United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DECISION AND ORDER SCREENING PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED
JOSEPH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
McDaniel, who is representing himself, filed a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He also filed a
motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. On
April 9, 2018, I screened the original complaint and directed
McDaniel to file an amended complaint if he wanted to
proceed; I also waived his initial partial filing fee given
his lack of funds. Docket #15. McDaniel filed an amended
complaint on April 16, 2018, docket #25, and filed a motion
to use his release account to pay his initial partial filing
fee, docket #19. He has also filed twelve letters with the
court regarding his claims against the defendant. Docket
#'s 16-18, 20-22, 24, 26-30.
I already waived his initial partial filing fee due to his
lack of funds, I will deny as moot McDaniel's motion to
use his release account to pay his initial partial filing
fee. McDaniel shall pay the filing fee over time as explained
in my April 9, 2018 screening order. Docket # 15.
of Amended Complaint
law requires that I screen complaints, including amended
complaints, brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I must dismiss a complaint
if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
“frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The
complaint's allegations “must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the
deprivation was caused by the defendant acting under color of
state law. Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee,
570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v.
Village of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th
Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635,
640 (1980). I am obliged to give the pro se
plaintiff's allegations, “however inartfully
pleaded, ” a liberal construction. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
alleges that the “Waupun Correctional
Institution” violated his rights to medical care by not
transferring him to BHU, the behavioral health unit. He
asserts that he is a mentally disabled inmate who has a
“serious brain injur[y]” that should be in BHU
because he is “really stressed out.” Dkt. # 25,
at 2-3. However, during his eight years of incarceration, he
had not been placed in BHU. His “clinical”
refuses to refer him to BHU. Id. He states he
informed the security director and Dr. Van Buren of this
“and they said no to  McDaniel mental health.”
Id. at 2. McDaniel then goes on to name several
other people who also did not “put [him] where he
belong which is BHU.” Id. at 3.McDaniel seeks
primary matter, McDaniel has again failed to name the proper
defendant. Section 1983 allows a plaintiff to sue any
“person” who violates his civil rights under
color of state law. The Waupun Correctional Institution is
not a proper defendant, because it is building and not a
person that may sued under § 1983. Nava v. Sangamon
County Jail, 2014 WL 1320259, *2 (C.D. Ill. April 2,
2014); Wright v. Porter County, 2013 WL 1176199, *2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Wright also sued the jail
itself, but this is a building, not a ‘person' or
even a policy-making body that can be sued for constitutional
violations.”); Phillips v. Sangamon County
Jail, 2012 WL 4434724, *2 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 24, 2012).
had McDaniel named as a defendant any of the persons he lists
in his facts, he has still failed to allege sufficient facts
in support a claim of a constitutional violation. McDaniel
alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because
“clinical, ” the security director, Dr. Van
Buren, and several other individuals failed to transfer him
to BHU. This purported failing, however, is not a
constitutional violation. A prisoner has no liberty interest
in a specific correctional facility, a specific wing of that
facility, or a specific cell in a specific area of that
facility, unless such an interest is created under state laws
or regulations. See generally, Parker v. Lane, 688
F.Supp. 353, 355 (N.D.Ill. 1988).
to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a prisoner must show
that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. A
serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by
a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious
that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention.” Wynn v.
Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 593 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir.
1997)). Additionally, the official must be both “aware
of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
McDaniel's general claim of being stressed out, without
more, is insufficient to implicate the objective prong of the
Eighth Amendment. Second, even if I were to assume at this
stage that McDaniel's had sufficiently alleged a serious
medical need, his allegations do not support an inference
that the prison official's denial of his placement in BHU
were blatantly inappropriate. See Thomas v. Pate,
493 F.2d 151, 158 (7th Cir.1974). Indeed, McDaniel's
allegations amount to a mere disagreement with the prison
officials' decision not to place him in BHU. A
disagreement between a prisoner and his doctor, or even
between two medical professionals, about the proper course of
treatment generally is insufficient, by itself, to establish
an Eighth Amendment violation. Johnson v. Doughty,
433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006).
I acknowledge the numerous letters McDaniel has filed some of
which discuss facts that could possibly be sufficient to
support a constitutional violation claim. For example,
McDaniel explains in his letter filed on April 18, 2018, that
he was in pain due to what was later determined to be liver
damage. Docket # 26. Instead of the officers taking him to
the hospital, they placed him in segregation. Id. In
the other letter he filed on April 18, McDaniel states that
several officers unreasonably injured his arms and wrist.
Docket # 27. In light of this, I will allow McDaniel to file
a second amended complaint to include as well as clarify
these possible claims.
again enclosing a copy of the court's complaint form and
instructions. McDaniel should write the word “SECOND
AMENDED” in front of the word “COMPLAINT”
at the top of the first page, and then put the case number
for this case-18-CV-208-in the field for “Case
Number.” He must list all of the defendants in the
caption of the complaint. He must use the spaces on
pages two and three to allege the key facts that give rise to
the claims he wishes to bring, and to describe which
defendants he believes committed the violations ...