United States District Court, W.D. Wisconsin
MATTHEW C. STECHAUNER, Plaintiff,
PAUL KEMPER, LAVAIL JAMISON, DANA BROWN, and KIM EINWALTER, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
D. PETERSON DISTRICT JUDGE.
plaintiff Matthew Stechauner, an inmate at Oshkosh
Correctional Institution (OCI), brings this suit against
officials at his previous prison, Racine Correctional
Institution (RCI). He alleges that defendants Lavail Jamison,
Dana Brown, and Kim Einwalter ignored his requests for
medical treatment, and that when he complained about the
quality of medical treatment at RCI, defendant Paul Kemper
transferred him to OCI in retaliation. He brings claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his rights under the
First and Eighth Amendments.
motions are before me. Stechauner has filed motions for
summary judgment against all defendants, Dkt. 39, and for
default judgment against Einwalter, Dkt. 56. I will deny the
motion for summary judgment because all of Stechauner's
claims involve disputed issues that will need to be resolved
at trial. And because I cannot assess damages against
Einwalter until after Stechauner's other claims are
resolved, I will defer ruling on that motion. After the trial
of Stechauner's claims against Jamison, Brown, and
Kemper, I will schedule a hearing on Stechauner's motion
for default judgment against Einwalter.
have also filed a motion for partial summary judgment, Dkt.
61, but after receiving Stechauner's response, defendants
concede that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and
ask to withdraw the motion. Dkt. 75. So I will grant that
Stechauner has filed a renewed motion for assistance in
recruiting counsel. Dkt. 76. I will deny the motion because I
am not persuaded that Stechauner will be unable to try the
Stechauner's motion for summary judgment
moves for summary judgment against all defendants. For his
claim against defendant Kim Einwalter, I will deny the motion
as moot. The clerk has already entered default against
Einwalter, so Stechauner no longer needs to establish
Einwalter's liability. See VLM Food Trading
Int'l, Inc. v. Illinois Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247,
255 (7th Cir. 2016).
Stechauner's claims against defendants Lavail Jamison,
Dana Brown, and Paul Kemper, I will deny the motion because
all three claims involve genuine disputes of material fact.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is “no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). A “material fact” is one that affects the
outcome of the case. Moore v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 908 F.3d 1050, 1054 (7th Cir. 2018). When ruling
on a motion for summary judgment, I must view all facts and
draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party (in this case, the defendants). Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). If no
reasonable juror could find for defendants based on the
evidence in the record, then summary judgment is appropriate.
Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Soc'y Ins., 910
F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). But if there is
any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to
return a verdict for defendants, then summary judgment is not
appropriate. Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th
Cir. 2003). (citations omitted).
Eighth Amendment claims
contends that defendants Lavail Jamison and Dana Brown were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. To
succeed on these claims, Stechauner must prove three
elements: (1) he had a serious medical need; (2) defendants
were aware of his medical need; and (3) defendants
disregarded the risk to Stechauner's health and failed to
provide treatment. See Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d
675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008).
parties genuinely dispute whether defendants were aware of
the seriousness of Stechauner's medical needs and whether
they disregarded them.
says that on October 8, 2015, he told Jamison that he was
suffering from chest pain, but Jamison did not get medical
assistance. Jamison says that she called the health services
unit after talking to Stechauner, and that a nurse told her
that Stechauner would be placed on a list to be seen later
that day. Dkt. 64, ¶ 7-8. She says that she did not
question the nurse's decision not to see Stechauner
immediately, because she saw Stechauner playing basketball
and running up and down stairs, even after he complained of
pain. Id. ¶¶ 6, 9. Stechauner disputes
whether he played basketball that day or ran on the stairs,
and he says that a different officer called the health
services unit, not Jamison.
Stechauner says that on October 28, 2015, he told Brown that
he was very dizzy, had difficulty breathing, and had chest
pain, a fast heartbeat, and other aching pain, but Brown did
not seek medical attention. Dkt. 42, ¶ 5. Later,
Stechauner became unresponsive and needed to be sent to a
hospital. Brown agrees that she talked with Stechauner and
that Stechauner was sent to the hospital. But she says that
he complained only about feeling dizzy, and that she did not
contact the health services unit because Stechauner told her
that a different officer had already done so. Dkt. 65, ¶
6-7. Brown says that had she ...