from orders of the circuit court for Winnebago County No.
2015ME267: KAREN L. SEIFERT and BARBARA H. KEY, Judges.
Neubauer, C.J., Reilly, P.J., and Gundrum, J.
C.S. was found not competent to make informed decisions as to
the advantages and disadvantages of accepting particular
medication or treatment while a prisoner and was
involuntarily medicated per Wis.Stat. § 51.61(1)(g)
(2017-18). C.S. argues that § 51.61(1)(g) is
facially unconstitutional as it does not require a finding of
dangerousness before involuntarily medicating prisoners who
are committed under Wis.Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar). We affirm
as § 51.61(1)(g) is reasonably related to the
state's legitimate interest in providing care and
assistance to prisoners suffering from mental illness who are
found not competent to refuse medication and
In 2005, C.S. was convicted of mayhem as a repeater and
sentenced to twenty years in prison (ten years' initial
confinement, ten years' extended
supervision). C.S. was diagnosed with schizophrenia.
Involuntary commitment and medication orders were obtained in
2012 and those court orders have been extended on several
occasions. The petition at issue in this case was filed on
May 22, 2015. Within the petition, a psychologist affirmed
C.S.'s schizophrenia diagnosis and opined that C.S.
satisfied the statutory criteria for an extension of
commitment and for involuntary medication. C.S. objected and
a jury trial was held in June 2015. The jury, addressing the
elements of Wis.Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar), found that (1)
C.S. was mentally ill; (2) C.S. was a proper subject for
treatment and in need of treatment; (3) C.S. was an inmate of
a state prison; (4) less restrictive forms of appropriate
treatment had been attempted and were unsuccessful; and (5)
and (6) C.S. had been fully informed of his treatment needs,
the mental health services available, and his rights, and he
had an opportunity to discuss these matters with a licensed
physician or psychologist. The circuit court entered an order
extending C.S.'s commitment under § 51.20(1)(ar) and
an order for involuntary medication and treatment under
Wis.Stat. § 51.61(1)(g).
In a postcommitment motion, C.S. challenged Wis.Stat. §
51.61(1)(g) as "unconstitutional for all prisoners
committed under Wis.Stat. § 51.20(1)(ar)" as it
allows prisoners to be involuntarily medicated without a
finding of dangerousness. The circuit court denied the
motion. C.S. appeals.
We begin by noting that C.S. previously made a facial
challenge to his commitment in Winnebago County v.
Christopher S. (C.S. I), 2016 WI 1, ¶3, 366 Wis.2d
1, 878 N.W.2d 109');">878 N.W.2d 109, on the ground that Wis.Stat. §
51.20(1)(ar) violates substantive due process as it allows
the involuntary commitment of a prisoner without a
finding that he or she is dangerous. Our supreme court
rejected this argument, finding that § 51.20(1)(ar) is
constitutional as "it is reasonably related to the
State's legitimate interest in providing care and
assistance to inmates suffering from mental illness."
C.S. I, 366 Wis.2d 1, ¶24. In this appeal, C.S.
challenges the intertwined issue of involuntary
medication of prisoners under Wis.Stat. §
51.61(1)(g), without a finding of dangerousness.
"The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law
that we review de novo." State v. Wood, 2010 WI
17, ¶15, 323 Wis.2d 321, 780 N.W.2d 63');">780 N.W.2d 63. We presume every
statute is constitutional. Id. A party challenging a
statute must "prove that the statute is unconstitutional
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Cole, 2003
WI 112, ¶11, 264 Wis.2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328. C.S.
presents a facial challenge to the constitutionality of
Wis.Stat. § 51.61(1)(g). See Wood, 323 Wis.2d
321, ¶13. "Under such a challenge, the challenger
must show that the law cannot be enforced 'under any
circumstances.'" Id. (citation omitted). If
the party succeeds, "the law is void 'from its
beginning to the end.'" Id. (citation
We discern an individual's substantive due process rights
from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, and article I, section 1 of the Wisconsin
Constitution. Wood, 323 Wis.2d 321, ¶17.
"The right to substantive due process addresses 'the
content of what government may do to people under the guise
of the law.'" Id. (citation omitted).
"An individual's substantive due process rights
protect against a state action that is arbitrary, wrong, or
oppressive," id., and "forbids a
government from exercising 'power without any reasonable
justification in the service of a legitimate governmental
objective, '" State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42,
¶74, 362 Wis.2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592 (citation omitted).
A challenge to Wis.Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) is subject to
rational basis review. See C.S. I, 366 Wis.2d 1,
¶42; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 223-26 (1990). "A law subject to rational basis
review will be upheld 'unless it is patently arbitrary
and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government
interest." C.S. I, 366 Wis.2d 1, ¶36
(citation omitted). "When faced with a substantive due
process challenge, we examine 'whether the statute is a
reasonable and rational means to the legislative
end.'" Luedtke, 362 Wis.2d 1, ¶76
C.S. argues that "Wis. Stat. § 51.61(1)(g) violates
substantive due process because it does not require a finding
of dangerousness at any point to involuntarily administer
medication to prisoners." We conclude that the
involuntary medication and treatment of a prisoner is
facially constitutional as there is a legitimate reason for
the state to ...