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Young v. Lee

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin

October 29, 2019

MARLON T. YOUNG, Plaintiff,
v.
KAREN R. LEE, et al., Defendants.

          SCREENING ORDER

          LYNN ADELMAN United States District Judge

         Plaintiff Marlon T. Young, an inmate confined at the Dodge Correctional Institution, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights. This order resolves plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and screens his complaint.

         I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE

         The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id.

         On October 3, 2019, I ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $36.74. Docket No. 8. Plaintiff paid that fee on October 17, 2019. I will grant the plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. Because the plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee, I will deny as moot his motion to use his release account to pay the filing fee. Docket No. 7.

         II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

         A. Federal Screening Standard

         Under the PLRA, I must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). I must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious, ” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

         In determining whether the complaint states a claim, I apply the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

         To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan- Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). I construe pro se complaints liberally and hold them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).

         B. Plaintiff's Allegations

         The plaintiff sues Nurse Practitioner Sandy McArdle, Registered Nurses Karen R. Lee and Erin M. Wehrle, and Warden Gary Boughton. The defendants are alleged to have been employees of the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility in Boscobel, Wisconsin, at the time of the events. Docket No. 1 at 2-5.

         The plaintiff alleges that on March 22, 2019, McArdle refused to see him for an “emergency issue.” Id. at 2. He alleges that he was experiencing “excruciating pain” in his right leg, but McArdle “kept changing the appointment days and time for me to be seen by her.” Id. The plaintiff also asked for a cane, wheelchair, or walker to get around but “was told” by unspecified prison officials that McArdle would not provide him a walking aid until she saw him for his pain. Id. The plaintiff alleges that McArdle agreed to see him “next week” about his pain but does not say whether McArdle ever examined him or provided medical treatment. Id. The plaintiff alleges that he continues to experience pain and difficulty moving around. Id.

         The plaintiff alleges that Lee improperly spoke with him about his medical condition outside of his cell door instead of in private in a room or at the Health Services Unit. Id. at 3. He asserts that by discussing his medical care in front of his cell, Lee “violated the ‘HIPPA' policy act.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that Wehrle also is ...


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