United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
RONALD A. DOBEK a.k.a. ALEXANDER M. ROVEGNO, Petitioner,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DKT. NO.
PAMELA PEPPER Chief United States District Judge.
September 18, 2018, the court denied the petitioner's
motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence. Dkt. No. 32.
A month later, on October 15, 2018, the petitioner filed a
motion to reconsider, alter or amend the judgment. Dkt. No.
34. The court will deny the motion.
petitioner's September 2016 motion to vacate, set aside
or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255 challenged his
2014 conviction on three counts related to exporting F-16
canopy seals to Venezuela. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 8 at 1. The
court screened the petition and allowed the petitioner to
proceed on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel. Dkt. No. 8 at 2. Post-screening, the petitioner
filed various documents, including several requests for the
court to expedite the disposition of the case. See
Dkt. Nos. 16, 17, 19. He also notified the court that he had
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Dkt. No. 20.
Order Dismissing §2255 Motion (Dkt. No. 32)
court's order dismissing the petition was forty-eight
pages long. Dkt. No. 32. It discussed the facts behind the
petitioner's claims-the grand jury indicted him in
December 2012, id. at 2; the case was scheduled for
trial on October 21, 2013, id. at 3; the government
asked for an adjournment at the eleventh hour, citing the
impact of the government shut-down, id.; the court
granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice,
id. at 3-4. Just over a month later, on November 26,
2013, the grand jury returned a new indictment (based on the
same facts), id. at 6; the defendant moved to
dismiss the second indictment on statute-of-limitations
grounds, id. at 7; the magistrate judge recommended
that the district court deny the motion, id. at 7-9;
the district court adopted that recommendation and denied the
motion to dismiss the indictment, id. at 9; the
petitioner was convicted after a jury trial, id.;
and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, id.
dismissal order then noted that the petitioner had buried his
four arguments for relief at page fifty-one of his 116-page
motion to vacate. Id. at 11. It reviewed each
It appears that the petitioner is saying that his appellate
lawyer should have invoked the collateral estoppel doctrine
to argue that Judge Stadtmueller's order dismissing
12-cr-253 constituted a final decision on the merits, and
that the statute of limitations barred the government from
re-charging him with the December 29, 2007 conduct. This
argument, the petitioner believes, would have convinced the
Seventh Circuit to invalidate his conviction in 13-cr-231.
And because the lawyer who represented him on appeal also
represented him in both 12-cr-253 and 13-cr-231, the
petitioner thinks that this issue should have been obvious to
his lawyer. Dkt. No. 1 at 65-66. Finally, he argues that this
“collateral estoppel” argument was stronger than
any of the three claims his lawyer raised on appeal.
Id. at 66-74.
Dkt. No. 32 at 18. The court's order reviewed each of the
four components of collateral estoppel, considering whether
the order was a (1) ruling that (2) finally resolved an (3)
ultimate issue after (4) the party had a full and fair
opportunity to present it to the judge. Id. at 18-19
(citing Loera v. United States, 714 F.3d
1025, 1028-29 (7th Cir. 2013)). The court explained why Judge
Stadtmueller's order dismissing the case without
prejudice did not meet any of those four requirements.
Id. at 20-28.
Broadening and Amending
court summarized the petitioner's “broadening and
amending” claim this way:
The petitioner argues that his appellate counsel should have
argued that the 2013 indictment impermissibly
“materially broadened and amended” the charges in
the 2012 indictment, rendering the application of 18 U.S.C.
§3288 (the statute that extended the statute of
limitations) inapplicable. Id., Dkt. No. 2 at 67
(citing United States v. Italiano, 894 F.2d 1280,
1283 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Grady, 544
F.2d 598, 602 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Friedman, 649 F.2d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 1981)). The
petitioner again argues that this issue should have been