United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin
ORDER ON MOTION TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE
FILING FEE AND SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
JOSEPH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
October 28, 2019, Danien Jonas Walls filed a complaint
against the State of Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(ECF No. 1). He was not incarcerated at the time he filed his
complaint. Walls also moves for leave to proceed without
prepayment of the filing fee (in forma pauperis).
(ECF No. 2). Not all parties have had the opportunity to
fully consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 636(c). Nonetheless, I have jurisdiction to
screen the complaint under the Wisconsin Department of
Justice's limited consent to the exercise of magistrate
judge jurisdiction as set forth in the Memorandum of
Understanding between the Wisconsin Department of Justice and
this court. Because I find Walls is indigent, I will grant
his motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee.
However, because Walls fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, I will dismiss his complaint.
federal in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1915, is designed to ensure indigent litigants meaningful
access to the federal courts while at the same time prevent
indigent litigants from filing frivolous, malicious, or
repetitive lawsuits. Nietzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 324 (1989). To authorize a litigant to proceed in
forma pauperis, the court must first determine whether
the litigant is able to pay the costs of commencing the
action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Second, the court must
determine whether the action is frivolous or malicious, fails
to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
standards for reviewing dismissal for failure to state a
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the same
as those for reviewing a dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See DeWalt v. Carter, 224
F.3d 607, 611-12 (7th Cir. 2000). In evaluating whether a
plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim, a court
must take the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and
draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. Id. at
612. Although a complaint need not contain
“‘detailed factual allegations, '” a
complaint that offers “‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.'”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007)).
to Walls' motion, he is unemployed and has no income or
assets. (ECF No. 2 at 1-5). As such, I conclude that he is
unable to pay the filing fee and turn to the question of
whether his complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim. To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that he was
deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of
the United States and (2) that the person who deprived him of
that right acted under color of state law. Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Because Walls is
representing himself, I construe his complaint liberally.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
alleges that Wisconsin State Court Judge David Feiss granted
him a bail reduction and allowed him to be released with a
GPS tracker upon paying bail. Walls states he posted bail on
September 8, 2019. He was then informed that he would not be
released because a GPS tracker was not available.
Specifically, he was informed that he was on a waiting list
to be released and that he was number 12 on the list. He
states that he has waited several weeks to be released with
the GPS tracker. He alleges that this violates his
constitutional rights because it is cruel and unusual
punishment and unjust imprisonment. He demands monetary
damages of $5, 000.00 per day for each day he was held in
custody after posting bail. He also demands that the court
order “the abolishment of this unjust and mentally
damaging Act/practice.” (ECF No. 1 at 5).
only defendant Walls names is the State of Wisconsin. The
Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states by its own
citizens, including suits for monetary damages under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. McGee v. Oshkosh Defense, LLC,
No. 18-cv-705, 2019 WL 4758216 at *6 (W.D. Wis. Sept. 30,
2019) (quoting Will v. Michigan Dept. of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 66 (1989)). Walls also requests
injunctive relief, but the Eleventh Amendment permits suits
for injunctive relief only against state officials
in their individual capacity, not the state itself.
Id. (quoting Kroll v. Bd. of Trustees of the
Univ. of Ill., 934 F.2d 904, 907 (7th Cir.
1991))(emphasis added). Walls fails to name any state
officials. As such, he fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, and I will dismiss his case.
IT IS ORDERED that Walls' motion for leave to
proceed without prepaying the filing fee (ECF No. 2) is
IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is
DISMISSED because the complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
order and the judgment to follow are final. A dissatisfied
party may appeal this court's decision to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit by filing in this court a
notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry of judgment.
See Fed. R. of App. P. 3, 4. This court may extend
this deadline if a party timely requests an extension and
shows good cause or excusable neglect for not being able to
meet the thirty-day deadline. See Fed. R. App. P.
limited circumstances, a party may ask this court to alter or
amend its judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) or ask for relief from judgment under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b). Any motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) must be filed within twenty-eight days of the
entry of judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline.
See Fed. R. Civ P. 6(b)(2). Any motion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) must be filed within a
reasonable time, generally no more than one year after the
entry of the judgment. The court cannot extend this deadline.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
is expected to closely review all applicable rules and
determine, what, if any, further ...