United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
William E. Duffin, United States Magistrate Judge.
3, 2019, the court screened pro se plaintiff Cedrik
Tujibikila's complaint and directed him to file an
amended complaint clarifying his claims. (ECF No. 16.)
Tujibikila also has a case before Judge William C. Griesbach,
where he was similarly ordered to file an amended complaint.
Tujibikila v. Corporal Neaf et al., 19-cv-00192-WCG
(E.D. Wis. 2019). Tujibikila filed amended complaints in both
cases, one on June 28, 2019, and one on July 1, 2019.
However, it appears that he misfiled his amended complaints
in both cases, filing the first page for case 19-cv-192 in
conjunction with the remaining pages of the complaint for
case 19-cv-193 (the case before this court) and vice versa.
As a result, the Clerk has switched the first pages of the
two amended complaints so they are filed in the appropriate
cases and refiled the amended complaints. The court will now
screen Tujibikila's amended complaint in this case.
of the Complaint
the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by
prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the
prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or
malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §
determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court
applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v.
Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668
F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint
must include “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough
facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege
that someone deprived him of a right secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that
whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color
of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799
F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan-
Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th
Cir. 2009)). The court construes pro se complaints
liberally, and it holds them to a less stringent standard
than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d
at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776
(7th Cir. 2015)).
states that defendants “Amy RN, ” “Angela
Nurse, ” and “Christine” of the Kenosha
County Detention Center were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. In order to give context to
Tujibikila's allegations, the court is taking judicial
notice of his amended complaint in case 19-cv-192 pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 201. In that case, Tujibikila states
that officers at Kenosha County Detention Center
“authorized chemical agents to be used without removing
[him], ” which caused him to cough up blood.
Tujibikila v. Neaf et al., 19-cv-192-WCG, ECF No. 22
at 2-3 (E.D. Wis. 2019).
complaint before this court, Tujibikila alleges that
Christine, a nurse at the Detention Center, took from him a
“specimen bottle full of blood that the plaintiff was
coughing” into. (ECF No. 18 at 3.) He gave this to
Christine, “in hope that [he] would be seen
immediately” (presumably by health services staff)
because he “was coughing up too much blood.”
(Id.) Tujibikila also alleges that Amy, an RN and
supervisor at the Detention Center, tampered “with the
specimen of blood” that he provided and “failed
to follow policies and procedures in doing so.”
(Id. at 2.) Finally, he states that Angela, a nurse
at the Detention Center, between January 2 and February 8
(year unspecified), “denied and delayed proper medical
treatment for the plaintiff's serious medical
claims that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment
rights. Prison officials' actions violate the Eighth
Amendment when they are deliberately indifferent “to
serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “To state a cause
of action, a plaintiff must show (1) an objectively serious
medical condition to which (2) a state official was
deliberately, that is subjectively, indifferent.”
Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir.
may proceed on an Eighth Amendment claim against all
defendants that they were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. He alleged an objectively serious
condition-coughing up blood as a result of chemical agents
being deployed. A condition is objectively serious when
“the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could
result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.” Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997) (quotations
to the second prong (deliberate indifference), the court
notes that Tujibikila's allegations are fragmented and
require the court to draw some inferences. But, considering
the court's mandate to liberally construe the pleading,
Tujibikila alleges enough at this stage in the litigation to
show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
coughing up blood. To show deliberate indifference, a
plaintiff has to allege the defendant knew about the serious
medical condition, the risk it poses, and then disregarded
that risk. Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th
defendant Christine, Tujibikila alleges that she knew about
his condition because he gave her the blood sample. Also, his
phrase “in hopes that he would be seen” suggests
that Christine did not arrange for him to be examined after
giving her the sample. For defendant Amy, he alleges she was
aware of the blood sample and that she did something with it,
the inference being that whatever she did prevented him from
receiving treatment. For defendant Angela, he uses the phrase