United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
MARLON T. YOUNG, Plaintiff,
KAREN R. LEE, et al., Defendants.
ADELMAN United States District Judge
Marlon T. Young, an inmate confined at the Dodge Correctional
Institution, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights.
This order resolves plaintiff's motion for leave to
proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case
because plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the
court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed
with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must
pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing
fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account.
October 3, 2019, I ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial
partial filing fee of $36.74. Docket No. 8. Plaintiff paid
that fee on October 17, 2019. I will grant the
plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepaying
the filing fee. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee
over time in the manner explained at the end of this order.
Because the plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing
fee, I will deny as moot his motion to use his release
account to pay the filing fee. Docket No. 7.
SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
Federal Screening Standard
the PLRA, I must screen complaints brought by prisoners
seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or
employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).
I must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that
are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that fail
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
determining whether the complaint states a claim, I apply the
same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851
F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v.
Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899
(7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as
true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on
its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right
secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States,
and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under
the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch.
Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing
Buchanan- Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824,
827 (7th Cir. 2009)). I construe pro se complaints
liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720
(citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th
plaintiff sues Nurse Practitioner Sandy McArdle, Registered
Nurses Karen R. Lee and Erin M. Wehrle, and Warden Gary
Boughton. The defendants are alleged to have been employees
of the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility in Boscobel,
Wisconsin, at the time of the events. Docket No. 1 at 2-5.
plaintiff alleges that on March 22, 2019, McArdle refused to
see him for an “emergency issue.” Id. at
2. He alleges that he was experiencing “excruciating
pain” in his right leg, but McArdle “kept
changing the appointment days and time for me to be seen by
her.” Id. The plaintiff also asked for a cane,
wheelchair, or walker to get around but “was
told” by unspecified prison officials that McArdle
would not provide him a walking aid until she saw him for his
pain. Id. The plaintiff alleges that McArdle agreed
to see him “next week” about his pain but does
not say whether McArdle ever examined him or provided medical
treatment. Id. The plaintiff alleges that he
continues to experience pain and difficulty moving around.
plaintiff alleges that Lee improperly spoke with him about
his medical condition outside of his cell door instead of in
private in a room or at the Health Services Unit.
Id. at 3. He asserts that by discussing his medical
care in front of his cell, Lee “violated the
‘HIPPA' policy act.” Id. The
plaintiff alleges that Wehrle also is ...