United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
KEVIN MICHAEL BOON-BEY, A.S.B., a minor child, K.M.B., a minor child, K.M.B., JR., a minor child, P.I.H., a minor child, and S.M.B., a minor child, Plaintiffs,
AUDREY SKWIERAWSKI and RYAN SANSON, Defendants.
Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff, Kevin Michael Boon-Bey (“Boon-Bey”),
along with five of his minor children, filed a complaint
against Defendants Audrey Skwierawski (“Judge
Skwierawski”), a Milwaukee County Circuit Court judge,
and Ryan Sanson (“Sanson”), a Milwaukee County
prosecutor, alleging there are jurisdictional defects in a
state juvenile court proceeding involving the minor children.
Judge Skwierawski is the presiding judge in that case and
Sanson is the prosecutor.
the Plaintiffs allege that (1) Judge Skwierawski acted beyond
her authority when she ordered that Boon-Bey undergo a
competency evaluation in that case, and (2) the state court
does not have jurisdiction over the juvenile court proceeding
because Boon-Bey is a tribal member of the Choctaw Musgokee
Yamassee Nation, and his children are tentative members,
meaning that the case must be transferred to a tribal court
under the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).
(Docket #1 at 9-13); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1901
et seq. They ask that this Court stop the
prosecution of the juvenile proceeding in Milwaukee County
and transfer it to the Choctaw Musgokee Yamassee Nation
Tribal Court. (Docket #1 at 13). In addition, they seek an
injunction against the Defendants from ever
“prosecuting or attempting to prosecute the Plaintiffs,
” the return of “all property of the Plaintiffs,
” and a “payment yet to be determined by federal
statute to the Plaintiffs.” Id.
October 15, 2019, the Defendants filed a motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c) for judgment on the
pleadings on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity,
judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, qualified
immunity, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. (Docket #14). Citing to a transcript of the
juvenile court proceeding that Plaintiffs attached to their
complaint, Defendants explain that Boon-Bey raised the issue
of his alleged tribal membership in the state court and Judge
Skwierawski found that the ICWA did not apply. See
(Docket #1-3 at 24). They also explain that the
“Choctaw Muskogee Yamassee Nation” is not an
Indian tribe recognized by the United States Bureau of Indian
Affairs, and there is no Choctaw Musgokee Yamassee Nation
Tribal Court located in Lancaster, California, as the
October 25, 2019, the Plaintiffs responded to the
Defendants' motion by filing a mostly incoherent document
titled “Objection.” (Docket #16). In it, the
Plaintiffs insist that their tribe is real, stating that the
Principal Chief of the West Coast Choctaw Musgokee Yamassee
Nation, Rawsheed Stone Coyote Patton, affirms “We are a
people of treaty.” (Docket #16 at 2). This statement is
footnoted by reference to several treaties and other legal
documents, none of which relate to a Choctaw Musgokee
Plaintiffs' complaint, and the arguments they make in
opposition to the Defendants' motion, are frivolous. The
myriad problems with the complaint are not limited to the
deficiencies the Defendants have identified. For example, as
a threshold matter, the Plaintiffs have not invoked the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal court; they
present no cognizable federal claim, and the parties are not
this Court has no authority to dismiss, review, or otherwise
interfere with the state court case. See In re
Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing
that as a general matter, federal courts lack authority to
“control or interfere with state court
litigation”); Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768,
771-72 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Lower federal courts do not
have jurisdiction to conduct direct review of state court
decisions.”). The complaint asks this Court to directly
interfere with the Milwaukee County Circuit Court proceeding
by overturning the judge's decisions to order a
competency evaluation and to decline to transfer the case to
tribal court. This Court lacks jurisdiction to do what the
even if the Court did have subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear this case, the minor children would have to be
dismissed; their father, proceeding pro se, cannot
bring claims on their behalf. See Elustra v. Mineo,
595 F.3d 699, 705 (7th Cir. 2010) (a parent may not sue on
his child's behalf without counsel).
the arguments made in the Defendants' motion for judgment
on the pleadings, nothing in the Plaintiffs'
“objection” gives the Court a reason to disagree
with the Defendants. The Plaintiffs failed altogether to
respond to the Defendants' arguments regarding immunity;
that alone is sufficient to warrant dismissal of any claim
for damages. See Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d
715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (a plaintiff forfeits his claim when
he effectively abandons the litigation by not responding to
alleged deficiencies in a motion to dismiss). The
Plaintiffs' only response to the Defendants' argument
regarding failure to state a claim is a laundry-list citation
to (irrelevant) treaties and statutes purporting to establish
the existence of the Choctaw Musgokee Yamassee Nation. The
Plaintiffs have not established their membership in a
recognized Indian tribe, and even if they had, they do not
tie that fact to any cognizable claim.
because allowing the Plaintiffs to amend their complaint-
something for which they did not ask-would be futile, the
Court will dismiss this case in its entirety.
IT IS ORDERED that the Defendants'
motion for judgment on the pleadings (Docket #14) be and the
same is hereby GRANTED; and IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED that this action be and the same is
hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.