI:
Captain Rymarkiewiez is the gang coordinator; Tony Meli and
Jeremy Westra are involved in reviewing inmate conduct
March 16, 2017, plaintiff had a personal telephone
conversation with Felicia Thurman. Id. ¶¶
1-2. Based on the content of the conversation, Rymarkiewiez
gave plaintiff a conduct report sometime in late March.
Id. ¶ 4. Meli reviewed the conduct report
without proper notice and hearing, and he gave Westra
approval to discipline plaintiff. Id. ¶¶
5-6. Plaintiff served 60 days in the Restrictive Housing Unit
(“RHU”) in conditions that amounted to
“mental [and] physical torture.” Id.
appealed the decision to Warden Foster (not a defendant), and
Foster reversed the guilty finding. Id. ¶ 11.
Following plaintiff's successful appeal, Rymarkiewiez,
Meli, and Westra took the following actions: (a) banned
plaintiff from all prison jobs, programs, and movement; (b)
denied plaintiff “back-pay” for lost job and
refused to reinstate job position; (c) removed plaintiff from
his “single-cell”; (d) and reinstated other
inmates for their jobs. Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.
Meli and Westra also forced plaintiff to complete a urine
test on April 4, 2017. Id. ¶ 8.
relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages and several
injunctions. Id. at 5-6.
state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that defendants (1) deprived him of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States; and (2) acted under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. Cnty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of North Fond
du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
state a First Amendment retaliation claim, plaintiff must
allege that he: (1) engaged in activity protected by the
First Amendment; (2) suffered a deprivation that would likely
deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the
First Amendment activity was “at least a motivating
factor” in the defendants' decision to take the
retaliatory action. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d
541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). In the prison context, the First
Amendment right to petition the government for redress of
grievances includes the right to pursue “administrative
remedies that must be exhausted before a prisoner can seek
relief in court.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 ...