United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
LANIS E. SOLOMON, JR., Plaintiff,
ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES, INC., HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, and NURSE PRACTITIONERS, Defendants.
Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge.
Lanis E. Solomon, Jr. proceeds in this matter pro
se. He filed a complaint alleging that Defendants
violated his constitutional rights. (Docket #1). This matter
comes before the court on Plaintiff's petition to proceed
without prepayment of the filing fee (in forma
pauperis). (Docket #2). Plaintiff's initial partial
filing fee was waived in this action, and Plaintiff has not
notified the Court of his desire to voluntarily dismiss the
case. The Court will therefore proceed with screening the
Court shall screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking
relief against a governmental entity or an officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the
prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous
or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. §
is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325
(1989); Hutchinson ex rel. Baker v. Spink, 126 F.3d
895, 900 (7th Cir. 1997). The Court may, therefore, dismiss a
claim as frivolous where it is based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are
clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327.
“Malicious, ” although sometimes treated as a
synonym for “frivolous, ” “is more usefully
construed as intended to harass.” Lindell v.
McCallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1109- 10 (7th Cir. 2003)
state a cognizable claim under the federal notice pleading
system, the plaintiff is required to provide a “short
and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is
entitled to relief[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). It is not
necessary for the plaintiff to plead specific facts and his
statement need only “give the defendant fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957)). However, a complaint that offers mere
“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). To state
a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, “that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The complaint's
allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (citation omitted).
considering whether a complaint states a claim, courts should
follow the principles set forth in Twombly by first,
“identifying pleadings that, because they are no more
than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Legal
conclusions must be supported by factual allegations.
Id. If there are well-pleaded factual allegations,
the Court must, second, “assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
to relief.” Id.
state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and
2) the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or
persons acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore
v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir.
2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du Lac, 384
F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The Court is obliged
to give the plaintiff's pro se allegations,
“however inartfully pleaded, ” a liberal
construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
was an inmate at the Milwaukee Criminal Justice Facility
(“MCJF”) in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. (Docket #1 at
2). During an initial nursing assessment, he informed the
nurse that he had a traumatic brain injury and often had
seizures. Id. He signed two consent forms: a release
of information so that medical providers could obtain his
health files, and a permission form in order to continue
off-site treatment. Id. In the six months after he
signed these consent forms, he had severe seizures that often
resulted in him losing control over his bowels. Id.
During this six-month period, healthcare providers did not
acknowledge the severity of his disability and did not
provide adequate treatment. Id. For example, MCJF
correctional officers refused to answer his medical emergency
button or notify medical providers when he was having a
seizure. Id. at 3. At one point, while having a
seizure, correctional officers dragged his body from one area
to another, under the eye of the medical supervisor.
asks to proceed on an Eighth Amendment right to medical care
claim. Prison officials violate this right when they
“display deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners.” Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d
645, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Deliberate
indifference claims contain both an objective and a
subjective component: the inmate “must first establish
that his medical condition is objectively,
‘sufficiently serious, '; and second, that prison
officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of
mind,' - i.e., that they both knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to inmate health.” Lewis v.
McLean, 864 F.3d 556, 562-63 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)
(internal citations omitted)).
construed, Plaintiff's allegations state a claim for
deliberate indifference against MCJF's medical staff.
Plaintiff alleges that he notified medical staff of his
seizures and suffered from several severe episodes while at
MCJF, but was either ignored or inadequately treated.
Court notes that one of the defendants, Armor Correctional
Health, Inc., (“Armor”) may not be a correct
defendant in this matter. Only those officials who are
directly responsible for a constitutional violation may be
sued under Section 1983. Minix v. Canarecci, 597
F.3d 824, 833-34 (7th Cir. 2010). However, Armor will be
retained in the case so that they can assist in disclosing
the identities of the individual Doe defendants. See
Donald v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 95 F.3d
548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). Additionally, the Doe defendants,
“Healthcare Providers” and “Nurse
Practitioners, ” should be substituted with the correct
individuals when their identities are known. Finally, the
Court notes that the complaint makes allegations against
officers who ignored Plaintiff's seizures and dragged him
across the floor, but does not name those officers as
defendants. Plaintiff is free to move to amend his complaint
to include allegations against those officers if he sees fit.
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion
for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee
(in forma pauperis) (Docket #2) be and the same is
IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to
appoint counsel (Docket #8) be and the same is hereby
IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Marshal
shall serve a copy of the complaint and this order upon the
defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4.
Plaintiff is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals
Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28
U.S.C. § 1921(a). The current fee for waiver-of-service
packages is $8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is
provided at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.114(a)(2), (a)(3).
Although Congress requires the court to order service by the
U.S. Marshals Service precisely because in ...