United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
CHARLES B. GILL, SR., Plaintiff,
BROWN COUNTY JAIL, HEIDI MICHEL, J. MEKASH, BRIAN MEYERS, IAN HIGGINS, and KAREN KONRAD, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND
PAMELA PEPPER, United States District Judge
Charles B. Gill, Sr., who was confined at the Brown County
Jail during the time of the events he describes in his
complaint, is representing himself. He alleges that the
defendants did not allow him to exercise his religion
correctly, and that they discriminated against him because of
his faith. Dkt. No. 1. This order resolves the
plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens the
Motion to Proceed Without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No.
Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to this case because the
plaintiff is incarcerated. 28 U.S.C. §1915. The law
provides that a court can allow an incarcerated plaintiff to
proceed with his lawsuit without pre-paying the civil case
filing fee, as long as he meets certain conditions.
Id. One of those conditions is a requirement that
the plaintiff pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C.
§1915(b). Once the plaintiff pays the initial partial
filing fee, the court may allow the plaintiff to pay the
balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions
from his prisoner account. Id.
court assessed an initial partial filing fee of $24.51. Dkt.
No. 7. The court received $25.00 from the plaintiff on August
22, 2017. The court will grant the plaintiff's motion for
leave to proceed without prepayment of the filling fee and
will allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350.00
filing fee over time from his prisoner account, as described
at the end of this order.
SCREENING OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
Standard for Screening Complaints
Prison Litigation Reform Act requires federal courts to
screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against
a governmental entity, or officer or employee of a
governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court may
dismiss a case, or part of it, if the claims alleged are
“frivolous or malicious, ” fail to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
state a claim under the federal notice pleading system, the
plaintiff must provide a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that [he] is entitled to relief[.]”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint need not plead specific
facts, and need only provide “fair notice of what the .
. . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
“Labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will
not do. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
factual content of the complaint must allow the court to
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Indeed, allegations must “raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Factual allegations, when accepted as true, must state a
claim that is “plausible on its face.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
courts follow the two-step analysis in Twombly to
determine whether a complaint states a claim. Id. at
679. First, the court determines whether the plaintiff's
legal conclusions are supported by factual allegations.
Id. Legal conclusions not supported by facts
“are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Id. Second, the court determines whether the
well-pleaded factual allegations “plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
proceed on a claim that his civil rights were violated under
42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States; and 2) the deprivation was visited upon
him by a person or persons acting under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du
Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court
gives pro se allegations, “however inartfully
pleaded, ” a liberal construction. See
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Facts Alleged in the Complaint
plaintiff is a member of the Muslim faith. Dkt. No. 1 at 3.
He alleges that during Ramadan, he was denied the right to
practice his religion “correctly.” Id.
The plaintiff says that on May 31, 2017, defendant Meyers
told him to pray in his cell. The plaintiff says that he has
been Muslim for twenty-three years, and that Islamic law
forbids a person from praying next to a toilet. Id.
at 3-4. The plaintiff tried to tell Meyers this, but Meyers
would not listen. Nonetheless, on both May 31 and June 1,
2017, the plaintiff tried to pray in the cell, but he could
not do something that he knew was wrong. Id. at 4.
On June 2, 3 and 4, ...