United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
JOSEPH United States Magistrate Judge.
Dickerson, an inmate at the Milwaukee Secure Detention
Facility who is representing himself, filed a complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated
his civil rights. Dickerson has paid the full filing fee.
This is now before the court for screening of his complaint.
court has jurisdiction to screen the complaint in light of
Dickerson’s consent to the full jurisdiction of a
magistrate judge and the Wisconsin Department of
Justice’s limited consent to the exercise of magistrate
judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and
requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The court must dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff raises
claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,”
that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the
defendant was acting under color of state law.
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North
Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see
also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The
court gives a pro se plaintiff’s allegations,
“however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
alleges that defendants Vince Varone, who is an
administrative law judge, and Brian Hayes, who is the
administrator of Wisconsin’s Division of Hearings and
Appeals, took his “extended supervision street time
credit” and tried to reopen his criminal case (No.
1996-CF-0123) when he already had reached his maximum
discharge date on August 26, 2016 and on April 26, 2018. (ECF
No. 1 at 2.) Dickerson states that he is wrongfully convicted
and falsely imprisoned because defendant Varone revoked him
on December 20, 2018.
alleges that he appealed defendant Varone’s decision to
defendant Hayes who refused to overturn the decision.
Dickerson states that he is confined illegally and unlawfully
because of Varone and Hayes’s decision to take his
“street supervision time and giving it back to me in
having me sitting on ‘dead time’ [be]cause my
case had discharged on August 26, 2016 & April 26,
2018[.]” (ECF No. 1 at 3.)
claims that he is illegally confined beyond the termination
of his sentence. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
correctly cites Eastern District of Wisconsin case law to
support his claim that being held beyond the term of
one’s sentence implicates constitutional rights.
However, these claims usually arrive after completion of a
sentence and they are usually brought against prison
officials, whose job it is to calculate a sentence, not
against judges who impose sentences. See, e.g., Campbell
v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2001);
Russell v. Lazar, 300 F. Supp. 2d 716 (E.D. Wis.
civil rights case, Dickerson may not proceed on a claim that
he is currently illegally confined based on the actions of
defendants Varone and Hayes. Judgment in Dickerson’s
favor on his claim for damages would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence. See Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). In order to
receive damages for an unlawful conviction or sentence, he
will first need to have the conviction or sentence
overturned. See Id. If Dickerson wants to challenge
the validity of his confinement, he may file a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after he
exhausts his state court remedies. See Hill v.
McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 579 (2006). The court will mail
Dickerson a habeas petition and a guide for unrepresented
litigants with information about filing a writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 along with this order.
case is subject to dismissal without prejudice because
Dickerson’s claim is Heck-barred. See Moore v.
Burge, 771 F.3d 444, 446 (7th Cir. 2014). In addition to
the Heck bar, the defendants are probably protected by
absolute judicial immunity. See Polzin v. Gage, 636
F.3d 834, 838 (7th Cir. 2011).
IT IS ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED