Searching over 5,500,000 cases.


searching
Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.

Reichart v. Saul

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

August 21, 2019

JOSEPH A. REICHART, Plaintiff,
v.
ANDREW M. SAUL[1], COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

          DECISION AND ORDER

          WILLIAM E. DUFFIN, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

         1. Background

         Joseph Reichart suffers from a Chiari Type I malformation, a condition in which brain tissue extends into a person's spinal canal. As a result, Reichart is in constant pain, which he describes as “like headache pressure” in his head. (Tr. 64.) The pain varies and sometimes becomes so severe that when he is undergoing work therapy through the Veteran's Administration he has to go and hide in a closet. (Tr. 81.) His condition also leads to blurred vision, uncontrolled muscle movements in his face, weakness in his arms, pain in his hands and feet, and a hard time concentrating or paying attention. (Tr. 64-65.) As a result of this and other impairments, Reichart alleges he is disabled.

         He applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Benefits under Title XVI and Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) Benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded Reichart had the residual functional capacity (RFC)

to perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567 and 416.967 except he must avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat, wetness or humidity, excessive noise, irritants such as fumes, odors, dust and gases, unprotected heights and the use of moving machinery; he is limited to occasional climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; he is limited to unskilled work performing simple, routine and repetitive tasks; he is allowed off task up to ten percent of the workday, in addition to regular breaks; he is limited to occasional interaction with coworkers and the public; and he cannot perform fast-paced production tasks but end-of-day quotas are permitted.

(Tr. 21.)

         Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that, based on Reichart's RFC, age, education, and work experience, he could work as a packager, laundry worker, or warehouse worker and, therefore, was not disabled. (Tr. 31.) The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review.

         2. Standard of Review

         The court's role in reviewing an ALJ's decision is limited. It must “uphold an ALJ's final decision if the correct legal standards were applied and supported with substantial evidence.” L.D.R. by Wagner v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 1146, 1152 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Jelinek v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 805, 811 (7th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Summers v. Berryhill, 864 F.3d 523, 526 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Castile v. Astrue, 617 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 2010)). “The court is not to ‘reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, decide questions of credibility, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the Commissioner.'” Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507, 510 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Lopez ex rel. Lopez v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 2003)). “Where substantial evidence supports the ALJ's disability determination, [the court] must affirm the [ALJ's] decision even if ‘reasonable minds could differ concerning whether [the claimant] is disab led.'” L.D.R. by Wagner, 920 F.3d at 1152 (quoting Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 2008)). Deference to the ALJ is lessened when the ALJ's determination is based on errors in logic or fact. Thomas v. Colvin, 745 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2014). If the ALJ committed an error of law, his decision cannot be upheld irrespective of whether it is supported b y sub stantial evidence. Bea rdsley v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2014).

         3. Analysis

         a. Off-Task Limitation

         Reichart argues that the ALJ erred because he failed to explain the basis for his conclusion that Reichart would be off task no more than ten percent of the workday. (ECF No. 17 at 3-5.) The ALJ stated:

In contrast with the consultants' opinions, the residual functional capacity assessed herein contains a limitation about off task behavior. This limitation is appropriate given the claimant's severe impairments. The off task limitation reflects the belief that the claimant has medical conditions that will cause him to be off task at work but, given the evidence as a ...

Buy This Entire Record For $7.95

Download the entire decision to receive the complete text, official citation,
docket number, dissents and concurrences, and footnotes for this case.

Learn more about what you receive with purchase of this case.